My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for his comprehensive introduction to this group of amendments, particularly those that he is supporting.
We are minus at least four noble Lords from this debate because of the clash with the other Bill. I have certainly made my view known to the usual channels in the next booth that we cannot continue to discuss this Bill in those circumstances because we will be missing too many people who have a stake in the Bill and amendments down. I cannot imagine what the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, is saying to his own Benches about this—actually, I probably can, and it will not be polite, I suspect. He put his name down to this amendment
and, presumably, found out that he was not allowed to speak in both the Second Reading debate and in this Committee at the same time. I can see why that rule is there, but we are finding that this really does not work.
While the affirmative procedure offers nothing like the scrutiny given to a Bill, which typically goes through several substantive stages in each House and can be amended, we agree wholeheartedly with the DPRRC’s view that Clauses 1, 8 and 12 contain inappropriate delegations of power. We are where we are, and we therefore take the view that the affirmative procedure should apply. Amendment 134 provides for all regulations to be made subject to the draft affirmative procedure rather than the negative procedure and for urgent regulations to be subject to the made affirmative procedure rather than negative procedure.
Both the DPRR Committee and the Constitution Committee have expressed considerable concern at the inappropriate use of the negative procedure in this Bill. For example, Clause 2(1)(n) provides that regulations under Clause 1 may make provision about prohibitions relating to the supply of human medicines. Clause 42(9) provides for such regulations to be subject to the negative procedure. The explanation given for this in the memorandum, which I think I referred to in the very first debate in this Committee, is as follows:
“proposals to make changes to existing provisions, or to introduce new provisions enabling the supply, administration or prescribing of medicines are made to reflect shifts in best practice following extensive consideration and scrutiny by the relevant professional bodies.”
The DPRRC found this an unconvincing explanation. I probably do as well. It noted:
“It isn’t clear why consultation with relevant professional bodies lessens the requirement for scrutiny in Parliament. Indeed, if proposed changes are sufficiently important for there to be extensive consideration and scrutiny by professional bodies, this supports requiring the higher level of scrutiny in Parliament that the affirmative procedure affords. Furthermore, the prohibitions to which clause 2(1)(n) applies are sufficiently important that breach of them is a criminal offence (punishable, in the case of 4 of the 5 prohibitions, by imprisonment for up to two years). Even accepting the appropriateness of the delegation of powers in clause 1, we take the view that the affirmative procedure should apply. The consultation requirement imposed by clause 41 of the Bill is to be welcomed but we are concerned at consultation being presented as a substitute for Parliamentary scrutiny. On the contrary, if the exercise of the power is of sufficient importance to merit extensive consultation, it is of sufficient importance to warrant the higher level of Parliamentary scrutiny which the affirmative procedure affords.”
The committee also highlighted and raised concerns about Clause 9(1)(f), which provides that regulations under Clause 8 may make provision about the categories of person who may apply for veterinary medicines. The EM states:
“any proposals to make changes to existing powers or to introduce new powers for veterinary professionals to supply, administer or prescribe medicines will be subject to extensive consideration and scrutiny by professional bodies”.
Again, the committee found this unconvincing for the same reason, and took the view that the affirmative procedure still applies. I must say, I wholeheartedly agree with its assessment. As it says,
“if the exercise of the power is of sufficient importance to merit extensive consultation, it is of sufficient importance to warrant the higher level of Parliamentary scrutiny which the affirmative procedure affords.”
My amendment also addressed the egregious provisions of Clause 42 that provide that where any such regulation needs to be made urgently to protect the public from imminent risk of serious harm to health, the negative procedure applies instead. The Government’s justification for departing from the affirmative procedure was that:
“It is appropriate for regulations made in these circumstances to be subject to the negative resolution so that they can come into force immediately and provide an efficient means of addressing an imminent serious public health risk. We expect that such regulations would only need to be in place for a very short period of time, potentially shorter than it would take to schedule and hold debates”.
This is wholly inadequate.
The DPRRC stated:
“We are wholly dissatisfied by departments repeatedly arguing for powers otherwise subject to the affirmative procedure to be subject to the negative procedure where there is a need to act quickly, and seeking to justify this without acknowledging the existence of the made affirmative procedure … Even accepting the appropriateness of the delegation of powers in clauses 1 and 12, if the affirmative procedure provides the appropriate level of Parliamentary scrutiny for regulations made in reliance on clauses 6 or 15 in non-urgent cases then, in the absence of cogent reasons for the negative procedure to apply in urgent cases, we take the view that the made affirmative procedure should apply in urgent cases.”
The Constitution Committee concurred, recommending that
“the emergency powers in this Bill are subject to the made affirmative procedure, rather than the negative procedure, such that Parliament is required actively to approve them.”
The Minister will be well aware that regulations under the “made affirmative” procedure can be made and laid as expeditiously as can regulations subject to the negative procedure. They can also be laid during a parliamentary recess, unlike draft affirmative instruments. Quite frankly, it is insulting that the Government have the gall to argue for emergency powers to be subject to less scrutiny under the negative procedure, especially in the current climate when hundreds of emergency regulations have been introduced with considerable haste using the “made affirmative” procedure. Can the Minister say how this dereliction ever made it into the Bill, never mind through the Commons? I imagine that the Minister might be quite embarrassed to put her name to the Bill, which is perhaps why the Government have introduced Amendment 133 at the 11th hour.
I also speak in support of the super-affirmative amendments in the name of the Lord, Lord Sharkey. They are supported by Members across the House—including my noble friend Lady Andrews who is not here to give her support although she is extremely enthusiastic about this amendment.
Given that this is a skeleton Bill, the use of the super-affirmative procedure seems a sensible and proportionate mechanism. In this case, it would allow relevant parliamentary committees, in consultation with stakeholders, opportunities to comment on proposals for secondary legislation and to recommend amendments before orders for affirmative approval are brought forward in their final form. It has been used effectively by Governments of all colours, who recognise that it allows them flexibility when they need to bring forward regulations, while consultation and scrutiny happen before any amendments come to the House by affirmative resolution.
That is particularly important given that many areas in which we expect regulations to be laid, ranging from life sciences and clinical trials to hub and spoke pharmaceutical models, could make the contents of the SIs—and, in the absence of policy details in the Bill, even examples of draft regulation that have been published in respect of other Brexit legislation—controversial. I hope that the Minister recognises the merit of this proposal.