UK Parliament / Open data

Identity Cards Bill

I am not sure that I shall be able to answer all the noble Lord’s questions, but I hope that I can respond fully to the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay. I quite understand her concern about the moving of the amendments in another place. I shall try to fill in some of the gaps left by Mr McNulty; it is unfortunate that longer responses were not given. These amendments relate to the inclusion in Schedule 1 of the numbers of various documents and counter-signatory details. The noble Baroness has explained the amendments. Amendment No. 92 would require the national identity registration number to be the same as the number on the ID card. Consequently, Amendment No. 93 would remove the ability to hold a separate ID card number on the register. The national identity registration number is the number allocated to the person for the lifetime of the scheme. The ID card number is the issue number for that specific card and is likely to change for every card issued. One could compare that to the issue number on a cheque card. It would operate in a similar way. As with banks, that is needed to help with the tracking of card delivery and revocation of cards. It makes sense that there should be two separate numbers, which should both be held on an individual’s entry on the register. Amendment No. 94 would prevent the Secretary of State holding the number of any document that can be used instead of a passport. This is not a spurious addition—there are certain documents which allow stateless people to travel, but which are not, strictly speaking, either a passport or an identity card. We would want to be able to record the reference numbers of those documents in the same way as we can capture the number of passports and ID cards issued by authorities outside the United Kingdom. Of course, that would assist us in tracking the movement of individuals for immigration purposes. Amendments Nos. 94A and 95A are consequential amendments precluding UK driving licence numbers being held on the national identity register. The driver number from a driving licence is to be specifically held for a number of reasons. Should driving licences ever become designated documents, it is only right that we can hold driver numbers on the register. When individuals apply for registration on to the identity cards scheme it would form a useful part of the biographical footprint check if the entry on the register could be cross-referenced with the DVLA database. Finally, holding the driver number in Schedule 1 would allow the police or, for example, car hire companies to cross check whether an individual holds a valid driving licence if that individual has proffered their ID card and consented to a verification check as proof of their identity. Amendment No. 95 removes the ability to hold the number of any other designated document which does not fall elsewhere in the paragraph. Documents already considered for designation have their numbers in the list in paragraph 4 of Schedule 1; for example, a passport or residence permit. It is possible that in the future we will want to designate a document that is not covered in this list. In that case, it is important to be able to hold the number of any such document on the national identity register. Amendment No. 96 would preclude the register from holding details of counter-signatories. As part of our work to counter potentially fraudulent applications, it will be important to be able to check back and consider all the circumstances surrounding the original application. This would include the counter-signatory to ascertain whether they were complicit in the false application. This is nothing new. Counter-signatories for passport applications already have their information held. We believe that retention of the counter-signatory’s details will assist with an effective enrolment process. When first-time adult applicants are interviewed, their knowledge, or lack thereof, of the person who has countersigned their application may indicate whether or not the application is genuine. Additionally, retention of these counter-signatory details will enable the agency to build up a log of devious or suspect counter-signatories that might require further investigation. I am sure noble Lords would agree that any measure which throws light on possible incidences of fraud is one well worth having. Finally, I should say that the validation information under paragraph 7 of the register cannot be provided to organisations which request a verification check on the register with the consent of the person concerned under Clause 14. It is excluded by Clause 14(2). We think it is important to retain details of counter-signatories in order to maintain the integrity of the register and as a further check against fraud, much as is the case with passport applications.

About this proceeding contribution

Reference

676 c992-4 

Session

2005-06

Chamber / Committee

House of Lords chamber
Back to top