My Lords, I, too, welcome our maiden speakers.
Like many noble Lords, I find that the conclusions of the Constitution Committee, the European Union Committee and the DPRRC chime with my own concerns about the Bill. I concur with the many magnificent speeches today, led by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, about the rule of law. My humble offering is that the Government have made their bed, must lie in it and must use internationally respected ways to work with it to best advantage.
Regrettably, the theme throughout the Bill seems not to be about working with things but a rush to legislate around primitive principles, lacking the refinements of consultation, consent or even continuity concerning devolution. Really, the question is why. The Bill seems designed to upset. Is it part of the “revolution by disruption” plan, or was it thought that boxes needed ticking right now?
The UK internal market must be taken seriously, but why is there not time to stand still and work intergovernmentally and then legislate where needed, without recourse to Henry VIII clauses to make up for not yet really knowing what to do? The powers in the Bill are a land grab, taking the soul, if not the territory, of the devolved nations as well as sidelining Parliament, allowing anything to be changed by regulation.
I want to make points about the CMA and whether it is the right body and construction to be the embryonic unelected guardian of the single market. Paragraph 35 of the Constitution Committee’s report says it all. Why choose the CMA? Why not establish a properly independent body representing all four nations? Further, the input tenets in the EU lookalike texts of mutual
recognition and non-discrimination have neither been agreed by all nations, via the frameworks or otherwise, nor maintain the degree of flexibility and subsidiarity that already exists in the UK.
The CMA itself is sponsored by a Government ministry and all the appointments are still governed by the Secretary of State—despite, for the OIM side, after consulting the devolved authorities. But this is a serious question: why the hermetically sealed and secretive CMA inquiry panel process? I understand it for matters of competition where commercially confidential information is considered and policy is well developed, but for the internal market it will be a matter of public interest and constitutional development. That surely should not be secretive. It will not be simply technical analysis. That leads to overbearing harmonisation; how often have we fought the EU over that?
Analysing the UK internal market must encompass subsidiarity and degree, at least once that has been properly agreed. Does the CMA have that expertise? Surely the evidence, procedures and reasoning need to be seen and, if I may say so, be robust enough to withstand public scrutiny. The Minister has already twice referenced the support of what are, in the end, relatively few of the total of UK businesses. Even within the unsuitable structure, unsuitably appointed, a minimum task group of three is too small and exclusive. Why should it be potentially smaller than the minimum number of judges sitting in the Supreme Court? Are panellists so superior? For such a constitutionally important matter, this all needs a rework.