My Lords, I will address the amendments in what is now group 4, commencing with Amendment 18 in my name, which address the various ways in which the board of an ICB should be constituted. I thank the noble Lords who have supported the amendments in my name and will speak also to Amendments 28 and 37.
Amendment 18 covers who should be on the board and, crucially, who should not. These amendments are about the governance of ICBs. They are going to be very powerful bodies—they are already operating in a shadow way, as it were—which will allocate hundreds of millions of pounds of public funds on our behalf. The question is about who should have a seat at the table where the decisions are taken. We should perhaps begin with who should not be on an ICB. There appears to be agreement that private sector interests should not be permitted, so I see no point in repeating the debates that took place in the Commons because that principle has already been settled. However, as ever, the devil is in the detail of how that translates into legislation and the ICB constitutions. It is my belief that what is in the Bill so far is not strong enough.
The objective is that private providers cannot have any part in decisions about how NHS resources are allocated or how contracts are placed. In my other amendments, I have extended the scope of this to ban GPs with APMS contracts, as they are definitely private sector interests. How someone from a social enterprise or the voluntary sector might be regarded is an issue to address sensibly, and I very much welcome that the Minister has said on several occasions that he believes that a margin of flexibility will be needed to make that happen. We all know that there is a single example of someone from Virgin Care being on a non-statutory non-decision-making ICS, one out of the 42 ICBs and one person on a body with 20-odd other members. That is still one too many. It is the principle that matters.
Private providers are bound essentially and legally to be addressing shareholder value, which is absolutely right and as it should be for their particular business interests, but they are not the values that underpin the NHS, which is absolutely not about striving for profit and shareholder value in any way. That is not to say
that the NHS at every level should not strive for value for taxpayers’ money and effectiveness, but the best service for patients and communities is surely the underpinning objective of our NHS and it should be that for ICBs. Nor is it saying that the NHS should not be commissioning or working with a variety of providers, but we need to safeguard those values and the social value that underpin the NHS.
In the Commons this has been debated and Ministers are on the record about their intention not to have private providers represented. Sadly, some of us are still sceptical. This is particularly so when one looks at the easing of the 2012 commissioning and procurement regime. I await with interest the Minister’s reply on this matter. In making appointments to ICBs we are clear that there should be some kind of test so that if someone has something in their background which a reasonable person might think makes them unreasonably favourable or disposed to the use of private providers within the NHS, then they have no role on an ICB. I suspect that one might have to see, when the Bill finally takes effect as an Act, that those tests might be brought to bear on some of the ICS/ICB chairs and non-executive directors who may fail it.
The ICBs have similar duties to the CCGs they replace, at least on paper, but the board of an ICB will be very different from the CCG GPs and sometimes, it has to be said, the rather ad hoc arrangements that existed there. ICBs will be much closer to the unitary board model of trusts, FTs and the PCTs of recent memory. We agree with the intention of more effective commissioning of health services in the new era of co-operation and collaboration and with better integration with related services, so there should be a new kind of board made up of fewer NHS insiders and more who may have a wider perspective and fit better into the new model and the aspirations of the Bill.
We have had what feels like a dozen different ways of making commissioning work, and I have been directly involved in some. My observation is that as soon as they look like they are starting to work, they get reorganised. The trouble has always been the split between commissioners and providers, which some may say is essentially bogus. Both bits are still core NHS, and the big trusts have massive influence because they are massive. There is no democratic accountability, and the big providers had all the clout, not the commissioners. The NHS commissioning operation is often in splendid isolation from the rest of the public services, disconnected even from social care, to say nothing of where primary and community care and public health come in. This Bill aspires to be different, so we need to look at how it is served differently by the ICBs.
There has been some pretence that this will all change under the Bill, just as there has been for previous ones on commissioning. ICBs are given flexibilities and can build place-based sublevels, but the reality is that, as they are constructed at the moment, they are the same old NHS cartels. They have all the freedom they are allowed, but they may ultimately be powerless. The public will have as much idea about what ICBs do as they did about CCGs, and we all remember the marches to save our PCTs in the distant past. Just to make this clear, vested interests
get a place in the ICB as of right but the public, patients and staff are not given that honour and responsibility. That is what part of these amendments does. Amendment 37, in my name and that of others, sets out our view about which voices are most important, and it breaks the mould of NHS appointing.
I divert briefly to say that elsewhere we will discuss more about how those appointments are made. Our view is that some independent appointments commission ought to make a comeback. I took great encouragement from the comments of the noble Earl, Lord Howe, on Tuesday, which helped in this regard. But there is still far too much control from the top and far too little say from the bottom on all the appointments that will be made under the Bill. Amendment 37 at least offers a way to have some diversity and possibility to challenge the interests that dominate the NHS.
Surely nobody who looks at what the amendments suggest would argue that these interests do not have a right to some voice. The public, patients, staff, social care, public health, mental health—which of these can be safely ignored and which has no part to play? We know the Minister in the Commons gave a minimalist defence in the interests of the new mantra of flexibility. He rightly said that boards should be of a manageable size and that ICBs should have some flexibility—as much as NHS England would allow—to add others to the board, beyond the minimum. The NHS actually has to do what it is told and, unless a more stringent requirement is put in the legislation, it will do what it has always been allowed to do. If we really want a better care system and some change to make organisational upheaval worthwhile, let us have a go at doing something different, with a wider group of voices to be heard and take decisions.
Our Amendment 37 deals with appointing key non-executive board members to represent interests, but within a unitary board. On Tuesday, colleagues pointed out that all board members share collective responsibility, which is a tried and tested model, but we need a discussion about this. I can see from the amendments in this group that other noble Lords have views—my noble friend Lord Bradley and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for example—but our amendments and others in the group, if we discuss them together, would make for a better balanced board, which does not necessarily have to be a larger board. I hope the Minister will consider these submissions carefully. I beg to move.