My Lords, there are some valuable things in the Bill but they are dwarfed by things that really should not be in it. Parts of the Bill are dangerous to our civil liberties while other substantial parts add nothing useful to existing law.
I shall concentrate on just four points. To start with, there is the sheer extent of the Bill, which has been referred to. As a former member of the Constitution Committee, I am enthusiastic about its report pointing out that Bills of this size and complexity impede proper legislative scrutiny by Parliament.
Secondly, the Bill makes bad law. Take the deeply objectionable attempt to reduce rights to protest, in apparent defiance of the European Convention on Human Rights. This gives enormous subjective discretion to police officers—who, so far as I am aware, have not asked for that kind of subjective role—and introduces the concept of “unease” in relation to noise, in the wording
“persons of reasonable firmness … may … suffer serious unease”.
I like to think that I am a person of reasonable firmness and indeed I am caused serious unease by loud noise in shops, restaurants and various places, but it does not usually represent a reason why someone else’s civil liberties should be seriously abrogated. In this context, we really have to avoid such badly worded legislation.
Thirdly, I turn to the Delegated Powers Committee, which the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, has spoken about. The committee says in its report:
“We are surprised and concerned at the large number of inappropriate delegations of power in this Bill.”
There is the accretion of ministerial power to rule by statutory instrument. The Secretary of State will have power by regulation to prescribe what constitutes “serious disruption”, in Clause 55, and will have the Henry VIII power to alter the meaning of “qualified homicide” and to amend this Act accordingly. The extraction of confidential information from telephones is inappropriately left to regulations that, in the view of the committee, should be in the Bill itself and therefore amendable. The committee also pointed out that the Bill will
“allow the imposition of statutory duties via the novel concept of ‘strategy’ documents”
that in some cases may not even be published at all. There are also the usual wide powers of consequential amendment by regulation, which currently seem to be slipped into many Bills as standard.
Then there is the direct and indirect effect of the Bill’s sentencing provisions and the wider sentence-inflation effect that they, and the rhetoric of longer sentences, will produce. The impact assessment reckons that there will be 700 more prisoners, with 300 new prison places immediately required. Paragraph 43 speaks of
“a risk of having offenders spend longer in prison and a larger population may compound overcrowding (if there is not enough prison capacity), while reducing access to rehabilitative resources and increasing instability, self-harm and violence”.
We have seen that happening in prisons, and if we have 700 more prisoners it will get worse.
Measures to bring about longer sentences are wide in their effects because it is not merely about the inclusion of a long sentence for a particular offence; it is all the campaigns that then follow, saying that the sentence for something else is not enough—“That’s all you get for stealing someone’s pet rabbit”, for example—that could happen if the Government go ahead with this suggested amendment. There is a knock-on effect, and it affects the judiciary. There is no escaping the fact that long periods when much is talked about longer sentences have an effect on what judges do in sentence determination.
This move to longer sentences is a major reallocation of resources, unsupported by any evidence that it is the most effective way to keep the public safe either by deterrence or by rehabilitation during custody. These are resources that are desperately needed to fight crime and tackle the problems that lead people into crime in the first place. It really is time that we corrected this trend.
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