My Lords, I will attempt to address three short points in the hope that I can push a little on an open door.
On the first point, relating to abstraction from mobile phones, the door has already been opened by the Minister. This problem has bedevilled the criminal justice system for at least nine years, and the opportunity has now come to deal with it comprehensively. The Bill does not do so. My noble and learned friend Lord Judge admirably put the change in the mores in a way which I could never match, but there is an area on which I can perhaps add a bit—the change in technology and the advent of programmes that can be used to assist has greatly changed things. I hope, therefore, with the indications given by the Minister, that we can look for a comprehensive piece of work, in a code or in statutory provisions, that will deal with this subject comprehensively.
The second area I want to turn to briefly is the use of out-of-court disposals. They play an essential part in the criminal justice system; I wish to say nothing about the specific changes put forward. However, with the growth in the use of out-of-court disposals over the past 15 years, there has been the need to ensure consistency, transparency and accountability. Attempts have been made by the judiciary, in conjunction with the magistracy, the police and the Government, to try to set up some form of accountability, particularly through panels of magistrates. I have no time to go into the details of that but a lot of it is summarised in a report by Cerys Gibson of Nottingham University, published by the Sentencing Academy in February. What is needed, if the confidence of victims and the public is to be maintained in this very extensive use of sentencing powers, is proper scrutiny. This will ensure consistency so that one force does not vary from another; we cannot have a postcode lottery. We also want to be sure that the police carry this out fairly and appropriately. I hope that the Minister will be prepared to explore this area, which needs dealing with comprehensively.
Thirdly, Clause 109 concerns a much more specific but important point. For the past 20 or so years, it has been a hallmark of our justice system that matters dealing with the sentencing of individuals are dealt with utterly independently and that people are not put, or kept, in custody for longer other than through a judicial or Parole Board process. The power under Clause 109 may be needed to deal with high-risk offenders in respect of certain individuals, but it is a power referred to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State. I very much hope that we can do two things: first, ensure that the clause is drafted in such a way
that the risk of political pressure is removed; and, secondly, ensure that no one is kept in prison for longer than is necessary and that the decision to keep someone in longer is that of an independent body. As I read the clause, as it is currently drafted, it is possible—by a very late reference by the Secretary of State—for someone to be kept in custody without any judicial determination. I hope, therefore, that the clause can be looked at carefully and amended, because I am sure that no one wants to see us go down the road of terms of imprisonment being extended other than by an independent judicial body. It may be a small point, but the two hallmarks of our system require independence from political interference and decisions on custody being totally in the hands of independent bodies.
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