My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, pointed out, it is scarcely a packed Committee; none the less, the contributions from the noble Lord and from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, have been of a thoughtful character and, indeed, merit the label “philosophical”, which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, attached to his closing submission.
I am grateful for those contributions and for the broad indication that, while neither of the noble Lords who spoke began to approach the idea of giving His Majesty’s Government a blank cheque in relation to these provisions, and they demanded further scrutiny, none the less, they are broadly speaking in support of the measures in this statutory instrument.
I shall address the questions that were put to me. The noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, asked—and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, echoed the question—about the frequency with which the urgent procedure will be used. I start from the proposition that, as the Committee is aware and has heard, these provisions relating to STPIMs substantially reflect the provisions relating to TPIMs. To a certain extent we can extrapolate from the use of TPIMs some predictions, although the noble Lord, Lord Marks, accepts that it would be a very difficult task to estimate how many. But we can extrapolate from the TPIM experience something which I hope will address the Committee’s concerns. That allows me to say that we expect that the urgent procedure will be used very rarely. It has not been used in relation to TPIMs since the TPIM Act came into force in 2011. As I say, we would expect that the experience in relation to STPIMs would broadly reflect that.
Identifying a case as being urgent would not be a matter of seeking to avoid scrutiny. An urgent case will be one in which notice is sought; that notice must contain justification for the approach and the matter must be referred immediately to the court, which must consider the case within seven days of the notice being imposed. The court will apply exactly the same principles as if it had been consulted in advance and will have the power to quash the notice, or any of the measures specified in it.
I can advise the Committee that, while the experience of TPIMs has been that none has been overturned altogether, the courts none the less have acted anxiously and vigilantly to observe the manner in which they are to be applied and have adjusted, from time to time, certain of the terms of orders that have been made.
The individual has a right to a full, automatic High Court review of the case, and a directions hearing in relation to that must take place within seven days of the court confirming the imposition of measures.
Reference to directions hearings allows me to digress for a moment to offer the Committee an assurance that, while that procedure and this statutory instrument apply to the Civil Procedure Rules applicable to England and Wales, equivalent measures will none the less be introduced by our equivalents in the devolved Administrations in Northern Ireland and Scotland. Communication has been made with the relevant rules bodies in those jurisdictions.
Further questions posed by noble Lords related to the matter of volume. Again, if we can be permitted extrapolation from the TPIM experience, it is anticipated that the volume of these measures will be low and used only as a last resort. As I said on an earlier point, the courts will be able to review all closed material and will have the opportunity to challenge the imposition of an order before it is made. Furthermore, through the automatic review, the court could quash the order or remove specific measures. As I said, it has done so in the context of TPIMs.
In terms of transparency, there will be independent oversight by the independent reviewer of state threat legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, who has accepted that post. He will publish an annual report on the use of these powers.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, posed the philosophical question, given the necessary degree of confidentiality that will attach to these measures, about how the Government can be satisfied that the measures are working properly, and that the provisions intended to protect the interests of individuals made subject to these measures, notwithstanding the fact that they will not be placed before those persons or their instructed legal representatives, are effective. I can rely with confidence on the integrity of the legal profession in the jurisdictions of this kingdom and the independence that it has always shown, on the independence of our judiciary, and on the special advocate procedure itself, which confers these responsibilities on counsel. They are usually members of the Bar, but this would potentially be open to those with extended rights of audience as solicitor advocates, with the training and vetting they would receive before appointment.
I can take from the submissions heard by the Committee that it is persuaded that the statutory instrument is necessary for the effective operation of STPIMs, slotting in, as it does, into the Civil Procedure Rules and simply adding provisions referring to the governing Act.