I thank noble Lords for their valuable contributions to this short debate. The points that we have been discussing
today highlight that these regulations will ensure that the United Kingdom can comply with the provisions of the protocol agreed between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Japan. The amendment ensures that the protocol is captured under the Office for Nuclear Regulation’s statutory purpose: to ensure compliance by the UK with relevant international agreements, and that operators provide information on qualifying nuclear material or other relevant items to the Secretary of State.
In response to the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, and my noble friend Lord Trenchard regarding the Government’s commitment to minimising cost and bureaucracy, I must emphasise that a number of requirements already existed through the agreements between the UK and Japan which this protocol amends. Under the new regime, operators are required to provide information on nuclear material to the Office for Nuclear Regulation and information on non-nuclear material and equipment to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. There is no requirement to provide information to Euratom. We therefore expect the administration costs associated with implementing new requirements under the protocol to be very low.
My noble friend Lord Trenchard also asked whether co-operation with Japan in civil nuclear is more important than ever, and whether it is important to have major investors in our nuclear energy projects from countries whose security and defence interests are aligned with our own. Japan is a significant strategic partner for the UK and we regularly discuss a range of issues, including nuclear energy. Both countries collaborate in areas of nuclear regulation, research and development, decommissioning and advanced nuclear technology development—although it would not be appropriate to comment on the detail of these discussions. As Japan requires a nuclear co-operation agreement with countries before it will conduct nuclear trade with them, the protocol in this secondary instrument is an important enabler of co-operation between the UK and Japan on any future nuclear projects.
Both noble Lords mentioned the Wylfa project. We recognise that Hitachi’s decision to pull out of the proposed project at Wylfa and wind up Horizon Nuclear Power was disappointing for local communities, and personally for me as the spokesperson for Wales. Ultimately, though, these were commercial decisions, and the future of the site is a matter for Hitachi. However, as my noble friend Lord Trenchard rightly pointed out, the energy White Paper is clear that nuclear remains an important part of the UK’s energy mix. We have committed to at least one more 1 gigawatt power plant and we will continue to discuss new projects with other viable companies and investors wishing to develop sites, including the one in north Wales. The civil nuclear sector continues to be of key strategic importance to the UK and we welcome foreign investment in our infrastructure, subject to thorough scrutiny and the need to satisfy our robust legal, regulatory and national security requirements. I point my noble friend to the National Security and Investment Bill that is going through the House this week.
In relation to the question on high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, in 2019 the UK and Japan signed a memorandum of co-operation on energy innovation. This is the beginning of discussions on what the UK-Japan collaboration on advanced nuclear might look like. The joint NNL and JAEA report was published in October 2020 to provide a technical basis to establish and agree the next phase of collaboration, which will be welcome.
In response to my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering, I will say that the UK Government are considering NCAs with other countries. We cannot comment on any ongoing negotiations, but we are of course keen to put in place NCAs with any country where such an agreement would be mutually beneficial. All the NCAs that the UK has in place are operable and we review them regularly.
With reference to the change in the UK’s overall weapons stockpile, the UK Government have consistently stated that we will both keep our nuclear posture under constant review, in light of the international security environment and the actions of potential adversaries, and maintain the minimum destructive power needed to guarantee that the UK’s nuclear deterrent remains credible and effective against the range of state nuclear threats from any direction. We regret that the security environment has necessitated this change, but we must recognise that the security situation has worsened since the previous Government’s declaration of their intended nuclear warhead stockpile ceiling in 2010, since when we have seen an increase in nuclear challenges. Against this backdrop, the UK must ensure that its nuclear deterrent remains credible and effective against the full range of state nuclear threats from any direction.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, for his question about the interests of the IAEA in relation to this SI. The IAEA seeks to promote the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technologies. The nuclear co-operation agreement between the UK and Japan seeks to do the same. As a former chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, I am sure that IAEA director-general Grossi will be pleased to see that we have brought our agreement up to date and in line with NSG guidelines.
To close, I will underline that the protocol, and by extension these regulations, reaffirm the importance that the Government place on ongoing co-operation with the UK’s international partners in the civil nuclear sector. It highlights the continued value we place on mutually beneficial co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I commend these regulations to the Committee.