Identity Cards Bill

My Lords, I apologise to my noble friend on the Front Bench for not being present during her opening speech because of commitments in another forum. The Government introduced the Bill with the intention of protecting the public. To give that protection, they seek power and the public will expect that it be exercised in trust for those for whose protection it is given. Power based on trust should be the key to our acceptance of the Bill. I am a fervent believer in human rights, our traditional values and our sense of liberty. But I also accept the dynamics of modern society: terrorism that is as technologically adept as the private citizen could ever hope to be; crime that uses the newest methods of information and communication to cause damage to us, the people; and immigration, the proper control of which is, whether we wish it or not, a predominant preoccupation among many. These are the fundamental features of our society and they are dynamic. I simply do not accept that in dealing with them the law as we have always known it should be static. But if power is to be based on trust, that power must be exercised within reasonable limits. The Bill has three components: the principle, the implementation and the cost. On the principle, I accept the wisdom of others. As to the threat to our national security, particularly from terrorism, I adopt the measured approach of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew. On crime I accept the advice of an experienced and eminent policeman, the noble Lord, Lord Stevens; on the importance of immigration I accept the knowledge of my noble friend Lord Gould with his particular experience of gauging public thinking; and on the threat I accept the wisdom of my noble friend Lord Bhattacharyya. We simply have to realise that they are ahead of us. So the Bill in principle surely is acceptable. But it would be wrong, both in supporting it or opposing it, to descend into the apocalyptic. The principle is there to serve the protection of the public. The critical question, if that is a proper principle, is its implementation and the cost of it. Let us turn to the implementation. I have two, I hope, constructive proposals to make about it—one of detail, but important detail, and one more far reaching. The detail is that, to my surprise, under Clause 27(7) somebody who is in possession of apparatus and equipment for the production of passports is punishable only by a sentence of two years’ imprisonment. I realise that there are more serious offences in that clause commanding a sentence of 10 years, but I find a maximum of two years for the carrier of apparatus to be used for the production of false identity cards to be hopelessly inadequate. That is a detail, but I hope that it illustrates that if we are to protect the public, let us protect them with some force where required. The second proposal is a more general consideration about implementation—power based on trust. To give the Secretary of State, as the Bill does, nearly 60 statutory obligations and powers is remarkable in its extent, both numerically and in the scope of what it allows him or her to do. I do not object, provided there is adequate control and oversight. Why should the commissioner be responsible to the Government? Surely the commissioner should be responsible to the public to ensure that this statute is being properly applied with effect in the public interest, and be in a position to deal with any necessary changes or complaints by way of individual report or, in particular, by report to this House. That is no unreasonable restraint on executive power; it merely reflects the obligation on the Government to report to the people through an independent person on the exercise of powers as far ranging as these. Those are genuine concerns. If the provision is power based on trust, then it should be a proper and balanced agreement between those who exercise the power and those who give that power to be exercised. I turn to the cost. Clause 42 is disarmingly brief. It simply gives power to the Secretary of State to spend whatever is required to implement the scheme. I am concerned. This is a massive exercise in administration, in finance and in planning. Government ministries are not the usual receptacles for such arrangements to be efficiently managed. They cause tremendous difficulty in public companies and commercial life. So I have some suggestions to make. First, contracting should be privatised. The Government should contract for identity card manufacturing and changes with professional outside advisers—commercial, legal and technical—with the most powerful of penalty clauses and the ability of ““we the people””, paying our taxes to the Government, to make sure the supplier does his job effectively. It can be done. Every country in Europe that uses identity cards has done it without undue cost. Secondly, it should be phased in step by step to see how any changes needed can and should be made. Thirdly, the system should be maintained cost-effectively. Lastly, the cost-effectiveness should be reported on to Parliament. Expenditure in this area may run into billions of pounds. We are talking about an issue that is central to the security of our people. Its cost, prudently managed, is a topic for us all. I have dealt with the powers, principles, implementation and cost. Those matters require legislative management of the Bill of great skill and care, such as we have come to expect from my noble friend—great skill and care not simply to achieve its passage but to do so in a way that commands public confidence. When, in trust, you give power and it succeeds, you command public confidence. When you give trust to power and it does not work, there is a failure of public confidence. That is unacceptable in a matter as grave is this. I support the Bill, but I do so objectively, on the basis of reason and in the hope that where change becomes appropriate in Committee, it will be reasonably debated and, where sensible, properly accepted.