Following two previous attempts spread over years, the Trade Bill seems finally to be making its way towards the statute book, perhaps by way of ping-pong. These amendments were described by the Minister as essentially technical housekeeping. I agree with him and certainly with the amendments, but perhaps it is appropriate that the final amendments we will discuss focus on inserting the Bill into the devolution settlement, as symbolised by the Scotland Act.
As the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, said, the Trade Bill is about setting Westminster’s role for the future, just as the internal market Bill did. I am pleased to hear about the legislative consent from Scotland and Wales, but in the past months these Benches have shown that we disagree with the way the Bill has avoided the effective involvement of Parliaments and Assemblies in the United Kingdom, taking a lot of power for the Executive.
But we have had those debates, and I will use this time to focus on some elements of the application the Trade Bill might enjoy. It is worth pointing out that the UK will be embarking on this so-called independent trade policy when the global trading environment is—how should I put it?—challenging. Even before the massive uncertainty of the global pandemic there were increasing trade tensions and a slowdown in the global economy.
Yet when I listen to the words coming from government mouths, I often hear echoes of British exceptionalism. Phrases such as “sovereign island nation”, when trotted out, seem to hark back to the 19th century. It is this backward view of the world that most disturbs me. I hear overtones that reflect the use of trade deals in a way that European nations did to compete for imperial domination in the 1800s.
At the heart of this is a total lack of understanding of the nature of modern global supply chains. Despite ministerial remonstrations when debating the Bill, it is impossible for me not to take the recent deals as examples of trade policy and how they are being applied. Of course, we could look at the rollover deals, but none of these has delivered anything material that we did not have before, so there is not much material there.
Then we come to the EU and UK deal. Clearly, there are substantial changes here that point to the direction we are travelling in. It is hard. It demonstrates this lack of understanding of how the flow of goods and services is facilitated by supply chains. Such flows are no longer maintained by access to the clipper ships of the East India Company, as this nostalgia seems to reflect, but nurtured by standards, people and data—three areas the EU trade agreement fails to enhance.
The role of shared standards and regulations is becoming only too apparent to our exporters struggling with serious border friction. Meanwhile, the lubricating
effect to trade of mobility frameworks and mutual recognition of skills has yet to impinge on the wider public. However, I believe the tone of the Government’s responses to amendments addressing these issues will ultimately be seen as foolish. Finally, there has been no progress on data flows. That problem has just started.
Christmas Eve was not the end of this story; it was one step in a long process of negotiation. There will be protracted and difficult discussions about implementing the provisions covering trade in goods. We are starting to see this. Then there are two key areas outstanding. The first is financial services. Talks on an equivalence deal are taking place over the next three months, but this will exclude core banking services such as lending, payments and deposit-taking. If the EU and the UK fail to secure agreement, the UK will be left with the task of negotiating separately with 27 member states.
Then, as I said, there is data adequacy. The EU Parliament has severe reservations regarding sharing data with the UK. There is great suspicion over the potential onward transfer of data to the USA. Overcoming these fears will require much more than the Prime Minister looking into the eyes of MEPs and saying, “Trust me”.
However these go, the EU and the UK will remain in low-level dispute on all sorts of issues far into the future. Through all this, the UK will have to calculate the impact of whatever is agreed with the EU on its efforts to conclude bilateral trade agreements with other countries.
I question how the Government will use the much-vaunted freedom that they and the Prime Minister parade. As my noble friend Lord Purvis indicated, the UK Government are already looking for opportunities to diverge from the EU to demonstrate the symbolic value of Brexit and perhaps to pursue what they see as an advantage. Yet each change, each extra difference adds new friction to the EU-UK trade border. For every action there stands a possible reaction and a cost. We will see as time goes on whether the UK trade machine has the depth and sophistication to walk these lines. The weekend leaks on the working time directive and the Chancellor’s “big bang 2” speech seem to indicate otherwise.
The Bill sets a framework for trade. The Executive have taken upon themselves such powers that they will have no one else to blame for the results.