My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has brought a vital and sensitive debate before the Committee, for which I for one am very grateful. At the heart of each of these difficult cases is, as she said, the well-being of a child, and that principle has to remain uppermost in everyone’s mind. While the views of parents and guardians are routinely considered in everyday care, occasionally difficult disputes will arise. When they do, we should carefully consider how best to protect the interests of the child. I will start by saying that I fully agree with the noble Baroness that any failure to listen to the concerns of parents or a guardian would be bad practice.
However, I have a concern about the practical impact of this amendment. In cases of the care of children with life-limiting illnesses, the amendment would place the views of parents and guardians above those of clinicians and—let us be clear—the courts, which have a statutory obligation to act in the best interests of the child. Establishing a default presumption in favour of the parents’ views would fundamentally change the current balance. It would move away from the impartial assessment of the individual child’s best interests being paramount based on all the evidence in each specific case.
I understand the view that parents know what is best for their child and their wishes should be paramount. Sadly, though, I am afraid that I cannot fully agree with the proposition advanced in the amendment. It is
sometimes the case that desperate parents in these tremendously difficult circumstances are subject to the flattering voice of hope and, as a result, are not acting in a way that is necessarily in the best interests of their child.
To protect the child, it is right that when every effort at resolution has been unsuccessful there is recourse to a judicial process that can impartially assess all the evidence as to what treatment is best for the child. I also fear that it would be difficult for a clinician to determine, in the wording of the amendment, “anyone else” who has an interest in a child’s care. In considering the provisions of the amendment, I note that a child’s medical data can already be provided to parents following a subject access request, so we do not feel that legislation here is necessary. I absolutely agree that specialist palliative care teams should be part of the multidisciplinary team for any child or adult with a complex life-limiting illness; their involvement is an integral part of good practice, and I would expect referrals in such situations. However, I do not agree that it is necessary to put that into law.
Let me say something about mediation. I listened with care to my noble friend Lord Balfe. We know that mediation can and often does play a vital role in facilitating better communications and creating a space where voices on both sides of a dispute can be heard in a non-adversarial way. Unfortunately, that does not provide a solution in every dispute. The Government are supportive of the many excellent mediation schemes already available, including through charities and the private sector. We agree that parents and clinicians should be able to access such schemes where they wish to do so. However, we are not convinced that legislation is the answer to these thankfully rare but nevertheless tragic cases.
The current lack of statutory prescription means that mediation can be tailored specifically to meet the individual needs of families and their children, clinicians and hospitals, reflecting the unique circumstances of each case. There is currently a wide range of work and research into avoiding such protracted disputes and improving the approach to managing conflicts, with the aim of promoting good, collaborative relationships between parents and healthcare professionals to seek resolution without lengthy and costly legal battles. Furthermore, on those rare occasions where disputes are heard before a court, the amendment seeks to extend legal aid. Legal aid is already available for best interests cases, albeit subject to a means and merits test.
I understand the strong views on the amendment across the Committee. I understand that these issues are ethically charged and I take them seriously. However, I also believe that the current approach properly balances the views of parents and guardians with those of clinicians and, above all, with the paramount importance of the best interests of the child in question. The sensitivities around this subject are acute but I hope that what I have said has clarified why I do not feel able to accept what I know is a well-intentioned amendment.