My Lords, I start by commending the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, because she spotted something that nobody else noticed
on Monday evening, which is that I spoke in response to this amendment, but the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, had not moved it at all. That might be why I sounded as if I had prejudged a bit. I will reiterate some points on this occasion, but I apologise for being a bit previous with my comments.
As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said, Amendment 171 addresses the so-called carers’ defence within the controlling or coercive behaviour offence. Subsections (8) to (10) of Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 allow for this limited “best interests” defence, where the accused can demonstrate that they were acting in the best interests of the victim. The defence is not available in situations where the victim fears that violence will be used against them. I must be clear on that. For this defence to apply, the accused would also need to demonstrate to the court that their behaviour was reasonable in all the circumstances.
The defence was designed to cover cases where the accused is genuinely acting in the best interests of the victim. The first example that comes to my mind is a situation where the accused is looking after an elderly partner or parent with Alzheimer’s disease and must ensure that that person does not leave the house for their own safety. In these circumstances, it is entirely possible that the accused’s behaviour, while it might be considered controlling in a different context, is reasonable given the nature of their caring responsibilities.
As we have heard today, proponents of this amendment fear that it may enable the abuse of disabled people. However, there is a real risk that, without such a defence—and bearing in mind the example that I have just given—a person may be wrongfully prosecuted for and convicted of controlling or coercive behaviour, when in fact they were acting in a person’s best interests.
Ultimately—and I am repeating my words from the other night—it is for courts and juries to decide merit on a case-by-case basis, whether or not the threshold for the defence has been met. It should also be noted that similar or equivalent offences in Scotland, such as Section 6 of the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, and the proposed new domestic abuse offence in Northern Ireland, in Clause 12 of the Domestic Abuse and Family Proceedings Bill, which has recently completed its passage through the Northern Ireland Assembly, also contain a similar defence.
I hope that, in the light of my explanation—for the second time—of the necessity of this defence, the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.