My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and to have put my name to five of the six amendments in this group. The purpose of these amendments is to
preserve the potential for legitimate policy divergence that is inherent in the devolution settlement. That potential is squeezed out for the future, save in limited and inconsistent respects, by the non-discrimination and mutual recognition principles as they appear in the Bill.
The scheme of these amendments is to provide for derogations from the applicable market access principles, to be available on a consistent basis across Parts 1, 2 and 3 of the Bill. Such derogations would be safety valves against the pressures that build up when central and local interests clash—safety valves of the sort that the member states of the European Union were sensible enough to gives themselves in their treaties, and that exist in devolved, federal and confederal states all over the world. Their purpose is more than merely political. The exercise of devolved powers has, in the past, produced creative and positive results in fields ranging from the requirement of fire suppression systems to the sale of electric shock collars. Noble Lords drew attention in Committee to the potential for similar action in future, if not prevented by the Bill, from measures against obesity to bans on the sale of peat.
The amendments are not a recipe for pointless and obstructive barriers to trade, which I strongly agree are to be avoided, because the use of those exceptional powers would remain subject to strict statutory controls. If challenged, rationality and the absence of protectionist purpose would have to be demonstrated, much as when the Scottish Government were put through its paces on minimum alcohol pricing. Yes, there will be cases in which compliance has to be demonstrated in the courts. Who, if not the courts, can be the arbiter of whether public authorities, whether central or devolved, have exceeded the limits of their legal authority? Litigation is always an inconvenience, and I would not wish it on my best friend, but the universal fact that the scope of a legal power must, in the last resort, be determined by the courts is no sort of justification, I would suggest, for withholding or removing that power from the devolved Administrations.
As for cases that last 10 years, as a barrister I can only dream enviously of such a durable source of income. Urgent cases can be quickly resolved, and the major source of delay will be removed once we move outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Without its intervention, the time occupied by the Scottish case on minimum alcohol pricing —which delayed the introduction of that measure—would have been very much shorter.
The common frameworks incentivise consensus. Among their many advantages, therefore, is a likely reduction in recourse to litigation. So I welcome Amendment 1, which, if it remains in the Bill, will prioritise the common frameworks, and significantly narrow the circumstances in which the market access principles apply. For as long those principles remain in the Bill, it seems to me that something in the nature of these amendments is needed, if only and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, as a backstop. These amendments would diminish, in a controlled fashion, the crudely centralising force of the market access principles. They would also help to preserve the mutual respect between nations that the perpetuation of our union requires.
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