We have, as the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull, said, four amendments in this group. Amendment 31 provides that the domestic abuse commissioner may report to Parliament on any matter relating to domestic abuse, rather than to the Secretary of State. Amendment 45 provides for the commissioner to make an annual report to Parliament, once again instead of the Secretary of State.
The Bill states that the Secretary of State may direct the commissioner to omit material from a report if they believe that it may jeopardise a person’s safety or prejudice ongoing criminal proceedings. Amendments 32 and 48 would remove that power and instead provide that the commissioner must ensure that a report does not include any details that would jeopardise a person’s safety or prejudice ongoing criminal proceedings—surely something the commissioner should be capable of doing.
These amendments relate to the degree of independence that will be given to the domestic abuse commissioner. The Bill requires reports published by the commissioner to be submitted to the Secretary of State rather than Parliament and, in the case of reports other than the annual report, a draft to be sent to the Secretary of State beforehand. Our amendments seek to change that situation and, in so doing, enhance the independence of the domestic abuse commissioner.
Our amendments would significantly reduce the ability of the Home Office to amend or delay not only the commissioner’s reports, which they will be seeing beforehand in draft, but the commissioner’s work and activities, or otherwise apply undue pressure. Meanwhile, they would ensure the accountability of the commissioner to Parliament.
That independence from the Home Office is needed, and should be seen to be the case. One of the roles of the domestic abuse commissioner—and it is only one—in standing up for victims and survivors and raising public awareness will include considering the Government’s role and effectiveness in tackling domestic abuse. The key department concerned—although not the only one—will be the Home Office, with the policies it pursues relating to domestic abuse issues and their impact in relation to, for example, migrant women. The domestic abuse commissioner will also formulate policies and strategies, and this aspect needs to be seen to be beyond undue influence by government and officials.
The Commons Home Affairs Select Committee recommended that the domestic abuse commissioner report directly to Parliament. The Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill did not think the commissioner should be responsible to the Home Office and recommended a clear, direct accountability to Parliament as an assurance of the commissioner’s independence from government. The Joint Committee also proposes that the commissioner should be given power to appoint staff independently, albeit on Civil Service terms and conditions.
Both the Children’s Commissioner and the Victims’ Commissioner have said that greater independence for the domestic abuse commissioner is desirable, based on their experience. Witnesses before the Joint Committee on the draft Bill were unanimous that the commissioner would need to be demonstrably independent of government.
5 pm
There seems no reason why the specific issues on which the Secretary of State can direct the commissioner to omit material from a report should not be a responsibility that is given to the commissioner, as provided for in these amendments. As it is at the moment, if there is a difference of view between the Secretary of State and the commissioner over whether material in a report jeopardises a person’s safety or prejudices ongoing criminal proceedings, it would appear that the Secretary of State’s view prevails, rather than having any independent reviewer; that clearly could be a source of difficulty and friction.
Incidentally, the former anti-slavery commissioner, Kevin Hyland, has said that where such reports required prior approval by the Secretary of State, they had to go through a lengthy process of negotiation with, and modification by, officials, with the final report not necessarily fully representing his views. That is quite a sobering thought.
The Bill also provides for the Secretary of State to issue a framework document, which the Secretary of State can then revise. The framework document deals with matters relating to the commissioner, including matters relating to governance, funding and staffing, matters relating to the exercise of functions of the commissioner, and matters relating to scrutiny of the commissioner’s activities by Parliament. The commissioner is required to have regard to this document when exercising any of the commissioner’s functions.
I appreciate that the amendments to which I am speaking do not cover that particular aspect, but it is another issue concerning the independence of the commissioner. Those powers, in relation to the framework document, would seem to give the Secretary of State considerable influence over what the commissioner does and how it is done. While the Secretary of State cannot issue the framework document without the agreement of the commissioner, it is not clear what happens if there is a disagreement over its content—the commissioner and the Secretary of State are hardly equal parties if it does come to a disagreement.
In our view, all these considerations simply make the case for the objectives of the amendments to which I am speaking in relation to the independence of the
domestic abuse commissioner. The domestic abuse commissioner not only needs to be independent of government but needs to be seen to be independent of government. That is not what is provided for in this Bill as it stands.