I entirely agree, by the way, that the date of death should be held. It is only logical and sensible that it should be. Yet the noble Lord’s argument for why it was useful was interesting. It would be useful for people implementing the cards to take a look at it. The argument is that it prevents fraudulent use of the card, when actually the card is linked biometrically. If the biometrics are totally secure, then no one else can use the card. It will be shown up the moment that they give their biometrics. In cases where it is not used via the biometric link, it is used with a PIN number. If that is being held to be secure enough for some other purposes, it is secure enough also for the fact that the chap is dead. If it is not secure enough for proving whether a person is dead, neither is it for some other purposes postulated elsewhere in the Bill. Logically, that is an inconsistency.
If it is to end up as a ““flash and go”” card, without PIN verification or anything like it, the fact that date of death is registered somewhere is irrelevant. You cannot get at that date until either the PIN number or the biometric is verified against the use of that card. So it suggests there is a loophole in the entire security provision around the card.
Identity Cards Bill
Proceeding contribution from
Earl of Erroll
(Crossbench)
in the House of Lords on Wednesday, 23 November 2005.
It occurred during Committee of the Whole House (HL)
and
Debate on bills on Identity Cards Bill.
About this proceeding contribution
Reference
675 c1649 Session
2005-06Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamberSubjects
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