Identity Cards Bill

I understand the import of what the noble Baroness asks. Of course we have figures on how much it costs to prosecute and go through the courts system. A quantifiable cost would have to be made in relation to the pain and suffering to the victims. It is possible to quantify those costs, which are considerable. Members of the Committee have repeatedly asked about capital costs. I must make it clear that those are the most commercially confidential costs. They cannot be revealed because the purchase of the database and software will be dealt with extremely competitively. Information of that sort would put us in a position where we would be less advantaged than we should like. Looking over a 10 to 15-year period, the operational costs, which I have tried to offer to the Committee, are far greater—I repeat, far greater—than the capital cost of initially setting up the system. These operational costs are the most significant and we have revealed the overall operational costs. They are the major part of it. Amendments Nos. 10 and 12 focus on the security of the national identity register and are, in these instances, unnecessary, as I am sure Members of the Committee are aware. The fact that security of the register will be of paramount importance does not need to be set out in primary legislation. It stands to reason that that should be the case. Furthermore, the Data Protection Act—in particular the seventh data protection principle—imposes a statutory obligation to ensure that appropriate technical measures are taken in order to secure the safety of the register. The NIR is not physically connected to the Internet or any publicly available network. The security control procedures designed to connect the NIR to application handling and identity verification systems are among the most sophisticated currently available. Those safeguards are designed to provide a ““defence in depth”” and distributed security architecture, and are considered unlikely to be vulnerable to external attack while under appropriate management, audit and security operating procedures. The content of the national identity register will never be stored in a manner that would leave it exposed to the risk of data extraction. There will be a very small number of encrypted communications links serving the database, with no direct PC access to the register. It goes without saying that the register will be developed to be a fully secure method for storing and verifying registrable facts. The scheme will not serve the purpose envisaged if it provides only a partially secure method. It is also important to note that to date there has not been a recorded security breach or compromise of a government database which is protected in the same manner as that designed to protect the national identity register. I turn now to some of the other points that have been raised. I shall deal with liability for negligence, a point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, when we come to the amendment to Clause 3(3) tabled in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Dholakia and Lord Phillips. I hope that the noble Baroness will be content to wait until we reach that amendment. I have already dealt with some of the savings, but perhaps I may say globally that we have already quantified the estimated financial benefits as ranging from £650 million to £1.1 billion per annum once the scheme has been rolled out. I gave the breakdown earlier and noble Lords can study this in greater detail in the benefits overview which we published in June. No doubt the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, will be delighted to review that document. The noble Earl, Lord Erroll, asked about information concerning citizenship being included on the card. I note that the noble Earl is not in his place, but I shall do him the courtesy of answering. British citizens will be entitled to a card that does show their citizenship. It will be valid as a travel document for use throughout Europe. So there is a purpose behind it. I have already sought to deal with the issues surrounding DNA, but I know that the noble Lord, Lord Selsdon, has tabled a later amendment addressing the matter. Finally, I turn to the mandate. I say this only with the greatest of delicacy, but we have to take into account the fact that this Bill has been passed to us from the other place. On the question of the manifesto, I think that the noble Baroness should look carefully at this. She will understand what the word ““initially”” means.