My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this statutory instrument in his usual straightforward manner. I support it and, for once, I cannot quibble with its need for a hasty introduction within the 21-day limit. In the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism no time should be wasted. The need to add new countries to the list surely takes precedence over the need for a 21-day period before the legislation can come into force.
The Government have decided that they no longer want to be bound by the European Commission’s list of states which require extra money laundering precautions. They have opted instead to adhere to the Financial Action Task Force list although, in practice, this amounts to a very little change.
The need for vigilance is clear. The threat of terrorism is omnipresent. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant—ISIS—continues to pose a threat, as it has access to resources which enable it to carry out or inspire terrorist attacks. Al-Qaeda and its various affiliates
still pose a threat, and there are countless hostile forces, both organised and rogue, which can do harm to civilised nations. The proceeds of money laundering are their cash in hand. Money laundering is certainly not a victimless crime. It needs to be hounded out and this legislation is part of the process.
The Financial Action Task Force has set itself up as the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog. More than 200 countries and jurisdictions are signed up to its policies. However, I wonder whether its methods are any longer entirely reliable in giving us the list we require. For instance, Russia does not feature on the list of countries which should be subject to increased vigilance. I wonder why. We are told by FATF that Russia has an in-depth understanding of its money laundering and terrorist financing risks and that it has policies and laws to address these risks. That might be enough for the FATF, but can the Minister tell us whether it is enough for the British Government? Do they feel comfortable with the FATF list about where particular vulnerabilities lie? It seems to me—and to others—that Russia has a framework aimed at preserving what it wants to preserve and not at protecting the rest of the world from money laundering.
Richard Gordon, the director of the Financial Integrity Institute at Case Western Reserve University, points out that what the FATF endeavours to measure is not results but the processes that are in place to detect and deal with money laundering. None of the measures takes account of political concentration or a lack of independence of the judiciary. They would not serve to protect external countries from a threat posed by money laundering to fund terrorism.
Terrorism comes in many shapes. Russia is known to like to interfere with electoral processes, both in the US—where sanctions are now being imposed on it because of that—and in the UK, where its interference in our elections and our referendums is now clear. That interference is funded by money laundering. Does the Minister think that the FATF list should be the one on which we place such reliance, or should we go further with our new-found independence and construct our own list?
6.05 pm