My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who spoke to these amendments. At the outset, I will dispel one widespread misapprehension about this clause. Under Clause 11, those who meet the terms of the refugee convention will be granted refugee status. There is no question of this clause making it harder to be a refugee or otherwise enabling the Government to refuse refugee protection
to those who need it. That is simply not true. What the clause does is enable the Secretary of State to distinguish between refugees based on whether they came directly and claimed without delay, but anyone considered under this policy will be a refugee.
The status of Clause 11, as a deterrent, is closely tied to secondary movements and the first safe country principle. In Committee it was claimed that, for a number of reasons, the UK must allow people to choose to come here from other safe countries to claim asylum, if they wish. This is not sustainable. It has also been posited that requiring refugees to claim asylum in the first safe country would undermine the global humanitarian and co-operative principles on which the refugee system is founded. I categorically reject this. In fact, it would strengthen them, because more countries would have the capacity for resettlement via safe and legal routes. Quite simply, if spontaneous intake falls, our ability to bring over refugees from regions of origin increases.
I will also reiterate at this stage that the first safe country principle is itself internationally recognised. Not only does it underpin the Common European Asylum System but there is a long-standing safe third country agreement between the USA and Canada which means that, barring certain exceptions, anyone arriving at the Canadian border is ineligible to make a claim. As my noble friend Lord Horam might have mentioned, Norwegian legislation similarly sets out that an application for asylum may be refused where a person has travelled to Norway after having stayed in a place where they did not face persecution. Australia—much mentioned this evening—also has those statutory powers to designate countries as safe, with the effect that anyone from that place will be barred from claiming asylum. In Australia, they have almost entirely stopped small boat crossings.
The evidence on which such policies are based is not only the fact that certain safe countries are clearly more popular than others as a destination for asylum seekers but comes from academic analysis. To be clear, I am going to talk about the reasons for secondary movements from one safe country to another, not why people leave their countries of origin in the first place. The two are clearly not the same. Secondary movements were assessed in a comprehensive analysis by Takle and Seeberg in 2015. An important part of their conclusion was that “future possibilities” play a crucial role in explaining secondary movements:
“For the individual migrant, it makes sense to ask: ‘If I make it through the waiting period and if I gain protection in this country—will I have the means to survive here? Will I be able to work, to find adequate housing, to fulfil my family obligations, to complete my education, to find friends, to belong: will I have a life? If not, where might I be better able to build myself a new life?’”
These are entirely sensible and understandable things to ask oneself. However, every last one of those things can be found in France and other safe countries without the need for a dangerous journey to the UK.
Another study concerning secondary movements of Eritreans between Italy and Norway by Brekke and Brochmann in 2014 noted the following:
“National differences in the quality of the reception system, in welfare policies, and in labour market opportunities motivated the secondary migration of asylum seekers and refugees in Italy.”
They also observed:
“The UK, Norway, and Sweden stood out as attractive destinations for the Eritreans. One informant stated: ‘There you get everything if you are accepted: housing, pocket money, education and work.’”
Again, this is totally understandable. The notion, as I have heard repeated in this House, that people are motivated by singular and discrete “pull factors” unrelated to economic considerations is therefore reductive and misleading. In fact, commonly cited pulls, such as language, family, and diaspora links, are not only intrinsically valuable but instrumentally valuable to improving future possibilities, including work and education. I repeat: France offers perfectly good future possibilities. There is no need to take a dangerous journey across the channel to improve future possibilities. We must do everything within our powers to stop this, including putting Clause 11 into law.
Briefly, the “without delay” element of Clause 11 is intended simply to deter other unwanted behaviours that we see in the asylum system. This includes making late claims without reasonable excuse, often in response to a negative immigration decision to delay removal. This is intended primarily to improve operational efficiency, enabling us to focus resources on those most in need and to carry out quick and cost-effective returns of those who have no right to be in the UK.
Distinguishing between different refugees forms part of the refugee convention itself. For example, the entire structure of entitlement under the refugee convention rests on different levels of attachment, with physical presence and lawful presence distinguished for the purposes of various entitlements. Article 31 does not contain a blanket prohibition on the imposition of penalties on refugees who enter or are present illegally. Article 31 prohibits penalties only in respect of refugees who either are coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened or present themselves without delay to the authorities, and who show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.
We think that differentiation is not a penalty, taking into account that the convention does not explicitly define “penalty” and the fact that there is no unanimity on the definition of penalty. In any event, the convention does not prohibit differentiation and the clear implication of Article 31 is that states are entitled to impose penalties on refugees who enter their territory illegally when the three conditions are not satisfied. I have already spoken at length about the broad and flexible nature of the powers under Clause 11, which I have consistently argued enable the Secretary of State to exercise sensitive and compassionate discretion in each and every case.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham stated that nobody would be in group 1. That is not true. Those who could not be reasonably expected to claim in another safe country may well be in group 1 if, for example, they were trafficked. This goes to my noble friend Lady Stowell’s point: despite a number of misleading media and NGO reports, there is a vanishingly low risk that anyone who has, for example, suffered sexual or gender-based violence, is coming to terms with their sexuality or is the victim of trafficking will face differentiated entitlements.
Our definitions of concepts such as “come directly” and “without delay” are drafted in a manner that is responsive to those who may have legitimate reasons for being unable to comply with the standards set out and, as per my noble friend’s amendments, as drafted already enable us to use reasonable discretion when considering imposition of differentiated entitlements—again, a point that my noble friend Lady Stowell made. Indeed, there is no obligation to impose any particular condition on group 2 refugees. There is ample room for people to show that they could not reasonably have been expected to claim asylum in another safe country or that they could not claim as soon as reasonably practicable.
Group 2 refugees will still be protected and receive relevant entitlements in accordance with the refugee convention so that the object and purpose of the convention are upheld. Accordingly, Clause 11 is considered a good faith, compatible interpretation of the refugee convention.
My noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering lamented the diminution of safe and legal routes. We have not diminished such routes; I have set them out and distributed them to noble Lords. Some of those routes are not capped—for example, the BNO and refugee family reunion routes. On that note, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary stated today the ability of Ukrainians to come fee-free via the family reunion route. Potentially 100,000 Ukrainian refugees will come here, and we will be very glad to see them. On the point about visa waivers, I think it is very important that we continue to have the simple security checks that my right honourable friend talks about, because there is evidence that people who would do us harm are masquerading as Ukrainian refugees.
Just to finish, I have a point on Jordan, which I think the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, mentioned. The standards of housing, recourse to public funds, education and healthcare in Jordan are not comparable with the UK. I shall say no more about that, but it is a difficult one to compare the UK with Jordan in terms of the infrastructure and facilities for Jordanians.
I think that every concern from noble Lords thus far has been met with a very clear and reassuring answer. This clause strikes a robust balance between firmness and fairness, with a firm policy response to the evidential picture about secondary movements and upholding the first safe country principle, but fair in its acknowledgement that we absolutely must be sensitive to the vulnerabilities of certain asylum seekers. I hope that, on that note, noble Lords do not press their amendments.
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