My Lords, the amendment in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, borrows much from other amendments tabled in Committee and on Report, and credit is due to the authors of those amendments.
This amendment has three purposes. The first is to take the OIM out of the CMA after six months and set it up independently, using the budget already allocated for that purpose. For appointments to the OIM the Secretary of State must consult and seek the consent of Scottish and Welsh Ministers and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland.
The second purpose is enabling, not compulsory. It is to allow the OIM to become the competent body to investigate harmful and distorted subsidies and subsidy races made by any Administration within the United Kingdom that relate to harm within the United Kingdom. This can happen only after public consultation about state aid provisions, which the Government have already said will take place, and requires the consent of the devolved Administrations. The OIM will also, subject to the devolved Administrations’ agreement, be empowered to make recommendations to the Secretary of State for changes to the tests for harmful subsidies, and to its powers and functions. Finally, there is to be a general review of the competence of the OIM between three and five years after Section 30 comes into force.
The changes, following the devolved Administrations’ agreement, can be brought about by affirmative regulation. Overall, the amendment solves the problem of the unsatisfactory location of the OIM in the CMA and gives a vision for the consensual evolution of the OIM in its investigations of subsidy effects.
We have already debated, in Committee and since, why the CMA is not the right body. The mismatch stems from three sources. First, the CMA is expert in matters that are reserved, not devolved. Secondly, the CMA deals largely with disturbances to the market caused by market participants, whether that be through anti-competitive activities such as cartels, or through market concentration—which is culturally very different from looking at the actions of Administrations as they affect markets in the context of devolution. Thirdly, the tie to BEIS does not make it neutrally positioned in how it is embedded, or perceived, no matter what its objectives may be.
To some extent this proposal follows the TRA precedent of setting up in one location and spinning off, utilising whatever preliminary work has been done. Furthermore, if there is to be a body to examine subsidies —and it is an ‘if’ that can develop in the light of experience—an independent OIM, specialising in the workings of devolution, would seem the right home. As required, I give notice that it is my intention to test the opinion of the House on this amendment. I beg to move.