My Lords, I thank the Minister for his informed and helpful introduction, coming as he does from the cockpit of European politics of yesteryear. I also acknowledge my noble friend Lady Merron. When I was in another place, I always observed how cogent and persuasive she was when debating business from the Front Bench and elsewhere.
The second sentence of these regulations indicates why they should be passed in this formal, low-key manner. In the third sentence, however, we can see that some history is made. In the Explanatory Memorandum, at paragraph 3.1, we can see the status of Parliament writ large. In paragraph 3.2, at line 3, there is the failsafe for Parliament: “cease to have effect”. The Minister has introduced a quite exceptional and very necessary procedure.
These regulations enable one to acknowledge the magnificent way in which our hospital trusts responded throughout to this virus. I still live in what was my constituency of 31 years, and our Deeside Community Hospital manager, Mrs Cheryl Froom, took charge of a new hospital—our leisure centre. The jabbing went like clockwork, despite daily football match-sized crowds. The local GPs and nurses were brilliant; they were so efficient and professional, and the volunteers so co-operative and willing. It all went so well that Mrs Froom also took charge at the seaside resort of Llandudno. Our hospital trust faced up to an exceptional challenge superbly. Arguably, I dare say that the Minister knows of many other trusts that did so very well.
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In the Explanatory Memorandum there is reference to fixed penalty notices. Were any served? How many? What amount was charged? Will the Minister give further insight on FPNs? In paragraph 6 of this helpful Explanatory Memorandum—thanks should go to Ms Stockley and Mr Vereker—reference is made to Wales. Does Wales operate the exact FPN as England? My understanding is that Wales can be different and do its own thing legislatively.
I note the reference to small businesses in paragraph 13. Was there consultation with, for example, the Federation of Small Businesses? The Minister might know that the economy of Wales is based largely on small businesses, as well as some very great and considerable businesses.
If I may say so, the Government of Wales have, in my opinion, responded very well to this crisis. We took the people with us in Wales. The Welsh point of view
was expressed frequently on the influential Radio 4 programme, “Today”; the nation got to know our First Minister on the “Today” programme—perhaps the Minister did too, and might remember him from his Welsh accent.
What estimate is there from Her Majesty’s Government of the impact so far of decisions by devolved Governments on English Covid policy? Do different Covid policies cut across English ministerial policy in a negative way? Is the department now assessing such impact? Which of the Governments got it right? Have these conclusions been arrived at or not? Who is considering that big issue in governance? Devolved government is now coming up front, after some 20 years—the unforeseen consequences of devolved government.
On these matters, how often did the First Minister of Wales confer with Her Majesty’s Government? When the First Minister embarked on a different Covid path, how was Downing Street informed? Did English officials debate, criticise or confer with Welsh officials? What attempts were made to achieve a unified approach? Were there any? I am talking here of governance—how it affects a great crisis and as a consequence of devolved government. It is only right to pose these questions in a forum such as this; many of the regulations that we consider here, from time to time, impinge hugely on the daily lives of our fellow citizens, but we tend to debate them in this low-key manner, and across the Floor, there is usually friendship and co-operation.
For certain, the consequences of devolved government have manifested themselves in the British state. Health is the current issue: a highly centralised state, some two decades later, has experienced the consequences of its devolution legislation. That is a fact; we have seen it broadcast across the nation, time and again.
Has the Covid crisis signposted the way to a federal Britain? The regulation does not concern the constitution, but there is the question, as a consequence of central government dealing with a crisis in health: has the Covid crisis signposted the way to a federal Britain?
I participated as a Minister in the legislation concerning devolved government as it was put forward, and rejected, in 1979. I remember the campaign, as I do the one that succeeded. I must say that things have moved on, hence my questions. When I entered the other place in 1970, it quickly became apparent that there is a constant battle between the House and the Executive. We may have observed it today—arguably, quite importantly. It often crossed the boundaries of parties. Parliament always needs to be vigilant, but in this instance, for these regulations, there was immediate co-operation in the other place. Throughout, however, that co-operation was shot through by the considerations of devolved government, the consequence of decades-old legislation.
Lastly, having seen the emergency regulations put forward, and now addressed again by the Minister, I was in the Chamber of the House of Commons early in the 1970 Parliament, when that iconic manufacturing company, Rolls-Royce, became bankrupt. Overnight, the British House of Commons—in 24 hours—took into state ownership a dying company. I am not making a specific parallel, but the measures in the other place and here today conjure that up for someone with a
long parliamentary memory, such as me, and it seems apposite to dare to remind this Committee of those moments.