Identity Cards Bill

I am immensely grateful for the many helpful contributions to this part of the evening’s entertainment. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her response. Her assumption that I was rushing towards criminal convictions is wholly misconceived. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lyell, made the point that you can have a burden of proof in civil proceedings that more nearly equates to that applicable in criminal proceedings, and that is precisely what I am looking for. I am not looking to criminalise or anything of that kind, and I take the Government’s point in that regard. We can all think about this matter before Report, but at the moment there is some distance between the Government and those who have spoken in favour of this group of amendments. This is somewhat reminiscent of our earlier discussion about whether the requirement of the Secretary of State to attend an interview should be subject to a reasonableness test. It is rather on those lines, and I feel that it is not good enough to leave the matter as it is. It is all very well to say that the code of practice gives the Secretary of State discretion to do this or that and to consider this or that but, at root, there needs to be something in the Bill that makes it clear that intent is relevant to culpability. Indeed, in the noble Baroness’s own justification for the Government’s position she used the word ““intentional”” a number of times. That is natural because without intentionality there is no intention—to use the word again—to impose penalties. So why not put it in the Bill? I shall go on no further at ten to eleven but will join the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lyell, and others—and, I hope, the Government—in reviewing this matter because I do not think that it is satisfactory as left. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. [Amendment No. 122 not moved.] [Amendment No. 123 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]