My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 58 and speak to Amendments 60, 61, 62 and 65. The amendments in my name in this group closely resemble those I tabled in Committee and that I spoke to comprehensively then. They all relate to digital election campaign content, and I will not repeat the arguments I made for them at any length today. I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord True and Lord Parkinson, the Bill team and officials from DCMS and DLUHC for meeting with me after Committee, and for what could perhaps be called a moderately enlightening discussion.
Through these amendments, I have been pursuing four aspects of digital campaigning. First, clear guidance on digital imprints is represented by Amendment 58. I have been assured that the Scottish provisions in law—and hence their guidance—are not nearly as prescriptive as those set out in the Bill. I hope that the Minister will give his assurance that the current interpretation of the Bill means that statutory guidance from the Electoral Commission—when it comes forward—will require the imprint in almost every circumstance to be on the image or post, unlike in Scotland. It is really only on platforms such as Twitter, where there is a character limit, that it can be considered not to be practicable to put the full imprint. In addition, I hope he will confirm there will be an expectation that the forwarding of posts will require either the full original imprint to be included or a new imprint to be placed on the material.
There will also, I understand, be rules put in place for when and how long material must be retained for inspection.
Secondly, banning foreign actors is sought by Amendment 61. The noble Baroness, Lady Scott, and the noble Lord, Lord True, prayed in aid the new £700 limit and the imprint requirements at our meeting at Committee stage, but neither of them addressed the loopholes which will still exist where multiple identities can be created. This is where both Ministers’ statements were inadequate. The new amendment no longer covers British overseas electors, so I hope the Ministers come up with better assurances in this area. There is some consolation in the provision to review the operation of the Bill, but it is important at this stage—at this stage, not later—to take a view whether they are sufficiently watertight as regards foreign actors. This is an area where the Intelligence and Security Committee and the Committee on Standards in Public Life advocated much stronger controls.
Thirdly, Amendment 62 would require promoters to establish advert libraries for digital campaign adverts placed, while Amendment 60 would require detailed information about expenditure on digital campaign material. Here, the main government argument seems to be that the social media platforms that take political advertising—i.e. not Twitter—are keeping libraries already and are different in character, so it would be inappropriate to have a one-size-fits-all regulation. But at the same time, the noble Lord, Lord True, sought to assure me that several important recommendations of the Committee on Standards in Public Life and the Electoral Commission, including those relating to advert libraries and more detailed information on invoices, are still under consideration by the Government. Given the timing of the introduction of this Elections Bill, surely it is high time for the Government to have made a clear decision. What is the state of play here, in terms of a decision having been made on those recommendations?
The fourth area is that of misinformation and disinformation, starting with my Amendment 65 to criminalise false statements about election integrity, which is designed to see what direction the Government are planning to take. As I outlined in Committee, a whole host of Select Committees and the Committee on Standards in Public Life have made recommendations in this area. This has particular relevance in the context of the Ukraine invasion and Russian behaviour in the digital space for many years now. As former President Obama said in a recent interview with The Atlantic magazine,
“if you ask me what I’m most concerned about when I think back to towards the end of my presidency… that is the degree to which information, disinformation, misinformation was being weaponized. And we saw it. But I think I underestimated the degree to which democracies were as vulnerable to it as they were, including ours”.
And the director of GCHQ, Sir Jeremy Fleming, made a strong point about values in his recent speech in Australia. As he said,
“we must make sure that we stay true to our values, those that have made our systems and democracies so successful and will do so in the future too”.
A recent Ofcom study has revealed that 30% of UK adults who go online are unsure about or do not even
consider the truthfulness of online information. A further 6%—around one in every 20 internet users—believe everything they see online.
There is, of course, crossover with the Online Safety Bill. I was grateful for the presence of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, at our meeting, where he gave some assurance about the operation of the Bill and the powers of Ofcom regarding the design features of social media platforms and the way that their algorithms amplify misinformation and disinformation; about the adoption of the Law Commission proposals for a new offence of false communication; and about the workings of the counter-disinformation unit together with the Defending Democracy programme and the so-called Election Cell—which I was assured was not as opaque as it seems.
I do not expect the Minister to promise amendments ahead of the Online Safety Bill coming to this House, but I hope he will demonstrate a strong awareness of the importance of this aspect of digital campaigning. We will obviously return to this subject when the OSB comes into this House later in the year.
All that said, it is clear that in many of these areas the guidance and review of an independent Electoral Commission is going to be critical together with parliamentary oversight. Responsibility for elections has now transferred to DLUHC from the Cabinet Office but it is no more acceptable for the Secretary of State for Levelling Up to set the policy and priorities for the Electoral Commission than it is for the Cabinet Office.
Given the risk of skewing our political system in favour of the incumbent Government, it is all the more important we hold fast when the issue which we determined in the first group today comes back to this House. I beg to move.