Equality Bill [HL]

moved Amendment No. 130:"Page 17, line 5, leave out from ““enactments”” to end of line 7." The noble Baroness said: In moving Amendment No.   130 to Clause 30 I should like to speak to Amendment No. 146 to paragraph 7 of Schedule 2. They both provide for the commission, at its discretion, to provide assistance to a defendant or to a person who is what could loosely be called ““the respondent”” to proceedings or inquiries under this Act. I begin with Amendment No. 130. As drafted, subsection (1) provides:"““The Commission may assist an individual who is or may become party to legal proceedings””." However, this discretionary power is subject to two conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b). Condition (a) is that,"““the proceedings relate or may relate (wholly or partly) to a provision of the equality enactments””," which is fair enough. Condition (b) is that the individual who is assisted,"““alleges that he has been the victim of behaviour contrary to a provision of the equality enactments””." It is this second condition that the amendment seeks to remove. In other words, the amendment would give the commission discretionary power to assist either party—or indeed both parties—to an issue simultaneously. I find it absolutely paradoxical that an Act designed, according to Clause 3, to eliminate ““prejudice or discrimination”” includes a provision which is prejudiced against the defendant, which in effect assumes—prejudges, if you like—his culpability, and which automatically discriminates against the alleged victimiser in favour of the alleged victim. The philosophy of this provision indicates an assumption that the alleged victimiser is always in a stronger position to defend proceedings than the complaining party is to launch them. That is not a tenable point of view. A complainant may have the assistance in whole or in part of a powerful trade union or perhaps some pressure group. The complainant may have launched multiple claims against the same respondent—an event which is not unknown in litigation. The respondent may be the owner of a small business. The issue in a particular case may be of such major importance that it is in the public interest that it should be litigated to the fullest possible extent in order to get a definitive ruling. Why should the owner of, say, a small corner shop be saddled with the cost of defending himself when the complainant has the entire massive resources of the commission to support him or her? Amendment No. 146 relates to any inquiry, investigation or assessment instituted under Schedule 2. Such proceedings can, under the terms of the schedule, be extremely wide ranging, and get even wider while the process is in hand. The respondent to such an inquiry or investigation is obliged to provide information, to produce documents and give evidence under the pain of being deemed to have committed a criminal offence and liable to a substantial fine. The respondent to such an inquiry is, quite rightly, entitled to the assistance of the court if he believes that the commission is making unreasonable demands. But the cost of obtaining that protection can be enormous. It is only right and proper that the respondent to what may be an extensive and wide-ranging inquiry, possibly entailing the need of legal and other professional assistance merely to satisfy the demands of the commission, should not be inhibited or disadvantaged by having only limited resources. I referred earlier to the provision of Clause 3 against prejudice and discrimination. Clause 3 also calls for respect and protection of each individual’s human rights. The prohibition in Clause 30 against the commission assisting the respondent, and the failure of Schedule 2 to give the commission a discretionary power—I stress that; we are talking about a discretionary power—to assist a respondent to one of its possibly extensive inquiries or investigations, is a breach of his or her human rights. I cite in support of that contention the case of Steel and Morris v The UK. This was a case before the European Court of Human Rights, often called the McLibel case. It was held that legal aid should be given in civil cases where the resources of the parties were significantly different and where issues involving convention rights are involved. Cases and inquiries under the equality legislation are certainly involved with human rights, and there is certainly a vast discrepancy between the resources available to the commission and a very large number of persons against whom action is taken either by the commission itself or by someone supported by the commission under Clause 30(1)(b). There is no provision in the Bill, or in the existing legal aid legislation, for organisations or individuals to be given assistance if they are under investigation or inquiry, or are being sued with the backing of the massive resources of the commission. Nor does there appear to be any provision for any person or organisation to recover their costs and expenses in defending themselves during an investigation or from fighting a claim backed by the commission. These two amendments do not impose any obligation on the commission to grant any assistance. They simply empower it to do so at its own discretion. They would also remove the excuse for the commission to say that it would like to help but unfortunately does not have the power to do so. The amendments are simply designed to ensure a degree of equality and justice for all parties to proceedings under the legislation. I beg to move.