My Lords, in the last group I spoke at some length. This time I hope to be more brief. The principles have been discussed in some other groups and the points at issue are of relatively narrow ambit, although they are important.
Clause 22 creates a new expedited appeal that will be heard in the Upper Tribunal. Too often, those facing removal or deportation utilise delay tactics to thwart removal action, such as withholding relevant information in their initial claim, which can be used later if they are first refused, resulting in late and repeated claims and subsequent appeals. That is both costly and an unfair burden on the courts and tribunals system. With this clause, appeals in relation to late human rights or protection claims brought by recipients of a PRN are determined quickly, with decisions being final. That removes the incentive for bringing late claims.
Where a person provides good reasons for a late claim, their right of appeal will not be certified as an expedited appeal. Furthermore, the Committee will note in Clause 22(5) that the Upper Tribunal retains discretion and when it considers that the only way that justice can be done in an individual appeal is to remit to the First-tier Tribunal, that is what it will do. Therefore, while I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, that better decision-making is important and certainly part of the answer, I do not accept the implication of their contributions, that it is the only answer. This is also an important thing that we can do to improve the system.
Clause 23 works together with Clause 22 to ensure that individuals cannot utilise the appeal system as a tool for delay. Clause 22 provides expedited appeals to be determined quickly and finally by the Upper Tribunal. There may be additional rights generated by other claims that an individual may want to exercise in parallel with an expedited appeal. Those other appeals might usually be heard in the First-tier Tribunal. Therefore,
without Clause 23, an expedited appeal might have concluded but there would be an outstanding appeal in the First-tier Tribunal, which would prevent removal. Clause 23 provides that the other related appeals will be heard by the Upper Tribunal at the same time, so provides a suitable one-stop shop. Again, there is a safeguard to ensure that in cases where the Upper Tribunal thinks that justice can be done only by continuing the appeal in the First-Tier Tribunal, it can do that. That is the burden of Clause 23(7).
For those reasons, which are brief but, I hope, persuasive, I beg to move that Clause 22 stand part of the Bill.