Identity Cards Bill

I assure the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, that there is never a reason for him to seek to ingratiate himself with the Government. His stock, as all noble Lords know, is already incredibly high. The noble Lord’s amendment touches on the drafting of Clause 1(6), which I understand is to enable us to have an opportunity to clarify the situation. Clause 1 was really designed to prevent any number being added to the national identity register—such as a police national computer reference number—which would tend to reveal sensitive personal data. The noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, is right to say that we did that in an attempt to respond to concerns helpfully. We touched on the issue of sensitive personal data in the last group of amendments on our second day in Committee on 16 November. That was the group led by Amendment No. 36, tabled in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay. I have undertaken to write to the noble Baroness before Report to deal with some of the points that she raised, and I will do so. However, in replying to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, it may help if I set out some of that background now, so that your Lordships can better understand these issues. The ““registrable facts”” set out in Clause 1(5) may look like a long list, but they are all relevant in helping to identify an individual, and will allow cross-referencing with other departments’ databases during the application process. Holding the numbers on the register, as listed in paragraph (4) of Schedule 1, will also make it easier to derive joined-up government benefits from the identity card scheme. If I may give an example, it might be useful, in relation to a benefit or pension application, for the Department of Work and Pensions to be able to check someone’s national insurance number against their identity card. The Bill was amended on Report in another place by a government amendment to respond to a point made and taken up in Committee. There had been a number of questions raised about the need to ensure that information about criminal records would not be held on the national identity register. The Government have always made it clear that they do not intend to hold medical or criminal records on that register, and the Bill achieves this by linking the statutory purposes of the scheme at Clause 1(3) to the registrable facts as defined at Clause 1(5). These registrable facts do not cover criminal or medical records, other than any voluntary information recorded at the request of the cardholder as allowed for at Clause 1(5)(i) which might, for example, include organ donor status, or matters of that sort. So ““registrable facts”” can be amended only—and I emphasise ““only””—by further primary legislation. Therefore, the Bill provides a major safeguard against claims that the scope of the national identity register might be expanded in the future without proper parliamentary scrutiny. Thus it would not be possible to add criminal or medical records to the ““registrable facts”” at Clause 1(5) by secondary legislation. Nor would it be possible to add criminal or medical records to the list of items in Schedule 1 by secondary legislation, because Clause 3(6) requires that anything added to Schedule 1 is consistent with the statutory purposes and those, as I have just said, link back directly to the ““registrable facts””. However, a potential concern was raised in the other place that the Bill did not provide adequate reassurance that information relating to numbers would not be held that could lead to conclusions being drawn about a person’s criminal record. Clause 1(5)(g) covers,"““information about numbers allocated to him for identification purposes and about the documents to which they relate””," and the concern was that this might conceivably be used in the future to add the police national computer—the PNC—reference number to an individual’s national identity register record. While that would not provide evidence of an individual’s criminal record, it would clearly suggest that he or she had one. It was to avoid that scenario that the Government amended the Bill so that it would be impossible to add to the register a number that might tend to reveal information relating to a person’s criminal record, or indeed any other ““sensitive personal data”” within the terms of the Data Protection Act 1998. ““Sensitive personal data””, as noble Lords know, is not limited to criminal records but is defined in the Data Protection Act and covers a number of other issues, including the racial or ethnic origin of the data subject, his political opinions, his religious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar nature, as well as his physical or mental health or condition. There could not be a complete exclusion of ““sensitive personal data””, or anything tending to reveal such data, as some information that could be apparent from, say, a photograph, might easily reveal ““sensitive personal data”” such as racial or ethnic origin. An identity card with a photograph of a man or woman wearing a clerical collar would, for example, tend to indicate their religious belief, although perhaps not their denomination. Criminal or medical records or political opinions do not come within the ambit of the ““registrable facts”” listed in Clause 1(5) and so could not be added to the list of items that may be held on the national identity register and are listed at Schedule 1 to the Bill. However, the Government wanted in addition to put beyond doubt that it would also not be possible to add to the register in the future any reference number which of itself was simply a number, but where its existence could tend to reveal an item of ““sensitive personal data””. Amendment No. 38A would risk narrowing the safeguard that was introduced in another place by removing the words,"““or anything the disclosure of which would tend to reveal such data””." I know that is not the noble Lord’s intent, but it has given me an opportunity to give what I hope is a comprehensive explanation about why we think the safeguard is necessary. It works and it seemed to us to be capable of reassuring people who had genuine concerns that inappropriate information would be listed. If we are to achieve our objective of providing a clear reassurance that no numbers could be held that either would reveal or would tend to reveal any ““sensitive personal data””, those words should stay in the Bill. I hope that with that explanation the noble Lord will be content. I have the pleasure of thanking him for allowing me the opportunity to explain all of that.