My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will also speak to Motions P, Q, R and S. Let me begin with Amendment 22, which inserts a new clause relating to age assessment. I reiterate to the House that assessments are and will only be used when necessary. There is no appetite to use them when there is no doubt of an asylum seeker’s age. As we have discussed in previous debates, failure to ensure proper assessments are conducted on individuals whose age is doubted creates obvious safeguarding concerns. It can also create a plethora of risks to the most vulnerable, to children in our schools and care systems and to asylum seekers themselves.
The problem with this amendment is that it creates numerous restrictions on our ability to use age assessments and risks, perpetuating the very real challenges within the current system. First, this amendment would mean that only local authority social workers would be able to undertake age assessments under the Bill. This would curtail our ability to support overburdened local authorities in this difficult task, given that there is significant variation between local authorities in experience, capacity and resource to undertake age assessments. It is the Government’s intention to establish a national age assessment board with qualified expert social workers employed by the Home Office, specialising in age assessments, to improve the quality and consistency of decision-making and to relieve the burden on local authorities where local authorities choose to refer a case. It is not our intention to increase the percentage of age assessments conducted, and local authorities will retain the ability to conduct these assessments themselves if they wish to do so.
Secondly, the amendment would mean that scientific methods of age assessment are specified in regulations only if they are
“ethical and accurate beyond reasonable doubt”
as approved by relevant professional bodies. The UK is one of very few European countries that does not currently employ scientific methods of age assessment. We have already set up an independent interim Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee to advise on the accuracy and associated ethical considerations of scientific methods. No one method of age assessment is entirely accurate, so this amendment sets an unreasonable expectation for what scientific methods could achieve, especially when they will be used in tandem with other evidence from social workers and others as part of an holistic approach.
In addition, I stress that although there are questions about the accuracy of scientific methods, we simply do not know how accurate or reliable the current approach of the Merton-compliant age assessment is. We are aware of cases where individuals have been assessed to be of vastly different ages when assessed independently by different social workers in different local authorities. Genuine children whose ages are in doubt will therefore benefit from more informed decision-making as a result of supplementing the current age assessment process with scientific methods with known accuracy—or a known margin of doubt, I perhaps might more accurately say—and reducing the risk that children may be misidentified as adults and vice versa.
We also contest the idea that professional bodies should be required to approve scientific methods, because any scientific method proposed will be considered by the independent Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee. The committee, formed by the Home Office chief scientific adviser, will comprise representatives of the relevant professions and will consider the scientific, ethical and contextual issues and provide advice to the Home Office, via its chief scientific adviser, on appropriate methods.
Finally, the amendment would lower the current standard of proof for social worker age assessments from the “balance of probabilities”, which is long established in case law, to a “reasonable degree of likelihood”. Lowering this standard would require social workers to accept as children individuals whom, on balance, they believe to be adults. On this basis, I put it that we cannot accept this amendment, to which the other place disagrees for its Reason 22A.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has tabled further amendments on age assessment—Amendments 22B to 22F. Although I recognise the intent behind them, I cannot support their inclusion for a number of reasons. First, I reassure the noble Baroness that social workers conducting age assessments for the national age assessment board will of course be able to refer to comprehensive guidance that, in line with standard practice, will be published and accessible on GOV.UK.
Although the vast majority of age assessments are expected to take place following referral from a local authority, the legislation provides the flexibility to enable other public authorities to refer cases in the event that this becomes necessary for the delivery of their official functions. The specification of any additional public authorities through regulation would of course occur following consultation with them and is therefore not considered to be controversial.
Secondly, we have already commissioned the independent interim Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee to advise on both scientific and ethical aspects of scientific age assessment. In line with the noble Baroness’s proposals, this committee in fact comprises expertise from the relevant disciplines, and the Home Secretary will seek advice from it via the Home Office chief scientific adviser before specifying a method in regulations. On this basis I ask the noble Baroness not to move her Motion.
I now bring back to the House’s attention Amendments 23 and 24, to which the other place has disagreed because of its Reasons 23A and 24A. These amendments remove provisions from the Bill relating to late compliance with a slavery or trafficking information notice—or STIN. The Government are determined to deliver the right outcomes for victims while focusing resources where they are needed. This will ensure that potential victims of modern slavery are proactively identified as early as possible.
However, we have listened to the concerns raised by your Lordships’ House and appreciate that there may be particular vulnerabilities for children, which is why the vulnerability of children will be included in our “good reasons” guidance. This is why the Government have now tabled their Amendment 24B, to exempt from the Bill’s credibility provisions those who were under 18 when the most recent STIN was served. Therefore, if an individual were under 18 on the date of service of the most recent STIN, these provisions would not apply and there would be no obligation on decision-makers to find the individual’s credibility to be damaged. I hope that this reassures the House that the needs of children are being taken into account by this Government when identifying victims of modern slavery. I commend this Motion to the House.
