My Lords, I have given notice of my intention to oppose Clauses 29, 30 and 41 standing part. This is part of a full set of not stand part notices that signals concerns, in principle and to specifics, throughout Part 4 and Schedule 3. I will also probe what has been left unsaid about what the CMA or the OIM will do in total regarding the internal market. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for supporting my opposition to the clauses standing part. We have some common concerns, but we are not entirely in the same place. I will be interested to hear her response to some of the points I will make as the debate develops.
There are three parts to my concern. First, as I said at Second Reading, it seems odd to use the powerful investigatory might of the CMA—or a lookalike OIM—whose information-gathering powers, with accompanying enforcement and penalties for non-compliance, bear down on individuals and companies, but where the main purpose, from weighing up the clauses’ wording, is to advise administrations about their own and one another’s regulation, and not anything the companies themselves have caused. This is extraordinary.
Secondly, there are aspects in the Bill that relate to business activity. However, this is not articulated, except that businesses are presumably among those who could make a proposal to the CMA for it to undertake a review under Clause 31. I am left asking: what else is
happening that has not been said? Thirdly, there is the matter of making the CMA or the OIM properly representative of the four nations.
Overall, this seems an authoritarian, unexplained and unfinished state of affairs. The use of the CMA is a hangover from when Mrs May envisaged a corresponding body to the European Commission for all competition and state aid matters. State aid considerations have now dropped away to WTO-type considerations of distortive and harmful subsidies that will not be looked at by anyone; the Trade Remedies Authority might have to respond on incoming international complaints, but the domestic side is bare. That still leaves the market access principles to be enforced somewhere.
The Government’s response to the internal market consultation says that the expansion of the CMA’s remit will not position it as an enforcer. In a letter to my noble friend Lord Purvis after last Monday’s debate, the Minister confirmed that the OIM will provide expertise in scenarios where the economic impacts of particular regulations lead to disagreement between one or more administration, and that the non-binding assessments will ensure a technical underpinning to otherwise political discussions. Under the heading:
“On the Office for the Internal Market, disputes and governance”,
the letter to my noble friend Lord Purvis says:
“The Bill does not introduce new enforcement bodies, but instead relies on enforcement of regulatory compliance provisions in existing goods regulation to ensure that enforcement of regulatory compliance takes account of the opportunities offered by the market access principles of mutual recognition and non-discrimination”.
Does that mean that the CMA or the OIM will take account of the opportunities offered by market access principles? Does the CMA enforce the regulatory compliance provisions in existing goods regulation?
The impact assessment also mentions businesses and stakeholders. Page 29 says that stakeholders can “raise complaints” on internal market matters. This could arise by way of Clause 31 and seeking a review. However, the word “complaints” smacks of adjudication. It would be helpful if the Minister could explain whether that will be the case. Is it related to the mentioned regulatory compliance? How will that work?
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The impact assessment goes on to say:
“Any dispute resolution mechanism will be based on existing arrangements … However, these processes do not replace a potential court challenge; businesses and individuals might choose to enforce their rights in a court if a UKIM matter remains unresolved, potentially incurring substantial legal costs, time and effort.”
I do not dispute that the courts are a final point of recourse, but what is the implied prior process? Is it business disputes with national administrations, business on business, or both? Is this related to the CMA enforcing or underpinning compliance in goods regulation?
Those are some of the issues and questions that sit behind my opposition to the clauses, and behind my amendments. My Amendment 113 would delete the separate provision of the CMA being an adviser to the Secretary of State. Along with later amendments, this would avoid the suspicion that the body will become captured by the UK Government by both volume of work and physical location. If such a provision is kept
in, it must be available on equal terms to all nations. Indeed, that is what was promised on page 9 of the response to the internal market consultation.
Amendment 111 says that the CMA
“must not engage in dispute resolution.”
I tabled the amendment because I want to probe on the business side of things, as I have explained, who is doing the regulatory compliance with the market access add-on and where. What, if anything, has been or will be agreed with the devolved Administrations to enable this?
A great deal needs explaining, without which the powers provided later in this part are disproportionate and unjustified. Although this is early in our debate on this part of the Bill, I am prepared to return to this matter on Report.