Identity Cards Bill

My Lords, we have had an interesting debate on this very controversial Bill. My own analysis so far indicates that almost 17 Members are in favour of the legislation and almost as many are against. I assume that the noble Baroness, Lady Seccombe, will follow her party line. An interesting factor is that some supporters of the Bill have reservations about a number of its aspects. I appreciated and enjoyed the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Soley. Let us hope that we have the opportunity in Committee to tease out the issues identified by noble Lords. The Bill was introduced in February 2005. But despite its receiving a Second Reading at that time, we were not prepared to give consent for it to proceed beyond that stage. There have been minor changes to that enabling measure since then but our objections remain and our position has not changed. My noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury is right: we oppose the Bill. I offer three main reasons for our opposition. One reason cited by noble Lords on this side of the House, and one of the most important ones, is that the Bill affects the fundamental relationship between the individual and the state, so ably demonstrated by the Select Committee on the Constitution, which reported last week. The constitutional significance of the changes has been well spelt out. I commend my noble friend Lord Holme of Cheltenham on his contribution. I do not dispute that the Bill’s provisions were included in the Labour Party manifesto. I have no problem with that—in case at some stage the Government think it appropriate to use the Parliament Act. But your Lordships’ House, when we talk about constitutional matters, should look very carefully at noble and learned Lords’ comments on matters of constitutional importance in the Hunting Act. They ought to be taken very seriously. I have the judgment with me, but I do not intend to refer to it at this stage. The second reason for our opposition is that the Bill impinges on rights and liberties that we have enjoyed since the days of Magna Carta. Again, I commend the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, on that. The third and most important reason relates to the Bill’s purpose. In key areas of national security, identity cards cannot protect us from terrorists or acts of terrorism, and we do not believe that they will help us to tackle benefit fraud or substantial health fraud. In addition, ID cards have serious cost implications, of which so many noble Lords cited examples. In essence, it is a flawed system and will seriously harm community relations, particularly through its effect on certain groups in society, so often identified by many noble Lords in the context of stop-and-search (SAS) laws and related issues. The Select Committee on the Constitution has produced an important report. I hope that reports of this nature will be debated in your Lordships’ House. What is important about it is that the membership of the Constitution Committee comprises some of the most distinguished Members of your Lordships’ House. The conclusions they have reached ought to be taken very seriously. The committee gave the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, an opportunity to put the Government’s case. But there remains a serious concern that the scheme envisaged will record in a single database,"““more information about the lives and characteristics of the entire adult population than has ever been considered necessary or attempted previously in the United Kingdom””," and in response to those who advocate the case in the rest of Europe, let me add these words from the report,"““or indeed in any other western country””." Why do we need so much information? That is not the case in many of the western countries cited by noble Lords opposite. Let me start with some of the possible assumptions the Government have made in their consultation document, Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud. We are told that a card scheme could be a powerful weapon in combating illegal immigration. If that is the case, why do we not sort out the chaotic immigration procedure that lets in illegal entrants? We are to have biometric passports whether we like it or not; they will be introduced. But we have a choice which identity cards do not offer, and compulsion must be next in line. If we had proper, managed migration, a proper system of admission of those economic migrants whose services we require and a proper method of dealing with those who are genuinely being persecuted and are seeking refuge here, identity cards then become less relevant. Identity cards cannot be forced upon people who enter this country. They will not have a card when they come here to seek refuge. The cards are designed for those lawfully settled in this country. How identity cards will stop illegal entrants baffles the imagination. We have said that we would support a system of immigration based on the United Kingdom’s needs. We will support a system which is designed to help refugees and to deal effectively with those who enter the country unlawfully. Identity cards will do no such thing. To set up this aspect of policy as an end to all illegal immigration is just not true. It is not possible. It may placate the tabloid newspapers, but its impact would be negligible. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, has been a good friend. He had my full support when he was the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. But by their own admission the Government have confirmed that the Bill is unlikely to make any difference to the general powers of the police to stop people for no reason or to demand proof of identity. So all the hoo-hah that someone can simply produce an identity card when they are stopped by the police is just a nonsense. There is no obligation on anyone to do that. The only justification the police have is to obtain quicker and more reliable access to confirmed identification so that the time spent in police custody is reduced. But I am afraid that that also makes no sense. I have served as a magistrate, I have worked in prisons and I worked for the Commission for Racial Equality. Large numbers of suspects provide adequate information when questioned, and at present many stops and searches do not lead to a process of arrest. Identity cards are only marginal so far as policing matters are concerned. The police do not like fishing expeditions. Intelligence-based policing is more likely to be effective than identity cards. Quite simply, the Bill before us specifically prohibits any regulations whose effect would be to require an individual to carry an identity card with him at all times. But of course that position may change at some stage. If this is the case, it would be of little help to the police service. We know that the Bill has had a very difficult birth. Let us cast our minds back and consider the headlines in the old days when David Blunkett was the Home Secretary and he faced serious opposition from some of his own colleagues in the Cabinet. But every time the argument has been knocked down by the Opposition, the Government