My Lords, as others have said, this has certainly been a mixed bag of amendments, but clearly they all look at the extent of devolution, the powers and the different functions involved. We have two probing amendments in this group. First, in Clause 19, my Amendment 91 probes
“whether the Government will cooperate with trade unions representing employees of CCAs.”
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, for her support and for her excellent speech on this matter. At the moment, Clause 19—“Integrated Transport Authority and Passenger Transport Executive”—does not consider the people who work for the CCAs. We believe they should be able to be part of any decision-making process. This is also why we believe it is important for the Government to co-operate with trade union representatives.
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The power of employers, which does include local government, needs to be balanced with the needs of employees: there must be a balance between what employers want and what is right for employees. Trade unions work to safeguard this and to deliver quality public services and employment. Clearly, the Bill, once it goes through, is going to bring huge changes to local government. A positive working relationship with trade unions, during any implementation of these changes, will allow the changing needs of the workforce to be both listened to and taken account of. Local authorities should exemplify good employment practice, and we believe that good consultation and co-operation with trade unions and all employees is a fundamental part of this. We look forward to hearing the Minister confirm that trade unions and employees will be part of any consultation and delivery arrangements.
My noble friend Lady Taylor of Stevenage’s Amendment 477 would ensure that Ministers publish draft legislation for a devolution Bill. This is extremely important, and the LGA supports this amendment. It has been making the case for more local responsibility so that decisions are taken as close as possible to the people that they affect, because that is when the best decisions are made. All evidence shows that good devolution will lead to better outcomes. Where councils and combined authorities have taken on devolved powers, they have begun to demonstrate the possibilities that devolution can bring. Therefore, we believe that there should be a devolution Bill that actually sets out how these greater powers, functions and the funding should be transferred from central government to local areas. After all, this is supposed to be a Levelling-Up and Regeneration Bill, not a devolution planning Bill. It is really important that there is a devolution Bill set out that includes, for example—as suggested in the amendment—housing, energy, childcare, transport, skills,
training and employment. This would help to translate the priorities that the Government have talked about in their missions into action in the devolution agenda.
Amendments 89 and 90 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath have instigated a very interesting debate about what devolution is and what should or should not be devolved. The example of Greater Manchester co-ordinating NHS powers was a very apt thing to talk about within this devolution debate. My noble friend’s amendment refers specifically to the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016, so I thought I would take a look at that Act to see what happened during the Bill’s progress through this House.
Some interesting amendments were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Warner. They sought to provide safeguards to the local devolution of health functions. His amendments made it clear that, whatever devolution arrangements might be agreed, the Secretary of State would remain bound by key duties placed on him or her in respect of the health service. The amendments also specified some specific duties that could not be transferred, such as the overarching responsibility to Parliament for the provision of the health service in England, as well as overarching duties on quality, reduction of health inequalities—very relevant to this Bill, of course—research, education and training, and duties relating to the constitution of the NHS and its mandate.
It is interesting to remember previous debates on this issue, to see it in context. The noble Lord, Lord Warner, suggested that
“the Bill was never designed for the devolution of NHS functions … It is not designed for devolving functions from a 67 year-old iconic National Health Service, with a large number of statutory duties placed on a Minister, supported by a bevy of national bodies and requirements and strong public expectations of adherence to national standards and rules.”
He then said, which I think is important:
“So far, the Government have struggled to come up with a formula that reconciles the centralised characteristics of the NHS, which is held in great public affection, with a move towards the greater devolution of the delivery of health services and health service functions that many of us would like to see”.—[Official Report, 21/7/15; col. 1048.]
As my noble friend said, the centre has continually sucked up powers. There is no proper local scrutiny of services. As other noble Lords have said, absolutely correctly, local government becomes a junior partner in integrated care systems. It therefore strikes me that this is an opportunity for the Government to start looking at how, perhaps, some of the health services and health service functions could actually be devolved down more locally. I would be very interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts on that matter.
