My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 63, 65 and 80, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, in this group. They attempt to get to grips with the plethora of organisations that the Bill seeks to authorise to grant criminal conduct authorisations. I remind noble Lords that this is to grant legal immunity to covert human intelligence sources, informants or agents, and authorise them to commit acts that, under any other circumstances, would be a crime, but because these public authorities have said so, they are no longer crimes.
Unlike existing legislation that limits legal immunity to agents of the state engaged in property interference, intrusive surveillance, equipment interference and interception—all exclusively targeted on the most serious criminals and only with prior approval given by an investigative powers commissioner and often a Secretary
of State—this Bill seeks to give public authorities the power to grant immunity to anyone, often criminals, for almost any crime that can be imagined with no prior authorisation outside their own organisation. One would hope that the number of public authorities would therefore be extremely limited, and that evidence would be produced to justify their inclusion.
I am taken back to a recent statutory instrument—the Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2020—which added to the list of public authorities that can access communications data; that is, who contacted whom, from where, and when, but not the content of the communication. In the overall scheme of things, it is fairly low-level data. The Home Office had agreed to include more public authorities on the basis of detailed business cases submitted by each authority.
When I asked to see the business cases, I was told that I could, although the Home Office arranged for me to see them only 45 minutes before the statutory instrument was due to be approved on the Floor of the House. Will the Minister allow Members of this House to see the business cases that form the basis of the Home Office deciding which public authorities should be allowed to grant criminal conduct authorities, preferably not 45 minutes before we consider this issue on Report?
Our Amendment 63 would limit those public authorities that can grant CCAs to the police, the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office and the intelligence services, as it appears to us to be self-evident why these organisations may need to grant authority to agents or informants to commit crime. The other public authorities require justification, hence my request that noble Lords be able to see the business case justifying each of the other public authorities, albeit redacted and viewed in private.
Our Amendment 65 specifically singles out the Home Office, although it might be seen as a typical example—an example of a type of public authority—for further scrutiny. On the face of it, it sounds that, in theory, if not in practice, the Home Secretary could authorise a criminal to commit a crime and give that criminal legal immunity, whether directly or by ordering one of her officials to do so on her behalf. Giving power to politicians to authorise criminals to commit crime and to be able to grant those criminals immunity from prosecution, with no prior independent oversight, raises some worrying spectres.
Our Amendment 80 is consequential. At this stage, I will listen carefully to the concerns of other noble Lords and to the response from the Minister. I beg to move.