My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken to these amendments. Amendment 319AA would limit the offence of locking on—on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the deputy commissioner has in fact welcomed this offence—to cases where serious disruption had been caused, thereby excluding from the ambit of the offence cases where the use of a lock-on has not caused serious disruption but where the conduct is capable of doing so. Removing this element of the offence would make it possible for those who engage in such behaviour to evade prosecution. This could happen if they were quickly removed by the police or if they removed themselves from the lock-on after having caused some disruption which did not meet the threshold of “serious”.
In a similar vein, it is necessary that the offence can be committed if a person locks on and was reckless as to whether it would cause serious disruption. Amendment 319AB would remove this and have the offence be committed only if there was intent to cause serious disruption. If this amendment were made, a person who is aware of the risk of causing serious disruption but unreasonably took that risk anyway would not be captured by the offence.
What matters here is the protester’s intention and/or the impact of their actions. It may simply be fortuitous that the action of locking on did not cause serious disruption, but, if that was the intent, we believe the offence should apply. Equally, if there was not an
intention to cause serious disruption but it was a risk of which they were aware and they unreasonably took that risk, again we believe that such conduct should be covered by the new offence.
A few noble Lords talked about bikes, specifically people innocently going about their business with a bike lock. It is a defence for a person to prove that they had a reasonable excuse for carrying the equipment in question. For example, carrying a bike lock for the purposes of locking one’s bike to a designated space for bikes could be considered a reasonable excuse. The prosecution must also demonstrate that the person intended to use the item in the course of or in connection with the lock-on offence.
A couple of noble Lords asked whether this was a ban on protests. HMICFRS concluded that protest banning orders would not be compatible with human rights, but the report considered only orders that would outright ban an individual from protesting. The two are quite different. SDPOs grant the courts discretion to impose any prohibitions and requirements necessary to protect the public from protest-related offences, breaches of injunctions and serious disruption. Depending on the individual circumstances, this might mean that the court will not consider it necessary to stop individuals attending protests. Also, a court as a public authority must not act incompatibly with protesters’ Article 10 and Article 11 rights. This means that the court must decide whether making an SDPO is proportionate in an individual case.
Amendments 319AC, 319BC, 319DC and 319P seek to probe the maximum fine for the new offences created by the government amendments. What were level 5 fines, or a maximum of £5,000, were replaced in 2015 as a result of reforms introduced by the coalition Government through the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. We think that an unlimited fine is appropriate in the case of these new offences; a level 1 or level 2 fine, as proposed by the noble Lord, would not, in our view, reflect the seriousness of the conduct in question. An unlimited maximum fine allows courts to determine the level of any fine on a case-by-case basis, having regard to the gravity of the offence and the ability of the offender to pay.
Amendment 319BA probes what objects it will be a criminal offence to possess under the “in connection with” limb of the going equipped to lock-on offence. This could include items that supported the deployment of a lock-on but did not form a part of it—for example, tools to set up structures to be used in the course of a lock-on.
Amendment 319BB would limit the offence such that a person would only be guilty of going equipped to lock on if they are carrying the equipment to commit the lock-on offence themselves. This would mean that a group of protesters could each legally carry items to lock on for use by others in the group.
Amendment 319DA would limit the scope of the offence to where a person obstructs the setting out of lines for major transport works or actual construction or maintenance. We think that it is necessary to include acts that obstruct steps necessary for facilitating construction. This would include steps such as environmental surveys and the translocation of species. If protesters delay
ecological surveys into nesting or hibernation season, construction works may be delayed by a period of a year, potentially adding millions to the cost of HS2.
Amendment 319DB seeks further to narrow the scope of the offence to omit activity where a person interferes with, moves or removes any apparatus necessary for the works. This amendment would enable protesters to interfere with works without committing the offence simply by interfering with equipment rather than the relevant works. It is necessary that this limb of the offence remains.
Finally, turning to the amendments on serious disruption prevention orders, one of the circumstances in which an order can be imposed is when at least two protest-related offences have been committed. Amendments 319L and 319M seek to raise the burden of proof for demonstrating that two offences were protest related from “on the balance of probabilities” to “beyond reasonable doubt”. We have had this debate before, including in the context of serious violence reduction orders, and it is our view that these are civil orders and that it is therefore entirely appropriate for the civil standard of proof to apply in the making of an order. It is already the case that the court must consider the SDPO necessary to prevent a person committing harmful protest-related acts. In the event of a prosecution for breach of an order, of course the prosecution would need to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
Amendment 319N removes the ability of the courts to impose an SDPO on application. We think it is essential that the courts should have the power to impose an order in such circumstances. It will allow SDPOs to be placed on those who are intent on causing unjustifiable disruption at a protest but who have not met the criteria for an SDPO on conviction. It is entirely right that, where there is sufficient evidence of a pattern of behaviour that an SDPO be imposed. The public should not have to risk unjustifiable disruption caused by an individual who the police knew was likely to cause such disruption simply because they did not have two prior protest-related convictions. This would mean that even if someone had two convictions, if the application was not made at the time of the second conviction, an application could not be made until they were convicted of a third protest-related offence. This approach is consistent with other risk-based civil orders that may be made in the absence of a conviction—for example, domestic abuse protection orders.
Amendments 319Q to 319U remove the ability for a court to renew an SDPO. Where there is strong evidence that that an individual would go on to cause serious disruption, it is appropriate that the facility exists for SDPOs to be renewed.
Very finally, on the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, on the DPRRC report, we consider that the negative procedure for the SDPO’s statutory guidance to be appropriate, but we are studying the report and will respond soon.
The question of causing or contributing to felt like a bit of an exam question at the end of quite a long day. I have three Acts in which causing or contributing
feature: the Water Act 2014, the Climate Change Act 2008 and the Football Spectators Act 1989. On the question of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, about whether these measures will be taken in the new year, the answer is yes.
I am obviously disappointed that the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kennedy, have signified their objections to the amendments tabled today but, given that, I will not move them. However, the Committee should be in no doubt that we will retable them for Report and, if necessary, seek the opinion of the House. With that, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 319A.