My Lords, I have direct personal experience of this area of local government responsibilities. Following the tragedy at Grenfell, not only was I the leader of Newport City Council at that time but Newport was the only council in Wales that had social tenants in high-rise buildings covered in ACM cladding, and one of those tower blocks was in my ward.
The tragedy at Grenfell has prompted extensive inquiries, research and debate about the steps that might be needed to minimise the risk of such a tragedy happening again. Much of that has concentrated on the fabric and construction of high-rise residential buildings because the materials and techniques used in
constructing and renovating Grenfell Tower have been implicated in allowing the fire to spread so rapidly. That in turn will mean changes to the system of building control, which regulates how and with what materials buildings must be constructed.
I commend the actions in the Bill because I have first-hand experience of the benefits that can be secured when registered social landlords, such as Newport City Homes, act appropriately and respond to their responsibilities to manage and reduce the risk of fire in multi-occupied buildings. Within six months of the tragedy at Grenfell, the three tower blocks clad in ACM in Newport had sprinklers installed and, within a year, the work to remove and replace the ACM cladding had begun. This was achieved through pragmatic partnership working between the council, the housing association Newport City Homes, Senedd Cymru and South Wales Fire and Rescue Service.
Responsible landlords should already be conducting regular inspections of buildings with the local fire and rescue services, ensuring that evacuation plans are reviewed and regularly updated and personal evacuation plans are in place for residents, providing fire safety instructions to residents in a form that they can reasonably be expected to understand, and ensuring that the building complies with current standards. That is why I agree with the Fire Brigades Union that the Bill is the first—long overdue—piece of primary legislation that seeks to rectify the failures identified after the Grenfell Tower fire. The FBU has raised concerns with the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 since it was imposed. It is clear that many “responsible persons” who own and manage residential premises have not assessed the fire risks in their buildings, nor introduced sufficient measures to keep people safe in their homes.
It is the Welsh Government’s intention to bring forward a White Paper for consultation by the end of this current term and the analysis of this consultation will be available to inform any new Government bringing forward primary legislation in this vital area. These reforms build on the work set out by the Welsh Government’s Building Safety Expert Group in its report, A Road Map to Safer Buildings in Wales. The remit of the group was to identify the parameters of a Welsh response to the issues raised by Dame Judith Hackitt’s report, Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety.
In the immediate aftermath of Grenfell, the primary focus was on aluminium composite material—ACM—cladding systems, which had been implicated in the propagation of the fire. In Wales, we have made good progress in relation to remediation of buildings with ACM cladding. There were 15 buildings with non-compliant cladding, all of which have been remediated or have plans in place. We have been able to develop and maintain relationships with building owners and managing agents to ensure an open and honest dialogue about progress. No leaseholders will have to pay for remediation works in relation to ACM cladding. In addition, the Building Regulations 2010 have been amended to ban the use of all combustible cladding on residential buildings over 18 metres in height. The ban applies to combustible cladding on all new residential buildings and where renovation works take place, including
flats, student accommodation, care homes and hospitals over 18 metres high. The ban ensures that ACM and other potentially dangerous cladding cannot be used on tall buildings in the future.
The Welsh Government have worked closely with the Home Office on this Bill. It significantly expands the fire safety order’s coverage of blocks of flats, in particular to include the external walls and internal doors that were so clearly implicated in the spread of the Grenfell Tower fire. They have also been working with the social landlord sector through Community Housing Cymru to develop and trial work in relation to resident engagement and sharing of building safety information. Safety First in Housing intends to support those managing buildings to put in place helpful measures ahead of legislation that will allow genuine engagement with residents, and I urge the UK Government to follow this lead in resident engagement.
Newport City Homes had to take the original contractors of the cladding to adjudication to recover its costs to make the building safe. The reality is that flammable material should never have been put on the outside of buildings, and the contractors and developers who allowed this to happen should rectify matters.
The Welsh Government intend to take the opportunity to establish two new regulatory regimes for Wales. The proposed fire safety regime will build on the existing fire safety legislation and will cover all residential buildings containing more than one dwelling. That goes significantly further than the Home Office proposals for England. It intends to establish a new regime focused solely on fire safety in domestic dwellings, unlike the current fire legislation that blurs the focus of workplaces and residential buildings. The Welsh Government also intend to establish a building safety regime for purpose-built high-rise blocks of flats. This will incorporate the fire safety regime but will look across the whole life cycle of buildings, putting in place additional requirements on those designing and constructing high-rise residential buildings, all the way through to the way in which they are managed and maintained during occupation.
Dame Judith Hackitt’s review identified competence issues throughout the system. It found that there was no clear set of competence standards or expectations for many of the professionals involved in the design and construction of fire-safe buildings or the maintenance of fire safety in occupied buildings. Her recommendations apply across the UK. Building industry action to develop more robust approaches is welcome, in order to make the improvements necessary to ensure that competence is clearly embedded within the professions that make up the construction industry.
Dame Judith was clear that information, from inception to occupation, is key to overseeing the ongoing safety of buildings. It allows buildings to be constructed safely and managed appropriately when occupied. Her proposals for a “golden thread” of building information not only are the basis of the information and data required during the gateway process as buildings are designed and constructed but flow through to the occupation stage. The golden thread will be comprehensive and include full as-built plans, a construction control plan and a fire and emergency file, and culminate in
the safety case, which articulates how structural and fire risks will be managed and mitigated against. The safety case identifies the potential hazards in the building and considers how these might be reduced and mitigated against. The findings of these considerations should be recorded and acted upon. Evaluating and reviewing the success of mitigating actions should be monitored, and the processes of reviewing and assessing hazards undertaken on an ongoing basis. The golden thread is a live document—in effect, the user’s manual for the building.
Buildings must be designed and constructed in a way that ensures they are as safe as they can be. This is more than health and safety on a building site, and more than ensuring that there is fire-fighting equipment in an emergency. It is not only about ensuring that the design complies with building regulations safety requirements but that the intention is delivered in the finished product. This means making sure that safety features are properly installed in the right places, using the right materials and standards, by persons who are competent.
In conclusion, the Bill goes a good way to redressing the gaps in controls and provisions that led to the tragic loss of life at Grenfell Tower but I ask the Minister to ensure that no positive opportunity is overlooked when reviewing the steps available to get the Bill absolutely right for the future safety of our citizens, wherever they live in the UK, and to acknowledge and learn from the stronger steps that other Governments are putting in place for public safety.
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