My Lords, we come to the last group of amendments in Committee. It is my privilege to move Amendment 92. It may be last, but it is not least: it is of considerable importance to our future trade relationships. It concerns the provisions of the unilateral scheme of preferences, as it is referred to. It might be referred to as the generalised scheme of preferences to bring it into line with the naming of the scheme under the European Union. Noble Lords will recall that the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018 made statutory provision for the granting of unilateral preferences to eligible developing countries and least developed countries.
The structure of the provision in that Act is such that it would enable us to replicate what has been until now, and will be until the end of this year, the European Union’s generalised scheme of preferences. We have been reminded during the debates that the European Union scheme consists essentially of a generalised scheme of preferences, which grants for a wide range of products the absence of tariffs or a reduction in tariffs; and a generalised scheme of preferences-plus, which, by virtue of adherence of these least developed countries, and sometimes, I think, low-income countries, to 27 international conventions, including those on labour rights, environmental protections, human rights and good governance provision, gives them access to essentially a zero-tariff arrangement. In addition to that, for the least developed countries, there is what is
known as Everything But Arms, which is in fact everything but arms and ammunition—a zero-tariff commitment for all their products apart from arms and ammunition.
The European Union scheme that we are presently part of was reviewed in 2018. In the early part of this year, the European Commission undertook a consultation to which responses were received and it closed in June. I do not know that more has been said about the further revision of the European Union’s regulations, which I suspect would not come into effect until the end of 2023, when the current scheme expires. So, to an extent, although we might replicate the European Union’s generalised scheme of preferences to begin with, from the outset we will have our own scheme and diverge from that scheme. I have no problem with that; my point is about how we go about this process.
The Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act says that Ministers may make regulations. Section 10 of that Act gives Ministers the power to make regulations for the purposes of the unilateral preferences. Section 32 determines which of those regulation-making powers is to be exercised by reference to the negative or affirmative procedure. In this instance, it is all by the negative procedure. The first part of Amendment 92 is to change that, but not to make all regulations relating to the unilateral scheme of preferences affirmative—there will be a lot of such potential regulations. It is one of those areas where, rightly, Ministers do not want to burden the House with a constant stream of regulations.
However, as is the case for the global tariff, where Ministers put into that Act provisions whereby the first regulations made in relation to Section 32 would be subject to the affirmative procedure, this amendment would provide that the first regulations made for the unilateral scheme of preferences, our GSP, would also be subject to an affirmative procedure. I hope that those regulations will be made by the end of this year because we need them to be in place by then. If that is not the case, it would be immensely disappointing and could lead to considerable dislocation.
The second part of the amendment relates to the question of whether, when the Government make the regulations, Ministers have the power to disapply, suspend or withdraw the unilateral preferences when a country or territory is responsible for significant human rights abuses. This is not an idle point. On 12 August this year, the European Commission suspended GSP access for Cambodia, which will affect some 20% of its exports to the European Union, on the grounds of significant human rights abuses in that country. About three weeks ago, the European Parliament passed a resolution—not obligatory but a substantial expression of European opinion—suggesting that there should likewise be a withdrawal or suspension of preferences in relation to the Philippines by virtue of that country’s human rights abuses and lack of good governance. That was not responded to well by that country’s regime.
These are not idle points and potentially are issues on which we would have to make our own decisions. This Parliament has for decades not been used to taking decisions about such trade preferences and their relationship with developing countries. I am pleased
that we will have that opportunity; it is one of the few effects of Brexit that would be positive, whereby we can positively influence developing countries through our trade preferences.
Interestingly, only today, the UK Trade Policy Observatory from the University of Sussex posted a blog stating that it was worried that the unilateral scheme of preferences will not compensate many developing countries for loss of their competitiveness in the United Kingdom market because our global tariff reduces tariffs on a most-favoured nation basis. That is part of a liberalising process and I do not object to our overall reduction in tariffs, which is not large in scale. However, it reduces the preferential margin for the unilateral scheme of preferences. Therefore, countries that benefit from our preferential scheme will see less competitive advantage as compared to many other countries that will be able to access our global tariff.
The TPO also said that difficulties are being experienced by low and low-to-middle income countries in relation to rules of origin, access to origination from those countries giving them access to the preferential scheme, certification and the like. This is one of those technical areas in which it will be important for us to make sure that the regulations are right in that respect, not least because there is a complex interrelationship between the free trade agreements that we are entering into and the origination of product from countries with unilateral preferences because they can use cumulation in relation to other countries and those countries with which we have a free trade agreement. Of course, we do not have free trade agreements with all the countries with which the European Union has such agreements. They might lose some of that potential for cumulation at the end of the year if we do not put all these provisions in place. Instanced in the TPO’s blog are Ghana and Kenya, which might thereby lose out. I shall not go down that path because I know that the noble Lord, Lord Chidgey, who was kind enough to co-sign the amendment, might want to talk about some of those effects in Africa, given his expertise. I am grateful to my co-signatories on the amendment.
4.45 pm
I hope that I have given an illustration of why the amendment is extremely important. Before the end of the year I want a substantive and, I hope, positive debate on the new regulations that will come into force from the beginning of next year and that we as a House, and potentially the other place, have an opportunity through an affirmative procedure to express our views about the future structure of these important regulations. I am looking for the following from my noble friend the Minister in his response. In relation to the first part of the amendment, I hope that Ministers will look at this matter and come back in a positive vein on Report, and that they will ensure that this House has an opportunity for a substantive debate on the preferential scheme before it is introduced next year. I hope that the second half of the amendment is unnecessary because Ministers will indeed make sure that the regulations give our Government the opportunity to take decisions about access to preferences in areas such as human rights abuses, similar to decisions made recently by the European Commission. I beg to move.