I have the Clause 15 stand part debate and Amendment 195 in my name. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for their support in opposing this clause, and my noble friend Lord Blunkett for his support on Amendment 195.
Clause 15 puts in the Bill an existing immigration law on inadmissibility that makes any asylum claim inadmissible in a number of circumstances, including if the claimant has passed through a safe country or if they have a connection to a safe third country. The result of a finding of inadmissibility is that, unless the Secretary of State decides that there are exceptional circumstances, the claimant will be denied access to the UK’s asylum system for a “reasonable period”, currently defined as six months in Home Office policy, while the UK seeks to transfer them to “any other safe country”. With the huge backlog and delay currently in the system, it is impossible to understand how adding another six months to the asylum process will help an already dysfunctional system.
We believe that, as drafted, Clause 15 should not stand part of the Bill. It is just not acceptable or deliverable in practice. We have concerns on the definitions of “safe third state” and “connection” and the lack of relevant international agreements. Serious concerns have been raised by the UNHCR and the cross-party Joint Committee on Human Rights, among others. There is an absence of adequate safeguards against returning individuals to countries in which they will be denied rights owed to them under the refugee convention.
Safe returns, as part of an international asylum system, are not new and are accepted under agreed conditions. However, this clause does not provide for safe reciprocal return agreements. Even as it stands, the UK Government do not have return agreements with EU member states—namely the “safe third countries” that refugees are most likely to have passed through.
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Instead, it provides for cases to be stalled and unilaterally declared inadmissible, without a requirement for a relevant returns agreement, and on the basis of dubious connections to another state, where a person may or may not be able to enter an asylum system.
The clause provides that a claim is inadmissible if a person has a connection to a third state; it then clarifies that a connection can be with a state that a person has never even been to. It further clarifies that a person can be removed to a completely different state other than the one they have been deemed to have a connection with. The UNHCR has described this as a
“significant and highly problematic departure from international practice and UK case law.”
So will the Minister, on behalf of the Government, clarify that this clause permits the Home Secretary to remove a person to a third state on the basis that the Home Secretary believes they have a connection to an entirely different state, despite the person applying for asylum never having visited either?
On our concerns over the definition of a safe third state in the Bill, will the Government accept amendments to clarify the level of safety that a state must provide?
If not, why not? What does this clause lose by being more specific about the safety of where a person may be sent?
On the practicality of the clause, an inadmissibility regime of this kind came into force at the beginning of last year under changes to the Immigration Rules. The seemingly sole benefit of that so far is that it shows us in advance that it has not worked. From January to September of last year, more than 6,500 notices of intent were served to inform people that their cases were being considered for inadmissibility. Of more than 6,500 people, 48 people were actually deemed to be inadmissible, and only 10 people were removed. That comes from the Home Office’s own immigration statistics.
The current policy provides for a delay of up to six months where a person’s claim is still live but the Home Office takes no action on it. In practical terms, therefore, the actual result of this policy has been to add delay to thousands of cases for up to six months in a system where one of the Government’s key concerns—and a concern of this House too—is that it is fraught with delays. Since the Government now consider this policy successful enough to put into statute, despite the vast majority of cases having no realistic prospect of leading to removal, I have to ask: what is the intention of this clause, and by what measure will the Government think it a success?
Is delaying 6,500 cases for the removal of 10 cases from our system an acceptable balance and a good use of Home Office resources? If not, what would be an acceptable balance? Is the intention of the policy to reduce delays in our system? If so, the Government’s design is currently fatally flawed, as has been shown by the inadmissibility regime on which this clause is clearly based. Is the intention of the policy to act as a deterrent, as we believe it is? A version of this policy, as I have said, has been in action since January of last year, and there has demonstrably been no deterrent effect on the number of people seeking asylum in the UK, and the number of people risking their lives in dinghies has increased.
In order to have a safe reciprocal returns policy where necessary, the Home Secretary has got to put in the work on international co-operation and securing agreements. That, and not this clause, is the responsible approach, since this clause—Clause 15—is likely to return vulnerable people to unsafe countries and therefore breach international law and the refugee convention.
The clause is also clearly based on the presumption that the Government can persuade other countries to accept people from the UK: that is, that those who already take greater asylum responsibility than the UK will agree to relieve the UK of a substantial part of the modest responsibility we currently take. I suggest that the reality of Clause 15 is that no such agreements are likely to materialise.
Amendment 195 would provide that this clause cannot be commenced until the UK has working returns agreements that would allow the rules to function. Without them, the clause is meaningless. Your Lordships’ House would be asked to agree to a power which is not currently working and which cannot guarantee anything except further delays in our asylum system.
Finally, providing sanctuary to those fleeing war and persecution and to those trying to get their loved ones to safety, is an international effort. We are proud of that effort, but we by no means do more than our share. I simply ask the Government: what would happen if every state were to pass a clause absolving them of responsibility for months at a time in the hope that someone else might be able to deal with it?