Terrorism Bill

I entirely concur with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve). There is no place for the offence on our statute book. I do not see the point of it, and that is not because I lack any vigour on fighting terrorism. I simply do not believe that it is a useful addition to the offences available to the police and prosecuting authorities to reduce the likelihood of terrorism. Let us make no bones about this. The provision is clearly a vestigial remnant of an idea that must have sounded good on the day on which it was put forward by the Prime Minister, but that has been expunged elsewhere. The fragment of the Prime Minister’s idea remains in the Bill, but I hope that we will clear it up today, which is why we have put our names to amendment No. 3. The offence might have looked appropriate in 17th century legislation because it is the sort of thing that Parliament passed at that time. Parliament could afford a little imprecision in its terms in those days because it knew that it had a compliant judiciary that could be relied on to do the Executive’s bidding. I can imagine some of my ancestors being prosecuted for glorification. They were transported as slaves after the rebellion in 1685. We had a wonderful judicial system in those days because defendants were advised not to plead their innocence before the court because that would waste the court’s time. We have moved on a long way since then. The provision is drafted in such imprecise terms that it undermines the Government’s rational case behind other measures in the Bill. Its chilling effect is that it has the capacity to worry a great many people who will never be prosecuted under the Bill. We have considered such an effect when we have dealt with other legislation. The fact that it might be possible to bring a perverse prosecution under the Bill could mean that people would think it better not to say what they had intended to say. However, that would lead to the serious curtailment of our free speech. The Government have provided for other offences in the Bill. We have just debated the encouragement of terrorism. I have already said that I would prefer that activity to be termed as incitement because encouragement is a loose term. However, the concept of encouragement is a million times better than the strange offence of glorification. Labour Back Benchers made many valid contributions when we last discussed the matter and pointed out the dangers of the imprecision that was inherent in the measure. I hope that the Government will be prepared to think again even at this late stage. I do not think that those in the other place who are well versed in law—certainly better versed than I am—will wear it for a moment. The provision will be struck out there, but as I have said on many occasions, it would be preferable for the elected House to do its job. Ministers claim to be looking for consensus on the Bill, but they know that there is a general consensus on the proper requirement to deal with people who incite terrorism in this country. They should listen to others and acknowledge that the provision will not achieve what they want. We have heard fanciful and hyperbolic examples of what could be caught by the offence. Although they are useful for illustrative purposes, I do not think that anyone seriously assumes that the Attorney-General would prosecute anyone for the flimsy reasons that have been adduced as behaviour that could be caught by the offence. Of course, such prosecutions would not be brought. When we are legislating in the House, particularly when we introduce new offences that curtail the power of free speech, which some of us hold dear, we must be extremely careful and precise. We should know what is intended in the measures, and if we use hyperbole to illustrate our case we should do so with the intention of bringing the House to its senses so that it can understand the consequences of ill-considered legislation. My hon. Friends and I have tabled amendments Nos. 31 and 30, which deal with the use of the word ““glorification”” in clause 21. I urge the Government to reconsider its inclusion, because we have terms to proscribe organisations under the Terrorism Act 2000. Only a few weeks ago, the Minister submitted to the House a further list of organisations that should be proscribed under that Act. The House agreed with her, albeit with concerns about one organisations. Generally, however, it was happy to accede to her view that those organisation should be proscribed under that legislation. If she is going to extend the terms of proscription to include the vague concept of glorification, a vast number of organisations around the world could be caught. Some of those organisations may have had a presence in this country, but that will not be the case for many of them, as we learned from the order that was laid before the House only a few weeks ago. If we widen the scope of proscription, there will be intense diplomatic pressure on the Government to proscribe many organisations of which we know little. Another country’s Government, for example, may say, ““We have a problem with a certain organisation, which spends all its time saying what a wonderful thing it was that the statue of our President was blown up last week. That is entirely unacceptable. If Her Majesty’s Government are serious about terrorism, when will you take the necessary steps to proscribe that organisation?””If we wish to maintain a good diplomatic relationship with that country, the pressure on the Home Secretary to accede to that request will be very strong indeed.