has come up with a new one. Even magicians will confirm that there is a limit to how many rabbits you can produce from one hat. The Government must now be, I suspect, scraping the bottom of the barrel as far as this legislation is concerned. According to the Government, you do not have to carry the card. If that is the case, how will it be effective against terrorism? Even if it is made compulsory, will it stop terrorism? The Government should speak to the police in Madrid—we did—and ask them if identity cards would have made a difference there. They did not believe that having an identity card would have made any difference whatever; it would not have helped to stop the terrorist attack. It is absurd to think that ID cards would have stopped the bombings of our Tube and buses undertaken by the British-born terrorists on 7 July. Of course we acknowledge the serious threat of terrorism. In the majority of cases that have been identified, terrorists did not use false or multiple identities. The problem of passport fraud, identified by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, will be, to an extent, resolved when the international community reaches a decision on the kind of passport required. Past evidence in the United Kingdom, the United States and other countries abroad demonstrates that terrorists are capable of carrying out atrocities without changing their identities. Identity cards are of little relevance to those who are hell bent on destroying themselves. We may know the identity of someone, but that does not tell us what they are about to do. Let us take, for example, the classic case of Richard Reid, the so-called shoe bomber. Even if he had had an identity card, would it have given a clue about what he was about to do? Those who wish to destroy themselves do not care whether or not they have an identity document. This pattern is well established among suicide bombers. The Government’s argument is seriously flawed if they think that this is the way to stop terrorists or their activities. Let me put another point. If this matter is so urgent and the threat from terrorists in this country is so compelling, why will we have to wait eight to 10 years for the system to become compulsory? If we need it for that reason, surely we need it now. This does not make sense at all. I do not dispute that an identity card would provide people who are lawfully resident in the United Kingdom with a means of confirming their identity to a high degree of assurance. The problem is that it will stop neither terrorism nor illegal immigration, the planks on which the identity card argument was based in the first instance. The Government’s other objective is to help people gain entitlement to products and services provided by both public and private sectors, particularly those who might find it difficult to do so at present—we do not dispute that—and there is of course benefit and health fraud, but I fail to see what that has to do with identity. The vast amount of health and benefit fraud that occurs in the United Kingdom would not be stopped by the availability of identity cards. Is it not the case that only 5 per cent of cases involve individuals pretending to be someone they are not? The cost implications of the introduction of ID cards still remain a mystery. How much will it cost? What technology do the Government have in mind? This is a major national investment which requires intense security. It has to be evaluated on the basis of the other cards and other identity documents that many people possess. Who will operate the system, and who will be responsible for the protection of readable data? Is the Data Protection Act enough to protect that information? What guarantees are there that they will not be accessed for other purposes? It can be acceptable when a government are sympathetic, but information stored on identity cards in the hands of a government who are not sympathetic, particularly on immigration and other matters, could be put to some very worrying uses. The Government have not had much luck with computerised services. We have been given examples of where they have worked, but those of us who have worked in the criminal justice system know jolly well that in many cases the services have not delivered what they have set out to do. We will need a lot of convincing that a foolproof system that will not break down is available. Even before these questions have been answered, we see the unique situation in Wales. The National Assembly for Wales, under devolved powers, can take its own decision about ID cards on health provision. It has said that it will not ask for ID cards. Here is an example of the first unilateral declaration of independence from that Labour stronghold. Listening to the noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy, I suspect that that may happen in Scotland as well. There is a serious concern in the regulatory impact assessment about complex procedures and cultural problems. We have seen the impact of stop-and-search powers on our black and minority ethnic communities. The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants has produced research evidence from Europe which suggests that,"““black and ethnic minority British nationals could be disproportionately targeted on the basis of race for identity checks by the police, immigration officials or other public service officials””." Then there is the risk of conflict with the European Convention on Human Rights. All we can do at this stage is accept what the Minister has said about it. The other issue identified by the regulatory impact assessment is that only certain groups will be asked for proof of identity. I suspect that like the anti-terrorist legislation that caused so many problems for the Government, this provision is likely to be considered disproportionate in its use, discriminatory towards foreign nationals and adversarial in its impact on black and ethnic minority people in this country. We want to know the true cost of the system; more importantly, we want to know, when fully operational, what will be the financial contribution of each citizen in the UK, together with the cost of the biometric readable passport that we will be obliged to produce. Then we can argue about what alternatives are available to us in place of ID cards, such as more police, more intelligence officers and more spending on secure borders. There is so much information available on the citizens of this country. Their shopping habits, the products they buy and their financial standing are a by-product of the credit card system. The success of a national identity card depends on a sensitive, cautious and co-operative approach, involving all key stakeholder groups, including an independent and rolling risk of assessment and a regular review of management practices. In essence, we are not convinced that we understand and agree with the scheme. Costs, no matter how the Government define them, will be excessive on society or the individual. We are not convinced that it can work or be effective, and we have no doubt that its impact on society and civil liberty will be extensive. We shall oppose this measure.