My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, for giving us a chance to have this debate. I find myself in a slightly confused frame of mind, in that I agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Frost, has just said about the 2017 agreement and its consequences. However, we are where we are. There is as much chance of mutual enforcement becoming an acceptable solution to this crisis as there is of all the European countries and the United Kingdom deciding that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the best way forward for governance—in fact, there is rather more chance for the dictatorship of the proletariat. To tell the people of Northern Ireland to keep on going, that mutual enforcement is somehow a realistic option, is misleading.
On the disfranchisement of the people of Northern Ireland, the truth is that the Assembly will vote on this matter. I know there are those who dislike that. The major change between the Johnson agreement and the May agreement was putting in that there should be a vote in the Assembly on any new arrangements, giving the Northern Ireland Assembly a chance to vote. As for the talk about 1.9 million people being disfranchised, they are not being disfranchised—they are going to get a chance to vote. I understand the objection to the form of the vote, which is by a majority vote, although that is so because trade matters are actually the responsibility of the United Kingdom Parliament. It was a special concession to give a vote to the Assembly on this occasion. In 1938, at the time of the very
controversial Anglo-Irish trade agreement, the unionist MPs all accepted it was nothing to do with Stormont; it was a matter for the Westminster Parliament even though they were concerned it was unfair to Northern Irish businesses. A special case has been made for this vote.
In 2017, there was a general election in Northern Ireland. The DUP got 36% of the vote—it is closer to 20% now. The total unionist vote is little short of 50%. When it was agreed in 2019 that the Assembly would have a majority vote on this matter, it was not so obvious what the outcome would be. Today it is, but when that was agreed to in 2019, it was not at all obvious that a majority vote would be acceptance of the Windsor Framework arrangements, as we are all sure it will be now. It was not at all sure, and it was not inevitable.
There is an argument that one reason why the unionist vote has collapsed is the constant putting forward of solutions which are not solutions, like the mutual enforcement scheme. There is nothing at all wrong with it, had it been serious five years ago. We are now three international treaties down the road, and the European Union is not going to change its mind, and Parliament voted by a huge majority for the Windsor Framework. There is more chance of the dictatorship of the proletariat being decided as the way forward for Europe and the United Kingdom than the idea that suddenly people are going to turn round and say, “Let’s try something else completely different”—considerably more chance.
I have made general observations of where we are, and it is with regret that I say some of this because I think mutual enforcement should have been more properly discussed. The 2017 agreement is deeply flawed and set a framework which leaves us with many remaining difficulties which we have to talk about. None the less, this is where we are. I hate to be so simple about it, but it is the case.
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The Windsor Framework has been critically denounced by the DUP this evening. One of the great achievements of the Windsor Framework is on human medicines—though not so much on veterinary and animal health issues, around which there is ongoing dialogue, as has been referred to tonight. Human medicines have been removed absolutely out of any EU context, straight back into a UK set of regulations. That is an absolutely clear-cut victory for a particular position. In a situation where there had to be compromises, that is one for the UK view of the matter.
That we have to get this matter sorted out is the central, lead point in the DUP’s manifesto for Assembly elections. I never see it referred to subsequently, yet it is so rare for a party to get a 100% win. I mention this because the Windsor Framework is not simply a matter of its flaws; it is worth recalling that there are things in it—for example, the Stormont brake—which are of major importance and help to explain why, when the Assembly votes, there will be a vote for it. It also helps to explain why the move in public opinion in Northern Ireland is increasingly towards this.
To be very crude about it, if you look at the impact assessment, you find that it shows the impact of this SI to be very slight. There is no real impact on business—
I think the word used is negligible—and no direct costs to consumers were identified. This SI is not going to transform public opinion one way or another in Northern Ireland; it is just too intangible, as is so much of what has flowed from what is an inadequate deal with Europe, which has very bad roots, as was rightly said by the noble Lord, Lord Frost.
However, we are at a particular moment. Parliament has voted and the European Union is not going to shift its position either.