My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has already referred to the Henry VIII powers and questioned why they are repeated in this Bill when, to a large extent, they are available in the withdrawal Act. Amendment 22, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, gives us an opportunity to look at one part of that. It would delete the Henry VIII power contained on page 2, in paragraph (a) in line 27. That is a power to modify
“retained direct principal EU legislation or primary legislation that is retained EU law”.
That sounds rather obscure, but it is an opportunity to change significant standards, using Henry VIII powers to modify substantive primary legislation by means of statutory instruments. We all know what problems these powers present, as they are very topical at the moment. The powers can be exercised by UK Ministers or by Ministers in devolved Administrations, described as “appropriate authorities” in the clause. They put Ministers in the position that they probably have to worry a little less about what Parliament will think or do about what they are negotiating.
The Explanatory Notes say that this provision
“does not allow for regulations to make or extend criminal offences, charge fees, amend primary legislation other than retained EU law, or create new public bodies.”
The Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, raised this issue in the context of the previous Trade Bill, and pointed out:
“We are not persuaded by the Government’s position that it is sufficient for the power in clause 2 to be constrained presumptively
rather than explicitly. We recommend that the restrictions on the power be included in the text of the Bill.”
That is a perfectly reasonable request by the committee.
There is a context to it, or a context to our consideration of it. We have just been through a series of parliamentary rows and debates about the use of powers under the public health Act of 1984. I say the use—it was the fairly incompetent use of them, because every prosecution that relied on that legislation and orders made under it failed. Convictions were overturned because of confusion about the regulation-making power that the Act provided, and confusion about whether the individuals to which the provisions were applied could reasonably be expected to be infected or simply be put under these provisions for their own benefit, for which the legislation did not provide.
Continuity trade deals post Brexit are not the same as a pandemic, but they are surrounded by issues of urgency and claims of exceptional circumstances. It is in such contexts that powers of delegated legislation get abused or overused. When that happens, we ask why Parliament created such wide powers and why we allowed it in the first place. The answer usually is that it was by ignoring what the Delegated Powers Committee, the Statutory Instruments Committee or the Constitution Committee said at the time and relying on the fact that Governments will always do the right thing, won’t they? Well, Governments will not always do the right thing, sometimes for profoundly objectionable reasons and sometimes because they think that the need to get on with things overrides any of these considerations. There is a case for making the legislation clear on the limits on the use of power to repeal or modify existing primary legislation and that provision ought to be in the Bill. There is still time to put this right at Report.