I turn now to the clause stand part notices on Clauses 58 and 59 tabled by my noble friends Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Bach, which we very much support. They are absolutely correct: this has nothing to do with levelling up. The Minister needs to explain, as noble Lords have already requested, why these are in the Bill and how this fits with the levelling-up agenda. Again—I am sure the noble Earl, Lord Howe,
is aware of my constant concerns about consultation—there is no consultation allowed for Clause 59, which is very concerning.
The West Midlands has been mentioned by a number of noble Lords. I have had a meeting with the West Midlands PCC, at his request. He provided me, following that meeting, with a very detailed briefing about his concerns. It is important that his concerns are put on record, so I will go through those now. First, he asked for the clause to be deleted because he believes that it is very important to maintain the existing requirements for consent. Noble Lords have laid that out extremely clearly. The PCC’s first concern is that, through this clause, there is the abolition of the right to vote. As we have heard, it enables the mayor to abolish the right of people to vote for a democratically elected and directly accountable PCC. As noble Lords have said, this is profoundly undemocratic. In view of the breadth, scope and level of public interest in crime, policing and criminal justice, people should be entitled to vote for a directly accountable PCC. This is clearly preferable to a model where the mayor is just going to appoint a deputy mayor based on patronage.
The PCC is also concerned that the clause removes the people’s choice by enabling the mayor to remove the right to choose. On 6 May 2021, as we heard from my noble friend, the people of the West Midlands, within the same constituency—this is important: it is the same constituency—exercised the current choice available to them and voted for a Conservative mayor but a Labour PCC, who had included retention of the separate role in his manifesto, a commitment repeated in the police and crime plan for 2021-25. The people elected a candidate from one party to be responsible for policing and someone from a different party to be the mayor. In these circumstances, a provision that allows for an elected representative from one party to abolish an elected representative from another party is deeply divisive.
The PCC is also concerned that this imposes counter-devolution by enabling the mayor to disregard and override the views of the constituent councils and combined authority. At the moment, transferring police governance from a PCC requires the consent of all constituent councils, the combined authority and the mayor. All areas affected by a transfer must support it. In the West Midlands, the majority of constituent authorities oppose the transfer of the police governance function to the mayor, but the amendment would enable that opposition to be overridden. Any change requires the unanimous support of constituent authorities.
The clause also diminishes democratic scrutiny and oversight. It enables the mayor to diminish local democratic accountability and the scrutiny of policing. It relegates crime, policing and criminal justice to a secondary function. PCCs are democratically elected, directly accountable and exclusively focused on these matters. In the West Midlands, the police have a budget of £680 million. It would be the largest, most complex and most high-risk combined authority function, yet, under the alternative model, it would be delegated to an appointee.
Endangering the operational independence of policing is another concern. PCCs are prohibited from engaging in operational policing. Combined authorities operate
in a local government environment, with mayors engaged in negotiation with local authorities. Key statutory police governance functions—such as setting strategic direction and precept, holding to account and hiring and firing chief constables—will all be at risk, particularly in areas such as the West Midlands where there are political differences between the mayor and the local authorities. Requiring local authority unanimity for a transfer protects policing from becoming a matter of direct political contention.
The PCC drew particular attention to the fact that this would jeopardise local joint working in criminal justice, community safety and violence reduction. This is a pretty serious concern. PCCs have a leadership role in the local criminal justice system, in community safety and in violence reduction. By transferring the function, you run the risk of diminishing meaningful attention to this work. Maintaining a separate PCC function provides co-ordination, leadership and legitimacy by a democratically elected, directly accountable and visible individual. As I asked earlier—other noble Lords have also asked the Minister this—where is the clear evidence that shows why these clauses are needed?
Finally, I will mention very briefly Amendment 469 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, which
“would confer new powers on local authorities to run their own bus services”.
I am sure that the noble Baroness will not be surprised to know that I fully support it; I have talked about bus services before, as she mentioned. Obviously, I am fully aware of how many bus services have been cut and how much funding local authorities will need if they are to take on these new responsibilities. The next group of amendments concerns transport; I have a number of amendments in it and will talk about this issue in further detail.