My Lords, I have Amendments 35, 45, and 47 in this group. This is a very large group of amendments covering a range of issues and I apologise in advance for the length of my comments.
Noble Lords will forgive me for sounding like a broken record, but I go back again to the Government response to the consultation on the new legal duty to support a multiagency approach to preventing and tackling serious violence, which supports my own consultation with relevant stakeholders, which revealed universal concern that the Bill as drafted actually facilitates a police-led enforcement approach and not a genuine public health approach—a genuine multiagency approach to these issues.
The Government set out three proposals in that consultation: the one in the Bill, a new duty through legislation to revise community safety partnerships,
and a voluntary approach. More responses were in favour of revising crime and disorder partnerships than the Government’s preferred approach set out in this Bill. Can the Minister tell the Committee what the purpose of the consultation was if the Government had already made up their mind?
The revising of crime and disorder partnerships was supported by 40% of respondents, including half of all police responses, compared with 37% in favour of the approach in the Bill. It is not too late to accept the result of the consultation and to revise crime and disorder partnerships. Amendment 35 is a probing amendment giving an example of how this might be done: for example, by adding authorities to existing crime and disorder partnerships.
Amendment 45 raises the concern that sensitive personal information, which this Bill forces public authorities and even doctors and counsellors to disclose, may be disclosed to private sector or third sector organisations that the Home Office, police forces or others may subcontract work to, to tackle or prevent serious violence, whose data security and personnel vetting procedures may not be as good as that of public sector organisations, and that this may result in sensitive personal information leaking into the public domain.
What assurances can the Government provide that such data, if public authorities are forced to share it, will be kept confidential? Cybercrime experts tell us that no database is secure and that data holders need to work on the basis that their security will be breached and that they need to have back-up plans. The more sensitive personal information about individuals is shared, the greater the risk that confidential information will end up in unauthorised hands, potentially used for illegal purposes such as blackmail, and ultimately end up in the public domain. Amendment 47 removes any requirement to disclose information that would breach an obligation of confidentiality.
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Moving to other amendments in this group, Amendment 34, to which I have added my name, takes us back to what should be the fundamental principle of disclosure of information: that we should trust the professionals—whether doctors, counsellors, social workers or youth workers—to exercise their professional judgment in balancing the often hard-won trust and confidence of those they work with against the need to disclose sensitive personal information to the police or other agencies in order to tackle or prevent serious violence.
It should not be beyond the imagination of the drafters of the Bill to think of a scenario where preservation of that bond of trust is more important than the potential impact on serious violence of passing on sensitive personal information. Can you imagine a youth worker or a social worker trying to work to rehabilitate a young person involved in or at risk of becoming involved in serious violence, who on their first meeting had to say to them, “I have to tell you that if you tell me anything about serious violence, I am under a legal duty to pass it on to the police”?
As we heard in the last debate, there are existing systems, processes, policies and protocols about what—and under what circumstances—confidentiality can and should be breached. Having a law that compels disclosure of sensitive personal information will dramatically and detrimentally change the very relationships that are often crucial to reducing and tackling serious violence.
The other point on this issue is the practical effect of such a legal duty. If, as is almost always the case, the confidential exchange occurs between two people, where no one else is present, how will that duty to pass on that information about serious violence to the police be enforced if the youth or social worker decides to break the law by not passing it on, except in the highly unlikely event that the person who originally disclosed the information themselves makes the information public?
Placing people under a legal duty to disclose information to the police about serious violence is very likely to have unintended consequences that could make the problem of serious violence even worse. Amendment 34 is intended to leave disclosure to the professional judgement of those involved, as it is now, as are Amendments 46 and 63 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, which we also strongly support. The explicit provision that enables professionals to breach their obligation around confidentiality should not be part of the Bill.
The existing systems of processes, policies and procedures strike the right balance of building trust and confidence and, in exceptional circumstances, breaching that confidence and disclosing sensitive personal information. Clause 9 is not necessary and should not stand part of the Bill, and neither should Clause 14, forcing educational, prison and youth custody authorities to collaborate, including making any breach of confidence lawful.
We support Amendment 65, to which I have added my name, which refers to the provision of information to local policing bodies, which under Clause 13 “may assist” and/or “may … monitor” and/or “may report” on the actions taken in their area to tackle or reduce serious violence. This raises another fundamental issue: who is in charge and ultimately responsible for preventing and tackling serious violence? Is it crime and disorder partnerships or one of the specified authorities—in which case, which one—or police and crime commissioners? Is that not an important part of what PCCs are elected to deliver: to prevent and tackle serious violence? Is that not one of the major matters that they should be judged on by the electorate when it comes to re-election? According to the Bill, they “may assist”.
There is nothing more certain to fail than when something is everybody’s responsibility and therefore no one’s responsibility. In any event, as directly elected mayors and police and crime commissioners are only assisting in preventing and tackling serious violence or monitoring or reporting on it—and only if they want to, according to the Bill’s wording—the amendment ensures that any information supplied to them in their largely observer role is depersonalised.
For the reasons I have already stated, we also support Amendment 67 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, which would remove the power to compel people to divulge information to local policing bodies and remove any obligation to keep information confidential.
Directly elected mayors and police and crime commissioners already have considerable de facto authority in their local areas from their electoral mandate, without the need for legal powers to force other bodies to provide them with information. Clause 16 is not necessary and should not stand part of the Bill. To suggest that anyone in a position of trust and responsibility who is working with the issues and people affected by serious violence needs to be coerced, to have a legal duty placed on them to collaborate and to pass information that is essential to the prevention and tackling of serious violence to the appropriate authorities, is an insult and is likely to be counterproductive.