My Lords, I broadly support all these amendments in spirit, since, as we have heard, they tackle excessive levels of influence that any Secretary of State is awarding themselves to shape the strategic priorities and codes of conduct of Ofcom. I will speak to Amendments 254 and 260, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, who I am glad to see in his place. He will see in Hansard that he was about to be much missed. I cannot do him credit, but I will carry on regardless because I support his amendments.
The main difference between Amendment 254 and other similar amendments is that it requires that any guidance issued to Ofcom—under Clause 157, for example—is
“approved by resolution of each House of Parliament”
rather than by committees. However, the spirit of it, which is to remove the Secretary of State’s power to give wide-ranging guidance or instructions about Ofcom’s functions, and the concerns that we have about that, is broadly in line with everything else we have heard.
It is important to ask whether it is appropriate for our right to freedom of expression to be curtailed by secondary legislation, which cannot be amended, which has little parliamentary oversight and on which challenges are very often reduced to nothing more than rhetorical whinges in this House. That would mean that the power exercised by the Secretary of State would bypass the full democratic process.
In fact, it also weakens our capacity to hold Ofcom to account. One thing that has become apparent throughout our Committee deliberations is that—as I think the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, indicated—Ofcom will be an uber-regulator. It is itself very powerful, as I have raised, with respect to potentially policing and controlling what UK citizens see, read and have access to online, what they are allowed to search, private messaging and so on. In some ways, I want Ofcom to have much more scrutiny and be accountable to Parliament, elected politicians and the public realm. But that is not the same as saying that Ofcom should be accountable and answerable to the Secretary of State; that would be a whole different ball game. It could be said that the Secretary of State will be elected, but we know that that is a sleight of hand.
I want more accountability and scrutiny of Ofcom by individual users of online services; we even talked about that, the other day, in relation to complaints. I want more democratic scrutiny, but the Bill does the opposite of that by allowing the Government a huge amount of executive power to shape the proposed system of online speech moderation and even influence political discourse in the public square.
I want to move on to that issue. Under the Bill, the Secretary of State will have the power to set Ofcom’s strategic priorities, direct Ofcom to modify its code of practice through secondary legislation, set criteria for platform categorisation and designate priority illegal offences. They will be able to change codes of practice for “reasons of public policy”, which is as vague a phrase as you will ever get. I fear that, frankly, that level of discretion is likely to lead to a highly politicised and—my dread—censorship-heavy approach to regulation.
The Secretary of State could come under extreme pressure to respond to each individual concerning case of digital content—whatever happens to be in the news this week—with an ever-expanding list of areas to be dealt with. I dread that this will inevitably be exploited by highly political lobbyists and organisations, who will say, “You must act on this. This is hate speech. You’ve got to do something about this”. That is a completely arbitrary way to behave.
According to the Bill, Ofcom has no choice but to comply, and that obviously leads to the dangers of politicisation. I do not think it is scaremongering to say that this is politicisation and could compromise the independence of Ofcom. The Secretary of State’s power of direction could mean that the Government are given the ability to shape the permissibility of categories of online content, based on the political mood of the day, and the political whims of a specific Secretary of State to satisfy a short-term moral panic on a particular issue.
One question for the Minister, and the Government, is: should you ever create powers that you would not want to see your political opponents exercising? The Secretary of State today will not always be the Secretary of State tomorrow; they will not always be in the same image. Awarding such overwhelming powers, and the potential politicising of policing speech, might feel comfortable for the Government today; it might be less comfortable when you look at the way that some people view, for example, the tenets of Conservatism.
In recent weeks, since a “National Conservatism” conference was held up the road, I have heard members of opposition parties describe the contents of Conservatism as “Trumpist”, “far-right” and “fascist” hate speech. I am worried—on behalf of the Government —that some of those people might end up as a Secretary of State and it could all blow up in their face as it were, metaphorically.
In all seriousness, because I am really not interested in the fate of either the Opposition or the Government in terms of their parties, I am trying to say that it is too arbitrary. In a situation where we have such weak commitments to freedom of conscience, thought or speech in this Bill, I really do not want to give the Secretary of State the power to broaden out the targets that might be victim to it.
Finally—and I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, who would have been much more professional, specific and hard-hitting on his amendment—from what I have heard, I hope that all the tablers of the amendments from all parties might well have got together by Report and come up with satisfactory amendments that will deal with this. I think we all agree, for once, that something needs to be done to curtail power. I look forward to supporting that later in the process.
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