Identity Cards Bill

It may be convenient to the Committee if I speak to my two amendments in this group. My purpose here is to delete paragraph (b) of Clause 8(3) via Amendment No. 143 and substitute it with the text of Amendment No. 142. At first blush, this might strike one as an idiotic thing to do. After all, it is to be supposed that a principal motivation in having encrypted data on the actual ID card is to provide appropriate protections against the possibility of it being forged or used fraudulently. But there is another side to the coin. Given current drafting, the individual has no means of satisfying himself that the information about himself on the ID card is accurate and proportionate. Indeed, in many ways there seems to be a similar lacuna in respect of information in the register. To that extent, encrypted data on the card could create a degree of ambivalence about whether it would be Data Protection Act compliant. Moreover, if the scheme is to be ““convenient””—I make no apologies for returning to this theme—and trusted by the public, transparency and accountability need to be built into every aspect of the scheme. It is therefore wholly reasonable to suppose that the individual should be empowered to know what information about him appears on the card. Logically, if encrypted data are used, the individual has no ready means of accessing or reading the material to satisfy himself of its veracity. In effect, the card would lack appropriate levels of transparency and accountability. With that in mind, there is a legitimate argument that encrypted data should not be permitted. Against that background, I hope the Minister can offer me some comfort on the point.