Amendments 25 and 25B in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, replace the original provision for disqualification from modern slavery protections where an individual is a threat to public order, or has claimed to be a victim in bad faith, with a new clause. Unfortunately, however, Amendment 25 does not provide a definition for “public order” at all, and Amendment 25B defines “public order” as coming into play only when an individual has been convicted of a terrorist offence—and even then, only in exceptional circumstances.
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We submit that this definition is very narrow and is unworkable as it does not include individuals who have been served with terrorism notices, who have been involved in terrorism-related activity or who otherwise pose a risk to national security; nor does it include individuals who have been convicted of serious criminal offences, such as manslaughter, culpable homicide, murder, violent acts and sexual offences. It is right that the Government should be able to withhold the protections afforded in the NRM—national referral mechanism—from dangerous individuals where lawful and appropriate, in line with our international obligations so to do, and that is what the original drafting of this clause does.
However, I understand the concerns of noble Lords, and so I would like to provide further clarity and reassurance on how the disqualification would operate. To begin, it is not our intention to carry out a full
consideration of every individual who enters the NRM for a public order disqualification decision. A mechanism will be established to identify cases of public order concern at the point of referral to the NRM. This clause, therefore, is about cases where individuals have been identified specifically as being a possible risk to public order in line with the definition, and this process will involve relevant experts; for example, national security experts will be involved to assess where an individual poses a national security risk. The relevant competent authority will then take consideration of the circumstances of the individual—including mitigating factors—which may mean, on balance, that the public order disqualification should not apply.
We have said previously that guidance will set out the mitigating factors to be taken into account but I reassure the House, specifically, that these will include: consideration of the nature and seriousness of the offence; the time that has elapsed since the person committed any such offence; whether this offence was committed as part of that individual’s exploitation, and the level of culpability attached; and whether an individual is assisting or co-operating with the relevant investigation or prosecution effort. As I have made clear here, we recognise the specific vulnerabilities of children. That is why we will also take particular consideration of the age and maturity of the individual, their exploitation and public order offence; and of course, children have separate protections under the Children Act.
I also wish to clarify that, where necessary, the individual will receive needs-based support following a positive reasonable grounds decision while the public order disqualification decision is being considered and, where individuals are entitled to legal aid following a positive reasonable grounds decision, to access legally aided immigration advice on leave to enter or to remain in the UK. This will continue to be available to individuals who are subject to a public order disqualification.
I hope this gives the reassurances needed to not insist on Amendment 25, and I hope it gives the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, the assurances he may need in order to not to insist on his Amendment 25B.
Amendment 26 comes back to your Lordships’ House after not being accepted in the other place for its Reason 26A. This amendment would delete provisions relating to leave to remain for victims of slavery or human trafficking, replacing them with new provisions which include support for confirmed victims. I acknowledge my noble friend Lord McColl of Dulwich and the work that he has carried out on this matter.
The Government have committed to providing where necessary the appropriate tailored support for a minimum of 12 months to all those who receive a positive conclusive grounds decision and need specific support. The other place has considered this amendment and concluded, for its Reason 26A, that it would alter the financial arrangements that the other place has made. I therefore ask that this House does not insist on the amendment.
My noble friend Lord McColl has proposed an amendment in lieu further relating to the provision of 12 months of support. It is clear that he and the Government both firmly agree on the principle of entitlement to support. However, it is also the
Government’s firm position that both support and leave to remain should be provided on the basis of need, tailored to the individual and their particular circumstances. The Government are committed to supporting victims of modern slavery in their recovery in line with our international obligations. In fact, the Bill confirms that support and protections are provided where necessary, from a positive reasonable grounds decision up to the conclusive grounds decision.
During that recovery period, potential victims can access a wide range of specialist support services through the modern slavery victim care contract—MSVCC—to help rebuild their lives. Once a victim receives a positive conclusive grounds decision, following the recovery needs assessment, MSVCC support services are provided, based on need. There is no overall set time limit for that support. I hope that for the reasons outlined, my noble friend will be prepared not to press his amendment.
I turn to Amendment 27, the final amendment relating to modern slavery, which creates new provision for victims of slavery and human trafficking for victims under 18 or who were under 18 at the time of their exploitation. The aspect of this amendment regarding the STIN has been addressed by the Government’s Amendment 24B, which also preserves the benefits of early identification and access to support for children. As I said earlier, we will take account of age and maturity in the guidance on the public order disqualification, as we recognise the specific vulnerabilities of children, and we will do the same for instances of additional recovery periods.
However, it is not appropriate that individuals who were exploited as children but who are referred as adults and have been convicted of serious criminal offences, or who pose a risk to national security as adults, should be exempted from disqualification automatically. I submit that that is simply wrong. The risk to public order must be considered, but it is not a blanket disqualification and we will take mitigating factors into account.
We have been consistent in our approach that providing both support and leave should be based on individual need. We will continue, as now, to consider the best interests of the child while making decisions. The other place has disagreed with this amendment for its Reason 27A. I put it to your Lordships’ House that this amendment is not necessary and should not be insisted upon. I hope that, for the same reasons, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, will not press his Motion S1.
Motion N1 (as an amendment to Motion N)