My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee explained, Clause 17 has the potential for time limits to be placed on the submission of evidence in support of an asylum claim. I am immediately reminded of the criminal caution in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, which says:
“You do not have to say anything. But, it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court.”
There is no time limit, you notice. I accept it is not a perfect analogy, because we have already established that asylum seekers are not illegal immigrants and, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, this should be an inquisitorial process not an adversarial one.
In this context, a notice served on a claimant saying something along the lines of “It may harm your claim if you do not provide evidence in support of your claim as soon as it is becomes available” seems reasonable. As in criminal cases, it should be left to the court, or in this case the tribunal, to place whatever weight it thinks appropriate on the evidence based on when it was submitted, and if it considers that the timing of
submissions reflects on the credibility of the claimant or not. Placing a deadline for the submission of evidence seems completely arbitrary and unreasonable, hence Amendments 78 to 81. How long it takes to secure, collate, and submit evidence will be different in every case, and may be especially delayed in the case of vulnerable claimants for the reasons we discussed on Tuesday, and the reasons noble Lords have explained this afternoon, hence Amendments 78 and 82. Even if the Government want to instruct officials, why not do this through the Immigration Rules, as has always been done?
The rest of Clauses 17 and 18 seem superfluous. To instruct a judicial body by primary legislation what conclusions it must come to when it is presented with evidence appears unnecessary, unreasonable and unconstitutional. I say that not knowing anything about the constitution, but thinking in terms of separation of powers between Executive and judiciary.
Clauses 19, 20 and 21 relate to priority removal notices. These too set an arbitrary deadline that must be complied with—in this case, after which a person is liable to be removed and deported. I say that, but Clause 20(4) says:
“A priority removal notice remains in force … even if the PRN recipient ceases to be liable to … deportation”.
Amendment 87 asks why that is. I am guessing that it is to avoid having to serve a separate evidence notice.
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All the previous arguments—about the deadline being arbitrary and how the time taken to put a case together will be different in different cases, particularly in relation to vulnerable applicants—also apply here. Again, a simple caution similar to the PACE criminal caution appears to me to be sufficient. Whether the timing of the submission of evidence has a bearing on the credibility of the claimant should be a matter for the tribunal, not the Bill.