My Lords, the previous discussion has demonstrated the active concerns a lot of members of this Committee have that this Bill should not cramp the ability of local authorities to experiment with forms of local procurement, the encouragement of local enterprise, and so on. I had a message from a county council this morning on precisely that point. We are concerned about this. Perhaps there is enough room below the threshold, but we need to explore that a little more.
These amendments respond to the report on the Bill from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. Members of that committee are here, so I shall be brief and defer to their expertise.
The Minister will be well aware that many in the Lords are deeply concerned about the Government’s determined move away from clear, detailed legislation towards skeleton Bills and executive discretion. The perhaps soon to depart Prime Minister campaigned to leave the EU on the promise of restoring parliamentary sovereignty but has worked instead to bypass Parliament wherever he can. The Minister for Brexit Opportunities and Government Efficiency, who, as far as I understand it, has some influence over this Bill, is pre-emptively arguing that the Prime Minister was elected by the people and not Parliament, and therefore does not have to go if he loses the confidence of Parliament. We all recognise that both Houses of Parliament are deficient in a number of ways and in need of reform, but, for the moment, we have the constitution that we have inherited, battered though it is, and the spread of Henry VIII powers across legislation is a breach of that constitution, as the DPRRC notes.
Amendment 18 therefore challenges the delegation of power to Ministers to make exempted contracts for the provision of public transport services. Amendment 21 similarly challenges the degree of autonomy given to Ministers in providing concession contracts for air services. Amendment 28, to the schedule on utility contracts, challenges the width of the powers granted to Ministers to make exemption determinations.
Amendment 31 is more egregious on the same theme. It would give permission for Ministers to specify by regulation which services will be subject to the light-touch regime for contracts and which will be excluded. The DPRRC’s comment on this is that the power
“should be narrowed unless the Government can fully justify it.”
I suspect that the Minister is unable to do that.
Amendment 208 also addresses the remarkably wide freedom given to Ministers with regard to light-touch contracts. Here, it goes into tertiary legislation, allowing Ministers by regulations to
“specify services of a kind specified in regulations of the authority under section 8”.
I hope that members of the Committee understand that; I am not entirely sure that I do.
Clause 86, to which I have tabled a stand part challenge, gives Ministers powers to make regulations about a range of documents on contracts and information about contracts. Clause 109 gives Ministers powers
“to amend this Act in relation to private utilities”,
requiring them to consult
“persons appearing to the authority to represent the views of private utilities, and … such other persons as the authority considers appropriate”—
but not anyone with any standing in terms of public or parliamentary accountability.
Clause 110, which is covered by Amendments 530 and 532, relates entirely to regulatory powers. Our amendments would implement the DPRRC’s recommendations to make pricing determinations for qualifying defence contracts subject to the affirmative procedure and restrict the ministerial freedom to raise financial thresholds above the rate of inflation. On all these clauses, the DPRRC argues that the breadth of ministerial discretion should be narrowed. It comments that, in a number of instances,
“the Government … have chosen this approach for no other reason than that it hasn’t yet developed the underlying policy.”
I ask the Minister to attempt to justify these overextended executive powers or, otherwise, to narrow the powers granted and recognise the importance of parliamentary scrutiny and the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. I beg to move.