I said there was a robust system in place under the money laundering regulations in response to the various points that were made about financial services professionals, estate agents, et cetera. That is not to say that we cannot improve the system; we certainly look to do that. Providing information and transparency on property ownership, unexplained wealth orders and the sanctions regime, which is what we are doing, will help to supplement that system.
In July 2021, the CPS amended its legal guidance on money laundering offences for prosecutors to make it clear that it is possible to charge someone under Section 330 of POCA, which relates to the failure to disclose money laundering in the regulated sector. This closes a long-standing gap in law enforcement’s toolkit, which will better enable us to tackle the small minority of complicit professional enablers.
In addition, the Solicitors Regulation Authority—the largest legal PBS which supervises approximately 75% of regulated legal service providers in the UK—undertook a broad range of enforcement action in 2021. This included issuing 14 fines totalling £163,000, suspending membership three times and cancelling membership 13 times, effectively preventing an individual conducting regulated activity.
To take another example, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales—the largest accountancy PBS—undertook a broad range of enforcement action. This included issuing 59 fines, totalling £178,000, and cancelling the membership of firms six times—again, effectively preventing an individual conducting regulated activity.
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, suggested that we should consider how we can make legal professionals report matters relating to national security in a structured way and without the benefit of legal professional privilege. This is a complicated matter and not for this Bill, but I certainly welcome his contribution and his engagement, and we will certainly look at that.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, raised an important point on protecting whistleblowers. We recognise how valuable it is that whistleblowers are prepared to shine a light on wrongdoing and believe that they should be able to do so without fear of recriminations. The whistleblowing regime enables workers to seek redress if they are dismissed or suffer detriment because they have made a so-called protective disclosure about wrongdoing. It is right and proper that the Government review the whistleblowing framework once we have had sufficient time to build the necessary evidence of impact of the most recent reforms. We are considering the scope and timing of a review.
A number of noble Lords—the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, in particular— raised an important point concerning the wording “knowingly and recklessly”. The wording is drafted on precedent, coming from the Companies Act. This clause is intended to provide a necessary and proportionate deterrent to those who may otherwise provide inaccurate or misleading information on the register of overseas entities. This was debated at length in the other place and the Government have already made a commitment to reconsider the drafting. I also welcome the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, on the sanctions proposals.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, asked about the issue of the register and trusts. If the assets are owned via an overseas legal entity, then this entity is within the scope of the draft Bill and will be required to register the trustees as beneficial owners with Companies House and state the reason that they are the beneficial owner—that is, because they are the trustees of that trust.
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs introduced a register of trusts in 2017. Trustees of trusts that acquire UK land or property are required to register and provide information on the beneficial ownership of the trust. The information on the register can be shared with law enforcement authorities and enables them to access information on the trustees and beneficiaries of all trusts. Reforms to unexplained wealth orders will also allow law enforcement to investigate the origin of any property held via trusts.
I now turn to the points raised by the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Eatwell, on verification. Clause 16 requires the Secretary of State to make regulations requiring the verification of information before an overseas entity makes an application for registration, complies with the updating duty or makes an application to be removed from the live register. To ensure that regulations are laid in a timely way, we have added a requirement for regulations to be made before applications may be made for registration in the register of overseas entities. We expect that UK anti-money laundering supervised professionals may have a part to play in this, and we will set out details on the verification scheme in regulations. Overseas entities will be required
to update their information annually, and Companies House will be given broad powers to query information it holds via the further legislation to come later in the year. Also, the very public nature of the register means that there will be many eyes viewing the data, which will of course aid in identifying any inaccuracies. I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier for his comments on whether we are capturing the ultimate beneficiaries of property. This is an important point.