My Lords, I rise to address the amendments in my name, Amendments 264A and 264B. These amendments raise an aspect of electricity
supply which involves potentially dangerous network faults. I first declare an interest as probably the most out-of-date chartered engineer in Parliament, having been here full-time for 49 years, and a fellow of the Institution of Engineering and Technology. I still pay my subs after more than 60 years, and skim the technical journals.
In April, I read in Engineering & Technology about concerns relating to the risks of neutral current diversion, known as NCD. The author was investigative journalist, Conor McGlone, who wrote of experts expressing concerns of the real risk of deadly gas explosions and fires in the UK due to a common fault on the electrical system. They claim that the fault is neither acknowledged by distribution network operators or the Health and Safety Executive. In short, and keeping off the detailed techy stuff, a neutral current diversion can occur when the combined protective earthing and neutral conductor fails. The current is then diverted by making a circuit via exposed metal workings on buildings including gas, water and oil pipes. In other words, electricity can flow through gas meters in these circumstances.
NCDs are causing gas explosions. Gas meters are not designed to carry electricity and, if a current is diverted, creating heat due to the high resistance, an explosion can follow. The fault is such that, when changing gas meters, engineers attach jump leads between pipes because neutral current diversions are so prevalent and sparks can be created. After an explosion, of which there have been more in recent years, we are simply told: “possible gas leak”. In fact, a house in the Kingstanding part of my former constituency disappeared in such an explosion last year.
One example given by Conor McGlone was when Gordon Mackenzie, formerly of SP Energy Networks, became aware of a resident’s coat falling on a gas meter and catching fire. He detected a 35-amp current flowing through the metallic gas service pipe entering the property, affecting 72 houses. There was nothing whatever to indicate a problem: no flickering lights, nothing.
Neutral current diversions are not routinely considered after an explosion. Having read this, I therefore tabled some Written Questions, answered by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, on 2 May. I was informed that
“no additional action is required by the regulator”—
the Health and Safety Executive—
“to manage this risk of neutral current diversion at the present time”.
In other words: “We’ll keep it under review”.
Now these can cause fires in ordinary domestic appliances due to the high resistance. Voltage surges occurred in properties without a gas supply. As a result of the Hansard reports of the Written Answers, I was contacted about the wider problem of safety checks and weaknesses in electrical regulation. I am informed that the charity Electrical Safety First and certification giant Bureau Veritas have both expressed more concern than the Health and Safety Executive, whose approach has been described as
“nothing to see, move on”.
5.45 pm
My attention was then drawn to the Grenfell Tower inquiry website. No one knows how the fire in the flat started, and indeed the inquiry is not looking into this. The contractor, Rydon Maintenance, which subcontracted work to RJ Electrics Ltd to carry out electrical tests, appears to believe the inquiry is examining the cause of the fire. That is the excuse for not answering questions about electrical safety checks.
The interesting thing here, which is very unusual, is that the inquiry website is publicly available and contains the electrical installation works certificates relating to flats in Grenfell Tower. An analysis of the certification of the fixed wiring installations shows inconsistencies, dangerous oversights and a failure to comply with the IET Wiring Regulations, British Standard 7671. These certificates show that proper testing was not taking place. Indeed, there was a substandard level of testing of the hard wiring.
Unlike gas engineers, who are named as specific competent people, in electrical testing, the system is such that an employee, who may or may not be an electrician, conducts the testing and a competent body scheme supplies, at a cost, a qualified supervisor meant to ensure that the employee is competent and supervised for the work they undertake. There is more than one competent body, but the competent body we got in Grenfell is the well-known NICEIC—we see it on all the banners. I will not list all the examples, but will give a flavour of the list. I have read all the certificates relating to Grenfell, which have the NICEIC logo and are all serial numbered. The figures that follow have been assessed by experts.
The certificates show that 38 of 120 flats had electrical installations put into service without residual circuit breaker testing. This is crucial to protect equipment from shorting and maybe causing a fire. Nine flats had installations put into services with known deficiencies declared on the certificates. There are 13 certificates which do not have the date that the qualified supervisors signed off the work of the tester. For the majority of certificates, the dates between the tester doing the work and the qualified supervisor reviewing the work is more than 25 days.
There are 10 minor electrical installation works certificates for six different flats, recorded as completed on the same day in August 2015 by the same person. Experts tell me that it is highly unlikely that the testing was done correctly. I am deliberately avoiding referring specifically to any numbered flats, because the certificates obviously contain the numbers of all the flats, because I do not want to be confused about the flat where the fire actually started. It is the result of all the testing.
The experts say that it is quite clear that the testing was not done correctly. This is a result of a race to the bottom during a price war started by the introduction of the electrical safety standards in the private rented sector. The scheme, which appears to be not fit for purpose, is about to cover the social rented sector. It is clearly open to price-cutting, abuse and incompetence, and should be remodelled to the same standards as gas testing.
After I looked at comments from other engineers, it crossed my mind to ask about all the residential tower blocks where cladding needs to be replaced. I asked, via Written Questions, about electrical safety checks, records of voltage surges, the potential for improving the system in these tower blocks, where tens of thousands of families—the figure I have seen is 660,000—are living with similar external cladding to Grenfell, and whether the testing regime could be changed. The answer from the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Bybrook—I fully accept she is not present and I send my best wishes—said:
“All buildings should meet existing safety standards. We do not hold records of voltage surges or numbers of extra electrical safety checks … The Building Safety Regulator will be undertaking a cost benefit analysis of making regular inspections and testing of electrical installations in relevant buildings”.
Somebody must hold the electrical testing certificates for these properties. I do not expect the Government to hold them but somebody does. My question in these circumstances is: have the Government asked who holds them? The tragedy of Grenfell is that, because of the inquiry’s website, all the certificates are public; we can see them, but we cannot see them for the other blocks. Somebody is paying for the testing. The certificates have been issued and logged. Where are they, and has anybody checked? Are they being done to the same incompetent level as they clearly were at Grenfell, from the figures I have shown?
The term “will be” in the answer is worrying, but “cost benefit analysis” beggars belief in the circumstances. Inquiries that engineers and journalists have made show that the regulator, the Health and Safety Executive, clearly does not want to know. Many organisations refused to respond to repeated requests from Conor McGlone on behalf of Engineering & Technology. In 2022, the IET published a standardised way of testing for NCDs in its Guidance Note 3, so there is no excuse whatever. We should all be very concerned.
I therefore ask the Minister to ask within government not only why people remain at risk due to the cladding, which previous debates have shown, but why the inadequate electrical safety checking procedures cannot be upgraded to the better-qualified gas testing system. We need to do that, based on the evidence we now have from the inquiry’s website. I would be amazed if someone in the department had not asked about this or read the certificates. Somebody must have done; they are now publicly available. It will be too late after another event.