Identity Cards Bill

moved Amendment No. 221:"Page 21, line 26, after ““it;”” insert—" ““(   )   the arrangements for ensuring the accuracy and integrity of the information about individuals held on the Register;”” The noble Baroness said: My noble friend Lord Northesk has asked me to move his Amendment No. 221. In moving that amendment I shall speak to the other amendments in this very large group. I agreed to such an aggressive grouping in order to be able to have a wide debate on the powers of the commissioner. However, especially after what the Chief Whip has just told us, I am conscious of the significant amount of business ahead of this Chamber. Members involved in this Committee stage went on until half past midnight last week—I have no intention of forcing other noble Lords to be in the same position today. This group of amendments directs our attention to the vital importance of independent oversight of the ID cards scheme. It is important to examine the role and powers of the national identity scheme commissioner and to examine his role in the preparation of his reports on carrying out his functions. We do not accept that the creation of the register as set out in the Bill has so far been justified by the Government, but we are pleased that a national identity scheme commissioner will be appointed under Clause 24. In the draft Bill, the commissioner was restricted to a single power, reviewing the use of powers of disclosure without consent. That role was broadened slightly when the earlier Bill was published, and it has been extended again in the new Bill—but it is still far short of an independent, robust review of the scheme’s operation that we should like to see. The commissioner is powerless in relation to the areas that he has to review and has no power to change anything that he finds unsatisfactory. Amendment No. 221 adds a requirement to keep under review the accuracy and integrity of the information held on the register to the functions of the national identity scheme commissioner. As our debates in Committee have already indicated, these are especially important aspects of the scheme, and I hope the Government will feel sympathetic to this uncontroversial proposal. I tabled Amendment No. 223 in response to the recommendation of the Select Committee on the Constitution in paragraph 7 of its third report that the powers of the commissioner should be extended to include such matters as the investigation of complaints from individuals about the way the Secretary of State, or other authority responsible for maintaining the register, has handled their affairs. The Bill simply provides for the commissioner to supervise and oversee the operation of the scheme, to hold office in accordance with the terms of his appointment, and to make an annual report to the Secretary of State. I appreciate the fact that Clause 25 of the current Bill strengthens the duty of the Secretary of State in two respects with regard to reporting to Parliament; however, we believe that further improvements need to be made. Amendment No. 223 covers the first of those improvements: the ability of the commissioner to investigate complaints and data corrections from individuals whose details are on the register. Clause 24(3) sets out matters that will not be part of the commissioner’s functions. Why are those exceptions not included within the commissioner’s remit? Amendment No. 224 would permit the commissioner to take a general oversight of policy matters, but would expressly exclude from that thematic oversight the matters set out in its proposed paragraphs (a) to (e) inclusive. I have given the Government a reasonable choice here: if they say they cannot move as far as accepting my proposal in Amendment No. 223, I hope they would welcome that in No. 224. It is the appropriate function for the commissioner. It does not detract from the powers the Secretary of State wishes to give himself in relation to his official functions. Amendment No. 225 removes paragraphs (a) to (c) from Clause 24(3). It has a similar objective to part of Amendment No. 224, which is to challenge the limitations that the Government have imposed on the commissioner’s functions. Amendment No. 226 would add the chief executive of the Serious Organised Crime Agency to paragraph (d), in addition to the Director-General of the Security Service, the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service and the Director of the Government Communications Headquarters. Surely the Government should employ all the heads of the relevant police and security services in the detection and prevention of serious crime. Why has this particular office been excluded from paragraph (d)? Amendment No. 227 provides for what we believe to be a sensible liaison between the commissioner for the national identity scheme and the Information Commissioner. The effect of the amendment is that before the national identity scheme commissioner undertook a review that included the policy towards the provision of information to the various security directors-general, he could liaise with the Information Commissioner with a view to transferring responsibility for that review to the relevant person—that is, the Information Commissioner—or liaise with him or her with regard to the processing of personal data. The amendment returns to the objective of ensuring sensible thematic oversight. It does not seek to interfere with the courts, nor with the discretion of the Secretary of State. It seeks to provide sensible and independent oversight of a growing area of interference in the life of the individual. Under Clause 25 the commissioner must make reports to the Secretary of State, who must lay a copy of that report before Parliament. However, the Secretary of State may edit or delete information for a wide variety of reasons. He can remove information if it appears to him that publication would be prejudicial to national security, the prevention or detection of crime, or the continued discharge of the functions of any public authority. The fact that the Home Office and the UK Passport Service are public authorities means that any critical material in the commissioner’s report may be excluded as it would undermine them, thus undermining the very purpose of the commissioner. The Secretary of State may also exclude any information that appears to him to be contrary to the public interest. We believe that it is important that the commissioner’s role should be broader, and his powers stronger. In particular, he should report to Parliament directly, as the Information Commissioner already does. It is impossible to carry out a truly independent review if reports to Parliament are filtered by the Secretary of State. Ideally the commissioner’s role should extend to overseeing the operation of the registration and identification scheme as a whole. If it is envisaged that the Secretary of State will make repeated extensions to his powers through the passing of regulations, it is surely important that the commissioner is able to report on the use of such powers. That will allow parliamentarians to assess whether further extensions are justified. My remaining amendments in this group cover two broad issues. Amendments Nos. 231 to 236 look at the balance of power between the Executive and Parliament. The Select Committee on the Constitution recommended at paragraph seven of its third report that the commissioner should be able to report directly to Parliament, and we agree. Despite the fact that the commissioner is appointed by the Secretary of State, he is carrying out a public function for which he should account directly to Parliament. The Government’s view is that the commissioner is there to provide the Secretary of State with reassurance that the ID cards scheme is operating correctly. But that fails to take account of the need for the public at large to be assured that the register is being maintained in accordance with the law and the wishes of Parliament, not merely that the scheme accords with what the government of the day want. The proposals in the Bill mark a whole new departure in the relationship between the state and the individual, and Parliament has a vital role to play in a system of accountability for the oversight of the scheme. Amendments Nos. 231 to 236 broaden the commissioner’s power by ensuring that reporting takes place directly to Parliament. Amendment No. 232 ensures that the commissioner reports to Parliament as well as to the Secretary of State. Amendment No. 234 goes much further. It includes a general extension that will allow the commissioner to report on any matter he or she feels is appropriate. The information sharing powers in the Bill in particular are potentially without limit. The person charged with independent scrutiny should be given the appropriate remit. Amendment No. 234 removes the power of the Secretary of State to censor the report. Amendment No. 235 is merely consequential on Amendment No. 232. Finally, in this canter through, Amendments Nos. 237 to 242 refer to the power to edit the report. They all have the effect of asking how the report of the commissioner can be meaningful to the public if parts of it are censored by the Secretary of State. If we are not told whether any censorship has taken place, how can we truly judge the value of that report? The amendments ask the Government to justify the provisions of Clause 25(4). Amendment No. 241 is simply consequential on Amendment No. 237. I beg to move.