My Lords, in moving Amendment 176, I will speak also to Amendment 178B, both of which are in my name; I am grateful to the noble Lords who have given them their support.
In our discussion of the Bill, we have had much debate on the powers of mayoral authorities and the balance between upper-tier authorities—local authorities, regional authorities and mayoral authorities—and those lower down the chain. These amendments continue that debate in a different way. With noble Lords’ agreement, I will start by speaking to Amendment 178B; I will come to Amendment 176 after that.
Amendment 178B is very brief and technical but has quite a lot of effect. It amends the Greater London Authority Act to allow the assembly to amend the mayor’s budget by an absolute majority, rather than requiring a two-thirds majority, as now. Although it is drafted to apply to London, if granted this would have a wider effect, because there are other metropolitan mayoral authorities with similar arrangements for the scrutiny and passing of a mayoral budget. I will speak about London, from my experience, and the other matters can be taken later.
When the Blair Government set up the Greater London Authority through the 1999 Act, they were wedded to the idea that it should have a very strong mayor—a sort of Nietzschean super-figure bestriding the capital and, crucially for our purposes, able to impose his or her own budget on London, even if opposed by a majority in the elected assembly. No reason was ever given for this, as far as I understand, and it entailed a significant denial of the norms of democracy. When he was mayor, Ken Livingstone, who had a certain sense of irony, used to sit in the public gallery of the assembly when his budget was being debated. Every time he lost a vote and there was a majority against, he would give a little chuckle and declare a triumph, because although 50% or even 60% of the members were voting against that provision in his budget, it had no effect because they could not achieve a two-thirds majority.
When it was set up, it was explained that the Greater London Authority’s powers were strictly limited to it being a strategic authority for London; it was not meant to be a delivery authority. The mayor did operate four functional bodies in addition: Transport for London, the Metropolitan Police, the fire and rescue authority and the London Development Agency. Although the architecture around the development agency later changed slightly, that position remained.
However, the powers of the mayor have increased very significantly. As the Government have made clear in discussion on this Bill, the intention is to increase the powers of mayors in other parts of the country as part of their devolution and levelling-up approach.
We are seeing mayors accumulate more powers and larger budgets. For example, the Mayor of London is now responsible for the housing budget for London, which is billions-plus. These powers are being accumulated but the co-decision and scrutiny functions that go with them are not being kept up to date. In fact, the Government recognise this. It may not be government policy yet, but I even saw in a newspaper that the Government were speculating on increasing the scrutiny of elected mayors by setting up panels of local MPs to scrutinise what they were going to do. There is no need to do this: the assembly exists. The scrutiny body is there already: it needs empowerment, which this amendment provides. I am putting a burden on my noble friend by inviting her to explain why we should be denying democracy in our great cities and urban areas—such a burden that quite possibly she will decide to agree with me. I look forward to that very much indeed.
Turning to the question of balance of powers, we come to Amendment 176, which is drafted to cover the whole country and is not specific to London. However, I will speak of it in London terms because of my own experience and allow noble Lords to draw parallels with other areas. It relates to the ULEZ charge—a power the mayor has in fact had since the foundation of the Greater London Authority; road user charging was in the Greater London Authority Act as far back as 1999. It has been expanded in geographical terms. Under Ken Livingstone, it was small and very focused. There was a low emission zone around Heathrow Airport and a congestion charge around just the very centre of London. It has been expanded to include not only inner London, which has already been delivered, but outer London as well—the current proposal—into areas wholly different from inner London and best understood by their own elected councils. Yet, they have no say.
This amendment would give councils that say, not just in London but in other parts of the country. It would give a power of co-decision with local councils in the extension of a road user charging scheme—ULEZ in this case. It would require that that decision be made in full council. It would not be a decision of the executive arm—for example, the cabinet or the locally elected mayor. It would also be retrospective, so that existing schemes would have to be subject to such a vote in order to continue. It would also ensure that local councils have regard to their air quality duties under the Environment Act when making their decisions. Nobody is in favour of poor air quality; it is a question of how to get there.
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Of course, Londoners and those in adjacent counties value clean, healthy air, but they are groaning under the proposed burden of a rushed ULEZ imposed during a cost of living crisis. A wholly inadequate scrappage support scheme is attached to it which, in
large parts of outer London, is not strictly necessary because of their very different, almost rural characteristics. This is evidenced from TfL’s own impact assessment of what ULEZ is going to achieve. Residents look to their local councils to express their voice. Our job is to empower them to do this.
This measure is supported by members of the Liberal Democrat party and Liberal Democrat councils, and the ULEZ proposal has been opposed publicly by Labour Party Members of the other place. I hope that my amendment will command the widespread support of your Lordships’ House, not least of the one party not mentioned so far—the Conservative Party—when my noble friend comes to reply. I beg to move.