My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate on Clauses 58 to 60. These three clauses will help ensure unimpeded vehicular access to Parliament and implement the Law Commission’s recommendation to codify in statute the common-law offence of public nuisance.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, mentioned pressure from “wherever” regarding Clause 58. In fact, the clause gives effect to a recommendation by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which Harriet Harman is chair, to protect the right of access to the Parliamentary Estate for those with business there, including, of course, Members of your Lordships’ House. The clause amends the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 to allow a police officer to direct an individual to cease, or not begin, obstructing vehicular access to the Parliamentary Estate. If a person does not comply with a direction, they will be committing an offence and may be arrested. Currently, parliamentarians and others conducting business in the Palace can face delays in entering and leaving Parliament via vehicular entrances, both impeding the functioning of our democracy and creating a security risk, with vehicles held stationary while police clear the way.
I should stress at this point that this power does not stop people protesting in the vicinity of the Palace of Westminster. Those who want to protest outside Parliament can continue to do so but, if asked by a police officer, must allow the passage of vehicles through the Palace’s gates or face the consequences.
Should Parliament need to relocate for any reason, such as the ongoing restoration and renewal works, Clause 59 provides the Home Secretary with the power to designate a new controlled area around Parliament’s new temporary location. This would ensure that the protections afforded by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, as amended by this Bill, applied wherever Parliament relocated to.
Clause 60 implements the Law Commission’s recommendation that the common-law offence of public nuisance should be codified in statute. We heard last week calls for the Government to be more diligent in implementing Law Commission recommendations, so I hope noble Lords will support and welcome this measure.
Putting the long-standing common-law offence of public nuisance into statute will provide clarity to the police and potential offenders, giving clear notice of what conduct is forbidden.
We have followed the Law Commission’s recommendation as closely as possible. In doing so, we are narrowing the scope of the existing common-law offence. That is being achieved by retaining the use of the terms “distress”, “annoyance”, “inconvenience” and “loss of amenity” within scope of the offence but by requiring that these harms be “serious”. We are also increasing the fault element of the offence. Currently, a person would be guilty through negligence; under the new offence, that is raised to intent or recklessness. Finally, we have made it a defence for a person to prove that they had a reasonable excuse for their act or omission that caused a public nuisance.
The Law Commission’s report stated that as the offence is intended to address serious cases for which other offences are not adequate, if a maximum sentence is set then it should be high enough to cover these cases. We have therefore set the maximum custodial sentence at 10 years. It is worth noting that that is lower than the current unlimited maximum sentence available under the common-law offence.
I turn to the amendments tabled to Clause 60, beginning with Amendment 314 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. As the clause is currently drafted, the offence is committed if a person’s act or omission causes serious harm to the public or a section of the public, or obstructs the public in the exercise or enjoyment of their rights. The amendment would limit the scope of the offence to only where serious harm is caused to the public. That would significantly narrow the scope of the offence. Most forms of public nuisance will, by their nature, impact on only a section of the public rather than the public generally.
However, I believe it is right that the offence be committed if it affects a section of the public. It is a fundamental part of the common-law offence of public nuisance that not every member of the public need be affected but a section of the public must be. Similarly, the offence should include where the rights of the public are infringed; the Law Commission concluded it is right to do so. For example, the effect of excessive and persistent noise or the release of a foul-smelling substance or gas in a public place may affect only a small number of local residents but potentially affects any member of the public who enters the relevant area.
Amendment 315 flows from a JCHR recommendation that aims to clarify that this offence is not committed if serious harm is caused to a person. That would be achieved by removing the word “person” from the definition of “serious harm”. I understand that the noble Lord is trying to clear up ambiguity as to whether an offence of public nuisance can be committed to a person, but I remain to be persuaded that the amendment is strictly necessary. Subsection (1) of the clause already sets out that the offence of public nuisance can be committed only against the public or a section of the public, with the references to persons in the definition of “serious harm” being an interpretive provision that does not affect the scope of the offence. That said, I am ready to consider this point further ahead of the next stage.
The amendment would also raise the threshold at which the offence is committed where an individual put the public at risk of serious harm. The amendment would raise that to “serious” risk of serious harm. We have followed the Law Commission’s recommendations in setting the scope of the offence and the thresholds at which it will be committed. The commission conducted a rigorous consultation on the offence, and it is right that, in this instance, we follow the recommendations set out in the report.
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Amendment 315A is in the name of my noble friend Lady Morrissey. It would remove causing disease from the definition of “serious harm”. The harm of causing disease sits alongside causing death and personal injury to the public or a section of the public as an injury in scope of the offence. Again, we have followed the Law Commission’s advice. It is only right that, if someone can be guilty of public nuisance by causing or risking death or injury to the public, they can also be guilty should they endanger the public by exposing them to a highly contagious disease. Although thankfully not a threat we face today, in 1815 a woman was convicted of the common-law offence after she carried her smallpox-infected child through a public highway.
Amendment 316 seeks to give effect to another JCHR recommendation. It would add a provision to ensure that the right to protest is considered when determining if a defendant has a reasonable excuse for their act or omission which led to a charge of public nuisance. As we have stated in our response to the JCHR’s report, the Human Rights Act 1998 already provides that public authorities must not act in a way that is incompatible with any European convention right. Courts must consider defendants’ convention rights; therefore, this amendment is unnecessary as it provides no further protections than those already granted under the Human Rights Act.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 317 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, which I understand is to highlight the difference between this new criminal offence of public nuisance and the tort of public nuisance. The existing common-law tort of public nuisance will continue to exist. Subsection (8)(b) provides that the clause does not affect the civil liability of any person for an act or omission which constitutes public nuisance and subsection (8)(c) clarifies that the clause does not affect the ability to take action under any enactment against a person for an act or omission which constitutes public nuisance. I will reflect on this amendment.
In conclusion, I hope noble Lords are satisfied as to why I believe these amendments are unnecessary and will support the Government’s efforts to faithfully implement the recommendation of the Law Commission. I commend Clauses 58 to 60 to the Committee.