I totally accept what the noble Baroness says about her experience as police ombudsman; I think that it has been less straightforward in the case of information from other bodies over the years. That is why the Government have placed this obligation on bodies to disclose information, which goes further than ever before. Indeed, the provisions directly mirror those included in the draft legislation to give effect to the 2014 Stormont House agreement, so they have been around for some time, certainly in draft form.
The noble Baroness will be aware that “reasonableness” is not a term created or policed by the Government. It is widely used and understood; it is included in other legislation, such as the Finance Act 2008; and it has a specific purpose in terms of creating obligations on others to provide information. The law requires all public bodies to exercise their powers reasonably and proportionately. It is open to authorities to challenge an assessment of reasonableness, of course, but our expectation is that the ICRIR would request the information only if it were reasonably required for the purposes of discharging its functions, so any challenge would be likely to fail if the commission followed this practice. Ultimately, it will be for the courts to decide whether the commission has acted reasonably in any case.
On Amendments 39 and 185, which would add to the list of individuals who may be required to assist the commission in handling information that they have disclosed under Clause 5, the Government are
confident that all relevant individuals are already listed in the legislation. However, I am happy to take that away and look at the clause again.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, pointed out, Amendment 145 in her name—I welcome her to our debates—would require regulations regarding the retention of biometric material under Clause 31 to be made by the affirmative rather than the negative procedure. I assure her that the Government take their international obligations in this area—and in other areas, I hasten to add—very seriously. We are confident that our approach to the retention of legacy biometrics, if I can use that term, is compliant with the relevant European Court of Human Rights rulings in this area.
To remain compliant at all times, the commission will need to carry out regular, periodic reviews of the data that it retains for the purposes of its investigations, as set out in Clause 31(2)(a). This will of necessity involve the commission making decisions regarding the deletion or retention of certain data based on strict proportionality criteria that we will outline in secondary legislation. We feel that the negative procedure will provide an appropriate level of scrutiny for a power such as this, that is very limited in scope in the sense that it exists solely to ensure ECHR compliance in this area through the appropriate management of biometric material retained by the commission. The regulation-making power ensures that the commission retains only a limited category of biometric material in prescribed circumstances, for a limited purpose and a limited amount of time, after which it will fall for deletion.
The power allows only relevant biometrics to be retained and used by the commission to ensure there can be effective Article 2 investigations, while also ensuring compatibility with the provisions of Article 8 relating to the right to a private life. It also allows for biometric data no longer needed by the commission to be deleted, again to ensure ECHR compliance. So, in our view the power is proportionate and does not, for example, enable the commission to take new biometric data from individuals, but if the noble Baroness still has concerns about this, again, I am very happy to sit down with her. On that basis, I urge her to withdraw the amendment.