My Lords, I do not know whether the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, was intending not to speak to her next amendment, which is grouped with this one, but perhaps I will, though it will not be as good a speech as she would have made.
This is another group of amendments that I would say seeks to apply up-to-date thinking to bring the law up to date. I am pleased to have been able to add my name to the noble Baroness’s amendments because I always want to be on the same side as she is; I think her middle name must be “Indefatigable”.
Parliamentarians learn from experts by experience. I think we have used that phrase already today. That does not mean being uncritical or bringing a hearts-and-flowers sentimental approach to things but being open to really listening to experiences. We are lucky to have in this House experts with another sort of experience—the lived experience of applying professional expertise in acting for clients—so they have a well-informed perspective. Clearly, the Minister who will be replying—he is not being given much time off today—to yet another group of amendments has been applying his own expertise as well as having his brief. It has been very refreshing to listen to him.
Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, which would be amended by Amendment 139 is—it says so in terms—intended to clarify the operation of the common law defences of self-defence and defence of property. Those two were very closely linked in the minds of the public in the reaction to reports of Englishman Tony Martin defending his castle. This brought about the householder defence but it is, in fact, just about self-defence, and so is this amendment, although one might substitute the notion of home as a haven rather than as a castle, as it was referred to in the Martin case. The amendment uses Section 76 to address whether the degree of force is reasonable in the circumstances but—or maybe “and”, as in the householder case—does not allow force which is “grossly disproportionate” in the circumstances as the person using the force believes them to be. This is why this is so much a matter of bringing the law into line with up-to-date thinking about domestic abuse, in particular coercive and controlling behaviour.
We have already debated, and will go on to debate in other amendments, the impact of such abuse on the whole person. It is a traumatic response that goes far deeper than a black eye “because I walked into a door, silly me”. I am not going to repeat the amendments and arguments that we have already heard today, because noble Lords will hear them in the context of the days of debate—we have had several days of debate—on this issue. My relative brevity on this amendment does not mean that I support it any less strongly.
I turn to Amendments 140 and 145. Amendment 145 is very long but is, if you like, consequential on Amendment 140. This is modelled on the statutory defence in the Modern Slavery Act, which recognises that a perpetrator may actually be a victim of modern slavery. In this amendment, the compulsion to commit offences is attributable to being a victim of domestic abuse and having no reasonable alternative. The provisions are adjusted for those under 18. Similarly, this amendment uses up-to-date thinking about what drives a woman—it is usually a woman—to offend. I cannot read my writing. I have written “significant”—I hope I am not leaving out a significant point.
The Modern Slavery Act defence was in the independent review of the Act, whose findings were accepted by the Government as striking the right balance between protecting victims and, in that case, preventing opportunistic misuse. There was careful consideration of the reported difficulties in disproving the defence to the criminal standard, but the review panel was satisfied that the jury system which applied was appropriate. The Government said they would keep this under review, as they should.
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The review highlighted in the case of children, although I think this goes wider, the importance of understanding indicators of slavery—in this case indicators of abuse—and of training and guidance for judges and magistrates, as well as for defence lawyers, another matter we have debated today. It is just the same for domestic abuse. In technical terms, this statutory defence has to be raised, and should be raised at the earliest opportunity. That requires careful understanding and application of the defence—not something that can be left to come out in the wash of a case, as it were.
Both these issues are about perpetrators really being victims. I am delighted to support them.