I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for raising these important issues and facilitating this useful debate. I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in it.
On Amendment 2, regarding the exclusion of low-rise buildings from the fire safety order, the order places duties on the responsible person to protect those lawfully on the premises from the risk of fire. These duties include carrying out and maintaining an up-to-date fire risk assessment that is specific to their premises, and ensuring that they have taken suitable and sufficient measures to mitigate the potential risk of fire. That is a continuous process whereby emerging fire risks need to be kept under review as part of the fire risk assessment process. These duties apply to buildings within scope of the order. That includes all premises apart from those that are expressly excluded; domestic premises are one such category. The Bill clarifies that the fire safety order applies to the structure, external walls and flat entrance doors in multi-occupied residential buildings.
While I understand the intention behind my noble friend’s amendment, I am afraid I do not think it has quite the effect she intends. Domestic premises are already excluded from the scope of the order, so an amendment ensuring that they be excluded is not necessary. The buildings within which such premises sit are not excluded, in order to ensure that people living in such buildings have the protection they need to keep them safe. To exclude a category of buildings such as those less than five storeys high would remove that necessary protection.
Furthermore, it would be wrong to assume that the height of a building is the key determinant in its risk of fire, as has been noted. Certainly, it is a factor, but the potential risk is determined by many other factors that are nuanced and unique to each building. In that respect, I would like to refer to some of the fires we have witnessed since the tragic events at Grenfell Tower. In July 2018 a fire started on an external balcony on the third floor of the Orwell Building in West Hampstead, a six-storey block of flats. In September last year a fire destroyed a four-storey timber-framed block of flats in Worcester Park. Just a few months later, a fire spread via the high-pressure laminate coating on The Cube, a student accommodation block in Bolton. Mercifully, none of these fires resulted in casualties or fatalities, but clearly, they present lessons that need to be learned.
I am happy to put on record that the Government have no intention of excluding multi-occupied residential buildings of any height, including those that are low-rise, from the scope of the fire safety order. We will deliver on our commitment to strengthen the order as a proportionate legislative response to the risks of fire in high-rise residential buildings. However, we must also ensure that we do not discount the potential risk of fires in low-rise buildings. We must ensure that the responsible person continues to take a thorough approach when conducting their fire risk assessment.
Our fire safety consultation included proposals for implementing the legislative recommendations made by the Grenfell Tower inquiry’s phase one report. Most of these recommendations concerned creating prescriptive new duties for those responsible for high-rise
residential buildings, and in some instances, we have actually gone further than the inquiry’s recommendations. For example, we proposed in our consultation that responsible persons should provide information to their local fire and rescue services on the level of risk in the design and materials of the external wall structure and mitigating steps they have taken, which goes further than the inquiry recommended.
Noble Lords will be aware that the Government published the draft building safety Bill on 20 July. The proposed scope of the new regime in that Bill will apply to higher-risk buildings. On day one of that new regime, it will cover all multi-occupied residential buildings of 18 metres or more in height, or more than six storeys, whichever is reached first. The building safety Bill will allow a flexible legislative response to building safety risks as it will provide for the Secretary of State’s modifying the scope of the legislation and even changing the height threshold for multi-occupied residential buildings in order to bring them into the scope of the new regime as higher-risk buildings. For residential buildings outside the scope of the building safety Bill, the Housing Act 2004 will remain the primary means by which standards are enforced.
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I should also draw attention to the Building Safety Fund, through which the Government have made £1 billion available to fund the removal of unsafe non-aluminium composite material cladding. That is in addition to the £600 million we have already made available to ensure the remediation of unsafe ACM cladding. In developing the fund, the Government considered the view of experts, including Dame Judith Hackitt, who support its focus on buildings of 18 metres and above. Those experts recommended that we focus further public funding on remediating unsafe non-ACM cladding from high-rise residential buildings. Higher-rise buildings are the least likely to be evacuated safely in the event of a fire spreading via external cladding. There will be a small degree of flexibility in the fund to allow it to cover buildings that have been built just under the 18-metre threshold and which have similar fire safety strategies to those taller than 18 metres.
However, we do not expect that government funding to be the only means of remediating high-rise residential buildings with unsafe cladding systems. We expect a significant proportion of the remediation of unsafe non-ACM cladding on these buildings to be funded by those responsible for the original work, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, alluded to, through warranties or by building owners who are able to pay for remediation without passing on costs to leaseholders.
My noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lord Shinkwin raised powerful concerns about the impact that EWS1 forms are having on people selling their homes and those looking to buy homes. The Government share their concerns and are working with the industry to address this matter. The EWS1 form is not a governmental or regulatory requirement, nor is it a building safety certificate. It was developed as the industry’s preferred solution to support the valuation process for high-rise buildings above 18 metres, and that is all it was ever intended for. Not all lenders require an EWS1 form but the Government are aware
that other lenders are requesting such forms for lower-rise properties too. We do not support that blanket approach and are working with lenders to encourage a more proportionate approach and to reduce demands for them.
We are also working with professional bodies to see how we can increase capacity to carry out assessments where they are genuinely needed. In future, the building assurance certificate—provided for in the building safety Bill, not this Bill—and/or an up-to-date fire risk assessment following the clarification in this Bill should provide the reassurance that lenders are looking for in the EWS1 form.
I turn to my noble friend’s Amendments 20 and 21, concerning an impact assessment. The Government have published an impact assessment for this Bill; it can be found on the pages of the parliamentary website relating to the Bill, but if my noble friend would find it useful, I would be happy to share that directly with her. We worked closely with the National Fire Chiefs Council, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and other interested parties in preparing that assessment. We have also published an impact assessment for the fire safety order consultation and will conduct a final impact assessment before laying secondary legislation to bring about any changes to the order.
Government analysts used the most accurate data and assumptions available to them at the time to assess the potential impacts of the Fire Safety Bill. While I understand my noble friend’s desire to undertake further assessment, government analysts are already committed to a final impact assessment for the regulations before laying them before your Lordships’ House and the other place. Each of these assessments is informed by further engagement with those directly affected, and improved data and assumptions.
I turn to the aspect of the amendment which seeks for the Government to produce an impact assessment if changes are made to the fire safety order with regard to the premises to which it applies in future. The Bill already creates a duty on the Government to consult relevant parties should changes need to be made to the fire safety order relating to the premises to which it applies—that is in Clause 2(5). As part of this consultation —indeed, as part of the policy-making process—there is an expectation on the Government to carry out an impact assessment. Therefore, we do not think that it would be practical or necessary for that to be enshrined in law.
Finally, I turn to the aspect of the amendment that would require Welsh Ministers to produce an impact assessment under these circumstances. Although the Welsh Government and the Senedd fully support the Bill—indeed, they approved it unanimously—fire safety is, as noble Lords know, a devolved matter. It is possible for Parliament to legislate for Wales on a devolved matter only if the Senedd Cymru consents. It would also be inappropriate for your Lordships’ House to seek to instruct Welsh Ministers on how to exercise their functions. That is properly a matter for the Senedd.
My noble friend asked me three questions. I have alluded to some already and we will touch on others in later amendments. However, on the three points that
she raised, all buildings should be assessed when this Bill becomes, as we hope, an Act of Parliament. We are proposing the use of a risk operating model developed by the sector to target the buildings that should be prioritised. Height is not the only factor in that model; it looks at a range of risks.
On her second question, the task and finish group recommended a risk-based prioritisation of buildings, which generally means that high-rise buildings will be the first up, but low rise is not always low risk, as the recent fires to which I have alluded prove. The responsible person can undertake the risk assessment if they have the skills and competence, but for complex buildings they should seek professional advice.
On my noble friend’s third question, one reason for the risk-based prioritisation is that we are mindful that, as she notes, there are not enough fire engineers, and we want them to focus on higher-risk buildings. The Government are working with the industry in a number of ways and have a number of workstreams in train that are actively seeking to address these issues. For instance, we have been working with the fire risk assessment sector to develop a clear plan to increase its capacity and capability. In addition, we are funding the British Standards Institution to develop technical guidance to support professionals to make an assessment of the fire risk posed by external wall systems. This guidance will support the industry to increase the skills of more professionals to take on this work and improve the quality and consistency of the assessments.
I hope I have reassured my noble friend that the Government will ensure that suitable and appropriate fire safety measures are in place for low-rise buildings. I also hope that I have reassured her of our position regarding impact assessments and why we consider these amendments unnecessary. If I have, I hope that she will see fit to withdraw her amendment.